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most important reason behind this
increase.  With more people working
in Kentucky compared to previous
years, the state’s per capita income
might continue to rise, which has
been a major policy goal of the
Patton administration.
Drs. Michael Clark and Ginny
Wilson of the Kentucky Legislative
Research Commission look at the recent reforms in health
insurance in Kentucky.  Reforms passed by the General
Assembly in 1994 strongly limited the ability of insurance
carriers to charge customers based upon their health
status.  They note that this caused some carriers to cease
operations in Kentucky, but they point out that later
reforms attempted to remedy the situation and have
stabilized the health insurance industry in the
Commonwealth.
Health care reform is the topic of the next article by
Drs. Eric C. Thompson, James H. Stoker, and Dan A. Black.
In the context of Kentucky’s recent legislation creating a
managed care system for the state’s Medicaid program,
they look at the effects of similar legislation in Tennessee.
They find that the Medicaid managed care program there
had a negligible impact on decreasing the number of
health care establishments as more patients were covered
by the program without a concurrent increase in program
expenditures.
In the final article, Steven N. Allen, a research
associate at the Center for Business and Economic
Research, looks at the use of computers and the Internet
at Kentucky businesses.  Using a recent survey of large
Kentucky businesses, he finds widespread use of
computers and the Internet at these businesses.  He also
shows that about 90 percent of Kentucky businesses in
the survey place some value on computer skills when they
are hiring new employees, but that relatively few
businesses have begun to use online commerce as part of
their sales strategies.
The past year was one of the most successful in recent
years for the Center for Business and Economic Research.
We conducted many projects for various clients, including
ones for the Kentucky Arts Council, the Kentucky
Department of Parks, and several others.  We also
completed a study on the potential effects of deregulation
in the Kentucky electric utility industry and conducted
Bank One’s annual survey of Central Kentucky businesses.
In the spring of 1999, we will be releasing a comprehensive
study of long-term trends in the Kentucky economy.  This
collaboration with the Kentucky Office of Financial
Management and Economic Analysis will provide a
needed look at the changing conditions of the Kentucky
economy over the past thirty years.  We anticipate
maintaining an active research program in the coming year
and look forward to challenging new projects.
The Center for Business and Economic Research
(CBER) is pleased to publish the 27th Kentucky Annual
Economic Report.  The Annual Report is one of the
important ways in which the Center fulfills its mission to
monitor and analyze the Kentucky economy.  The 1999
Report contains seven articles that provide state and
national economic forecasts and address many of the
major economic policy issues facing the Commonwealth.
In publishing this report, we draw on expertise from
the Gatton College of Business and Economics at the
University of Kentucky and continue the practice of
inviting members of Kentucky state government to
provide their insights on economic issues facing the state.
Our authors include seven faculty members and one
graduate student from the Department of Economics, one
research associate from the Center for Business and
Economic Research, and two economists from the
Kentucky Legislative Research Commission.  One of the
strengths of CBER is that we are able to bring together
some of the best economists in the state to work on our
research projects.
The first article contains forecasts for the Kentucky
economy for the next three years.  Dr. Eric C. Thompson,
CBER’s Associate Director, maintains and updates the
University of Kentucky State Econometric Model, which
produces these forecasts.  Dr. Thompson forecasts that
gross state product will average 2.4 percent in 1999 and
that Kentucky will add about 29,000 jobs in 1999.  Overall,
he forecasts that the Kentucky economy will be more
moderate in the coming year compared to 1998.
This year, we are pleased to include an overview of
the United States economy by Dr. Christopher J. Waller,
the recently named Gatton Chair in Macroeconomics and
Monetary Theory in the Department of Economics.  Dr.
Waller provides a summary of the strong yet volatile U.S.
economy we saw in 1998 and offers some predictions for
the coming year.  He predicts that the U.S. economy will
grow at a steady pace in 1999 although we may see slight
rises in the unemployment rate, inflation, and long-term
interest rates.
The other five articles consider economic policy and
business issues in Kentucky.  Dr. William H. Hoyt
examines one of the most debated issues in Kentucky in
recent years, the Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA).
He provides an evaluation of the KERA reforms and notes
that expenditures per student in Kentucky school districts,
one of the reform’s major goals, has become more equal
but that other measures, such as test scores, graduation
rates, and college attendance rates, have not gained
relative to other states.
My article with Sharon Kane examines why more
Kentuckians are working in recent years compared to a
decade ago.  Specifically, we document the substantial rise
in the female employment rate in Kentucky.  We conclude
that rising education levels of Kentuckians has been the
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Dr. Dan A. Black is Professor of Economics and Ashland Oil Research Fellow at the University
of Kentucky, and a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie-Mellon University Regional Census Data
Center.  He received his Ph.D. from Purdue University in 1983, at which time he joined the
University of Kentucky.  His research interests include labor economics and public policy.
His papers have appeared in academic journals such as the American Economic Review, the
Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Journal of Labor Economics.  He is co-author with Dr.
Mark Berger of a recent book on on-the-job training from the Upjohn Institute and is currently
examining the retirement decisions of American households with Mark Berger, Amitabh
Chandra, and Frank Scott.
Steven N. Allen is a research associate at the Center for Business and Economic Research at
the University of Kentucky.  Mr. Allen received a M.A. in economics in 1998 and a B.A. in
history in 1996, both from the University of Kentucky.  Since coming to the Center in 1995,
he has worked on a variety of applied economic projects in Kentucky, including studies of
the proposed Interstate 66 project, the economic impact of the arts in Kentucky, the
deregulation of the electric utility industry, and many other projects.  For the past three
years, he also has served as managing editor of the Kentucky Annual Economic Report.
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Quarterly Forecasts for the
Kentucky Economy, 1999 - 2001 ......................................................... 1
Eric C. Thompson
The Kentucky economy is forecast to see moderate growth from 1999 through 2001.  During 1999, growth is expected
to be slower for Kentucky and the United States compared to past years.  Real gross state product is forecast to grow at
a 2.4 percent rate in 1999, real total personal income is forecast to grow about 1.5 percent in each quarter of 1999, and
total population is forecast to grow about 0.7 percent in 1999.  Employment growth is forecast to average about 29,000
new jobs each year from 1999 to 2001, with the services sector leading the way with about 14,000 new jobs each year.
Retail trade employment growth is also forecast to be strong, adding about 9,800 jobs in 1999, while manufacturing
employment is forecast to increase by only about 500 jobs in 1999.  Strong growth in occupations is also forecast to
occur in services and marketing and sales occupations.
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The U.S. Economy in 1998: Uncharted Waters ............................... 13
Christopher J. Waller
The year 1998 saw many macroeconomic events not seen in more than two decades and in some cases not since the
Great Depression.  While most of these events were ‘good,’ such as federal government surpluses, low unemployment,
near zero inflation, and solid growth of national income, 1998 also produced a tremendous burst of volatility in asset
markets, record trade deficits, and perverse interest rate relationships.  This has made the Federal Reserve’s job of
navigating the U.S. economy much more complicated and uncertain.  While the outlook for next year is murky, the
economy should be able to avoid a recession and continue to grow at a respectable rate, although probably at a lower rate
than we have observed in the last couple of years.
Why Are More Kentuckians Working? ........................................... 37
Mark C. Berger and Sharon Kane
Kentucky’s female employment increased substantially from 1986 to 1996, from 44.5 percent in 1986 to 52.8 percent in
1996, a larger increase than seen nationwide.  At the same time, Kentucky’s male employment rate decreased from 68.0
percent to 65.8 percent during this period, while the U.S. rate stayed the same.  The most important factor behind the
increase in the female employment rate has been the increase in education among Kentucky females from 1986 to 1996,
as more education tends to lead to higher employment rates.  Also important was the change in industry structure and,
to a lesser extent, growth in gross state product and a decrease in average household size.  The analysis is less clear for
Kentucky males, but nationwide male employment rates have been falling over time.
An Evaluation of the Kentucky
Education Reform Act ........................................................................ 21
William H. Hoyt
The Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA) caused drastic changes in the way education is provided in Kentucky.
Because KERA attempted to equalize funding and dramatically alter the curriculum and governance of schools, it is
appropriate to see how effective the reforms have been in affecting spending and educational outcomes.  Comparisons of
measures before and after KERA show that it has equalized funding among school districts, with some districts gaining
substantially in their funding of students.  Teacher salaries and student/teacher ratios have also improved relative to
national averages since the introduction of KERA.  Educational outcomes have not improved, however.  There has been
no appreciable gain in test scores or graduation rates in Kentucky relative to other states, and there is no evidence that
KERA has increased college attendance rates of Kentucky high school graduates.
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Computer and Internet Usage at
Businesses in Kentucky ......................................................................61
Steven N. Allen
Virtually all businesses in Kentucky use computers in some way.  Many businesses are also beginning to use the
Internet as a communications medium and sales and marketing platform for their goods and services.  Results of a
recent survey of large Kentucky businesses show that almost 70 percent of businesses use the Internet for electronic
mail and information searches while smaller numbers use it for marketing and promotion of products and online
commerce.  Kentucky businesses also indicated that they place a good deal of importance on the computer skills of
prospective employees, even though many firms still provide computer and Internet training to their employees.  Finally,
most businesses using the Internet consider it a productive tool for their business.
Market Responses to Kentucky’s
Health Insurance Reforms ................................................................ 45
Michael Clark and Ginny Wilson
Health insurance reforms in Kentucky in 1994, 1996, and 1998 dramatically changed the nature of health insurance in
the state.  One part of the legislation limited the ability of insurance companies to charge different premiums based
upon individual characteristics such as age, gender, and health status.  Because all insured persons would then be
charged an average premium based upon the average health status of the entire group, those in better health may have
opted to drop their insurance because they would be paying a higher premium than otherwise.  Legislation passed by the
General Assembly again allowed insurance companies to segment their customers by health status but does not allow
them to deny coverage to high-risk people.
Medicaid Managed Care and the TennesseeHealth
Care Industry: Potential Implications For Kentucky .................... 55
Eric C. Thompson, James H. Stoker, and Dan A. Black
The 1998 Kentucky General Assembly passed legislation creating a managed care program for Kentucky Medicaid
recipients.  In 1994, Tennessee introduced a managed care program for its Medicaid recipients called TennCare.  The
Tennessee program expanded to cover thousands of additional patients without a concurrent increase in medical
expenditures.  This overall increase in cost may cause some counties to lose health care providers and facilities.  TennCare
appeared to cause a modest reduction in the number of health care facilities in Tennessee counties located on the border
of the state.  The analysis shows that about 1 in 34 border counties would have one fewer establishment in each health
care industry after TennCare, with losses more likely to occur in counties with smaller populations.  As Kentucky
moves to a similar managed care system, it seems that the effect of such a program on the number of health care
establishments is likely to be small.
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Quarterly Forecasts for the
Kentucky Economy, 1999 - 2001
Eric C. Thompson
Introduction
This article describes a forecast for the Kentucky
economy produced using the University of
Kentucky State Econometric Model.  The model,
developed in 1995, is used to make quarterly
forecasts of the state economy three years into the
future.  The forecasts are updated each quarter and
have significant sector and demographic detail.
Forecasts are made for many mining, construction,
manufacturing, retail, and service industries and
government at a detailed level.  Forecasts also are
presented for occupational groups.  Population
forecasts are made for five-year age groups for both
men and women.  Forecast results are presented
below for 20 manufacturing industries, two mining
industries, three service industries, and three levels
of government.  Quarterly forecasts are presented
below for 1999. Annual forecasts are presented for
1999, 2000, and 2001.
The Kentucky economy is forecast to experience
moderate growth from 1999 through 2001.  Growth
in gross state product, which is a measure of the
value of all of the state’s goods and services, is
forecast to average 2.2 percent per year over the
three-year period, while employment growth is
forecast to average 1.6 percent annually.  Future
growth in the Kentucky economy is expected to be
broad-based.  All major industry groups besides
manufacturing and mining are expected to add
employment from 1999 to 2001; however, nine of 20
specific manufacturing industries are expected to
add employment.  Finally, all nine occupational
groups are forecast to add jobs over the next three
years.
Moderate job growth is forecast to lead to wage
and salary income growth of 1.8 percent per year,
and a total income growth rate of 1.4 percent
annually.  Employment and income growth is
forecast to encourage net migration into Kentucky
and yield an expected increase in the state’s
population of 0.7 percent per year.  Overall, job
growth in Kentucky is forecast to exceed national
job growth, but population is forecast to grow slower
in Kentucky than in the United States as a whole.
The rate of growth in the Kentucky economy is
forecast to exceed slightly the national growth rate
(see the Appendix for a description of the national
forecast).  Faster growth is forecast for Kentucky
because the state is expected to experience only a
small job loss in its manufacturing sector, while
manufacturing jobs nationally are forecast to decline
sharply.  This relatively strong performance is
expected for Kentucky even though the state does
not have a large concentration of rapidly growing
national manufacturing industries, such as those in
computers and related industries.
Even the slightly faster growth forecast for
Kentucky can have important consequences for the
The Kentucky economy is forecast to see moderate growth from 1999 through 2001.  During
1999, growth is expected to be slower for Kentucky and the United States compared to past
years.  Real gross state product is forecast to grow at a 2.4 percent rate in 1999, real total
personal income is forecast to grow about 1.5 percent in each quarter of 1999, and total
population is forecast to grow about 0.7 percent in 1999.  Employment growth is forecast to
average about 29,000 new jobs each year from 1999 to 2001, with the service industry
leading the way with about 14,000 new jobs each year.  Retail trade employment growth is
also forecast to be strong, adding about 9,800 jobs in 1999, while manufacturing employment
is forecast to increase by only about 500 jobs in 1999.  Strong growth in occupations is also
forecast to occur in services and marketing and sales occupations.
The Kentucky Forecast
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economy.  To give one example, Kentucky’s annual
total employment growth rate is forecast to exceed
the national rate by 0.1 percent on average from 1999
through 2001.  This percentage difference translates
into 7,500 additional jobs for Kentucky over the three
years.
During 1998, both the Kentucky and national
economies grew at a strong rate.  Employment in
the Kentucky and national economies grew at a rate
of 2.2 percent per year.  To achieve this
growth rate, Kentucky added roughly
37,400 jobs in 1998, and this growth rate
in 1998 was the same as that in 1997.  These
figures for 1998 were based on actual
employment data from the first six months
of the year and estimated values for the
last six months.
The strong performance in the
Kentucky economy in 1998 was in part
due to a growing manufacturing sector.
Manufacturing employment increased by
1,700 jobs in Kentucky in 1998.  The more
rapidly growing manufacturing industries
in Kentucky in the past year included
wood and furniture products and plastic
products.  Coal mining employment did
not grow in Kentucky in 1998.
Other major industry groups posted
employment gains in 1998.  The services and retail
trade sectors accounted for the most job growth.  The
services industry is expected to have grown at a 3.1
percent rate and added 13,400 jobs in 1998.  Business
and health services led the way in service industry
growth.  The retail trade industry is expected to have
grown at a rapid 2.5 percent rate and added 8,400
jobs.  Modest job and income growth also led to
modest population growth.  Population in Kentucky
is estimated to have grown by 0.7 percent in
Kentucky during 1998.1   Real personal income is
estimated to have grown by 3.2 percent.
The 1999 forecast calls for a slowing of economic
growth both in Kentucky and the United States.  This
Recent Developments
The Next Year
is true for a range of measures, from real value-
added output, real personal income, and total
employment.  Growth rates are forecast to be quite
similar in Kentucky and the United States.
Real value-added output, or real gross state
product, is forecast to grow at a moderate 2.4 percent
rate in 1999.  Growth is forecast to be steady but
rising throughout the year, as shown in Figure 1.
Gross state product is forecast to grow at an annual
rate of 1.7 percent in the first quarter and 2.0 percent
in the second quarter before rising to 2.9 percent and
3.0 percent in the third and fourth quarters,
respectively.
Such steady growth is also evident in
employment forecasts for 1999.  Total employment
growth is forecast to reach an annual growth rate of
1.8 percent in the first quarter of 1999, 2.0 percent in
the second quarter, 1.2 percent in the third quarter,
and 3.0 percent in the fourth quarter.  Growth in
real total personal income is forecast to be somewhat
steadier.  Total personal income growth is forecast
to be around 1.5 percent in each of the four quarters
of 1999.  With consistent employment and income
growth, population growth is also expected to
continue in Kentucky in 1999.  Population is forecast
to increase by 28,300 persons during the year, or a
0.7 percent rate of growth.
Just as in previous years, the greatest growth
among industries in 1999 is forecast for services and
retail trade.  Service industry employment is forecast
to grow by 3.4 percent in 1999, adding a total of
Quarterly Forecasts for the Kentucky Economy, 1999 - 2001
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The Three-Year Forecast
15,000 jobs.  Business services,
growing at 6.1 percent, and
health services, growing at 2.6
percent, are forecast to add the
most new service jobs.  Retail
trade employment is forecast to
grow at 2.9 percent in 1999,
adding 9,800 new jobs.
The manufacturing industry
is expected to add only a few jobs
in Kentucky in 1999.
Manufacturing employment is
forecast to rise by 0.2 percent.
This translates into 500 net new
manufacturing jobs.  Transpor-
tation equipment, wood and
furniture products, paper
products, chemical products,
plastic products, and fabricated
metals are forecast to be the
strongest manufacturing industries in 1999.
Following the trend of the last decade, coal mining
employment is forecast to decline by roughly 2.3
percent in 1999, or by about 400 jobs.
Growth in the Kentucky economy is forecast to
decelerate further in 2000 and 2001, but overall
growth rates for the three-year period still will be
moderate.  Real gross state product is forecast to
grow by nearly 2.2 percent on average for the three
years.  Total employment is forecast to average 1.6
percent per year, and real total personal income is
forecast to grow by 1.4 percent on average.  Each of
these growth rates meets or exceeds national
forecasts.  Population growth in Kentucky is
expected to lag national growth.  The following three
sections discuss the growth of industries, income,
and population in more detail.
Gross state product (GSP), the measure of value-
added output, is a comprehensive measure of
economic activity which includes capital
consumption, profits, business tax payments, as well
as employment and earnings.  As a result, analysis
of gross state product data can sometimes lead to a
different perspective than analysis of a less
comprehensive measure, such as employment
growth.  In particular, while more rapid job growth
in services is evidence of the emerging service
economy, analysis of gross state product data
reiterates the crucial role which manufacturing and
other goods-producing industries play in the overall
economy.
Manufacturing and other goods-producing
industries (such as agriculture, mining, and
construction) continue to account for a substantial
share of gross state product.  Manufacturing
accounted for 26.7 percent of real gross state product
in the fourth quarter of 1998, while goods-producing
industries as a whole accounted for 36.7 percent.  The
remaining 63.3 percent of real gross state product
was divided among other industries.  For example,
retail and wholesale trade together accounted for
14.7 percent, and services accounted for 13.9 percent.
Manufacturing and other goods-producing
industries are forecast to account for an even larger
share of growth in Kentucky real GSP, portending
an even more important role in the economy in the
future.  As Figure 2 shows, manufacturing is forecast
to account for 34.5 percent of growth in real GSP
from 1999 through 2001.  Goods-producing
industries are forecast to account for 37.3 percent of
Gross State Product
and Employment
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growth in real GSP.  Growth in manufacturing,
mining, agriculture, and construction will be a
crucial engine for growth in the Kentucky economy
in years to come.
Figure 2 also shows the relative significance of
trade and services for growth in real gross state
product.  These industries are forecast to play a
significant but secondary role in real GSP growth.
Retail and wholesale trade are forecast to account
for 18.2 percent of real gross state product growth
from 1999 through 2001, while services are forecast
to account for 18.1 percent of growth.
Strong growth in real gross state product is
consistent with growing employment.  However, an
increase in real GSP does not guarantee that
employment also will increase.  Productivity, or real
GSP per worker, can grow rapidly enough in some
industries that total employment will decline even
as gross state product grows.  This trend is occurring
nationally in many goods-producing industries
(manufacturing, mining, and construction).  Figure
3 shows indices for employment in 1999 through
2001 compared to employment in the fourth quarter
of 1998.  As depicted, goods-producing employment
is forecast to decline slightly in the United States
from the fourth quarter of 1998 through the fourth
quarter of 2001.
Growth in real GSP in goods-producing
industries, however, is expected to lead to a slight
increase in employment in Kentucky.  As shown in
Figure 3, employment in goods-producing
industries is forecast to increase just slightly
throughout the three-year period.  Goods-producing
industries are forecast to grow on average by 0.1
percent per year.  Table 1 shows growth and growth
rates for gross state product for the next three years.
Nongoods-producing industries also are
forecast to grow more quickly in Kentucky than
nationally.  Figure 3 also shows growth indices for
nongoods-producing industries such as services,
retail trade, wholesale trade, and government in
Kentucky and the United States.  Non-goods-
producing industries in Kentucky consistently
outperform national averages.  The growth rate in
Kentucky is forecast to average 2.1 percent per year
compared to a 1.7 percent growth rate forecast for
the United States.
Quarterly Forecasts for the Kentucky Economy, 1999 - 2001
Indices of Employment Forecasts for Goods- and Nongoods-Producing Industries
in Kentucky and the U.S., 1999 - 2001
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Income growth in Kentucky is forecast to exceed
national growth over the next three years.  Figure 4
shows indices of real total personal income in
Kentucky and the United States.  Real income refers
to income which has been adjusted for inflation.
Real income growth in Kentucky is forecast to
slightly exceed growth in the United States, as
evident in Figure 4.
Growth rate forecasts for both Kentucky and the
United States are slower than the growth rates in
previous years.  This is occurring in part due to an
expected slowdown in employment growth over the
next few years as the labor force ages and begins to
grow more slowly.  The slowdown is also expected
due to flat or falling earnings from interest payments
and investment dividends, as interest rates fall and
stock market growth slows.
Faster total income growth in Kentucky is not
the result of faster population growth in the state.
Population in Kentucky is forecast to grow more
slowly than nationally over the three-year period.
Instead, faster income growth in Kentucky is the
result of faster income growth per person.  From
1999 through 2001, growth in real per capita, or per
person, income in Kentucky is forecast to average
0.7 percent in Kentucky compared to an average
growth of 0.5 percent nationally.  Kentucky’s more
rapid expansion is forecast to result in faster-rising
average incomes for residents.
Population growth in Kentucky has been steady
throughout the 1990s.2   Rising in-migration, reduced
outmigration, or both, have led to positive net
migration, which is the number of persons migrating
to Kentucky minus the number migrating out of the
state.
With more persons moving to the state than
leaving, population growth has exhibited the kind
of steady growth seen elsewhere in the nation (net
migration also is positive for the nation as a whole).
But population growth rates in the late 1990s have
slowed somewhat from the growth rates in the early
1990s.  From 1999 to 2001, Kentucky’s population is
forecast to grow by 0.7 percent annually compared
to 0.8 percent growth forecast for the nation.  This
figure translates into an average increase of 29,000
residents each year.  Of that total, 22,200 are due to
net migration.
This growth, however, is not forecast in all
population groups.  As nationally, Kentucky’s
forecast shows an aging population.  The number
Population
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Income
TABLE 1
Real Gross State Product (GSP) by Industry
in Kentucky, 1999 - 2001 (Seasonally Adjusted)
 Real GSP 1999 Quarterly Growth Annual Annual Averages
4th Q 1998 at an Annual Rate Growth Rate Growth Growth
Industry ($mil) 1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 1999 2000 2001 ($mil) Rate
Total $73,228.63 1.68% 2.00% 2.87% 2.96% 2.38% 2.18% 2.10% $1,661.10 2.22%
Agriculture 1,557.57 -7.49 -4.42 32.82 14.52 7.69 -6.03 3.08 22.37 1.58
Mining 2,642.49 0.38 -1.47 1.26 0.66 0.20 0.90 0.62 15.25 0.57
Construction 3,180.92 -0.15 0.27 0.05 0.34 0.13 0.06 0.79 10.40 0.33
Manufacturing 19,576.29 1.16 2.57 3.05 3.88 2.66 3.36 2.52 573.42 2.85
TCPU 7,611.20 3.24 3.09 2.96 3.23 3.13 2.91 2.80 231.07 2.95
Trade 10,733.33 3.60 3.06 3.14 2.98 3.19 2.39 2.64 302.26 2.74
FIRE 9,384.02 1.67 1.75 1.40 2.17 1.75 1.57 1.44 151.28 1.59
Services 10,177.88 2.88 2.94 2.88 2.92 2.90 2.82 2.91 301.46 2.88
Government 8,364.94 0.49 0.46 0.41 1.09 0.61 1.15 0.15 53.59 0.64
TCPU = Transportation, Communications, and Public Utilities FIRE = Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
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of persons ages 35 to 39 in Kentucky is forecast to
decline slightly over the next three years, and growth
is very modest in other young age groups as well.
At the same time, some older age groups should
grow rapidly.  In particular, population is forecast
to grow quickly among the older portions of the
labor force.  The population of 50 to 59 year-olds is
expected to grow by 3.2 percent per year from 1999
through 2001.  Population is also forecast to grow
quickly among the oldest portion of the population.
The number of persons over age 85 should grow by
4.7 percent per year over the next three years.
The moderate growth forecast for the Kentucky
economy is not the result of a consistent growth rate
among all industries or sources of income.  Rather,
many industries are growing much more rapidly
than total employment, while some manufacturing
and mining industries are not growing at all.  The
following sections examine growth in industries,
occupations, and sources of income.
Employment growth among Kentucky
industries varies substantially, but it is broad-based.
Most industries are adding employment, with the
exception of coal mining and selected
manufacturing industries.  As nationally, the
majority of job growth is forecast in retail trade and
services.
Total manufacturing employment is forecast to
decline at an average annual rate of 0.2 percent in
Kentucky from 1999 through 2001, which translates
to a loss of roughly 500 jobs per year.  Manufacturing
employment is forecast to grow by 0.2 percent in
1999, remain flat in 2000, and decline by 0.6 percent
in 2001.  The forecast slowdown over the three-year
period is in contrast to modest growth in the
manufacturing industry in Kentucky in recent years.
The forecast decline reflects a pessimistic forecast
for national manufacturing employment in the next
few years.  Indeed, Kentucky’s 0.2 percent job loss
actually compares favorably with the national
forecast of a 1.0 percent decline in manufacturing
employment each year.  Kentucky manufacturing
Indices of Real Total Personal Income Forecasts in Kentucky and
the U.S., 1999 - 2001
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Growth and Growth Rates for Nonfarm Employment in Kentucky by
Industry, 1999 - 2001 (Seasonally Adjusted)
TABLE 2
Quarterly Forecasts for the Kentucky Economy, 1999 - 2001
Employment 1 999 Quarterly Growth Annual Growth Average Annual Growth
Industry 4th Q 1998 1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 1999 2000 2001 Ky. Ky. % U.S. %
Total 1,767,143 1.80% 1.99% 1.17% 3.00% 1.99% 1.59% 1.29% 29,142 1.62% 1.49%
Goods-producing 421,618 -0.46% 0.59% 0.48% 0.82% 0.36% 0.09%-0.27% 256 0.06% -0.48%
Mining 22,272 -1.93 -3.18 -1.16 -1.56 -1.96 -1.67 -2.19 -424 -1.94 -2.48
Coal mining 18,550 -1.89 -3.90 -1.45 -1.78 -2.26 -1.75 -2.44 -390 -2.15        NA
Construction 85,187 0.51 1.90 1.03 3.40 1.70 1.02 1.50 1,216 1.41 0.36
Manufacturing 314,160 -0.61 0.50 0.45 0.29 0.16 -0.04 -0.62 -537 -0.17 -1.00
Food products 25,581 -6.39 -4.18 -1.00 -1.19 -3.22 -1.71 -2.20 -593 -2.37 -0.98
Tobacco 4,600 -1.41 -3.13 -3.71 -5.09 -3.34 -4.66 -4.75 -187 -4.25 -3.36
Textiles 4,824 1.51 5.46 4.25 4.80 4.00 4.12 1.77 164 3.29 -0.85
Apparel 23,293 1.52 0.66 -0.13 -2.31 -0.07 -0.25 -0.52 -65 -0.28 -2.76
Wood 14,759 -0.01 1.88 2.07 3.12 1.76 2.63 2.24 334 2.21 -0.08
Furniture 5,471 -2.42 8.34 9.56 9.81 6.20 1.99 -7.08 12 0.37 -1.15
Paper products 12,587 -0.22 0.73 1.32 1.98 0.95 1.51 1.52 169 1.33 -0.45
Printing and publishing 22,925 -1.62 -0.88 -1.83 -2.85 -1.80 -3.40 -4.10 -689 -3.10 -1.00
Chemicals 14,620 0.52 1.57 2.72 -0.25 1.13 -0.26 -1.27 -20 -0.13 -0.19
Petroleum and
coal refining 3,086 11.43 8.01 5.50 3.55 7.08 1.11 -0.65 78 2.51 -3.39
Rubber and
plastic products 20,457 1.94 3.52 5.67 2.86 3.49 2.83 2.48 618 2.93 -0.37
Leather products 961 0.49 -1.50 -0.87 -2.28 -1.04 -2.04 -3.06 -19 -2.05 -4.87
Stone, clay, and
glass products 11,422 0.63 2.12 -0.99 -1.22 0.12 -1.18 -0.81 -70 -0.62 -1.52
Primary metals  17,549 -0.11 1.64 1.18 0.21 0.73 -0.12 -0.18 25 0.14 -2.18
Fabricated metals 24,064 1.19 0.72 0.67 1.98 1.14 0.56 0.18 152 0.63 -0.87
Non-electric machinery 37,189 -3.55 0.97 -0.96 -0.75 -1.09 0.17 -0.86 -220 -0.59 -2.54
Electric machinery 25,068 -0.16 -0.72 -1.19 -1.05 -0.78 -1.76 -2.52 -416 -1.69 -4.49
Transportation
equipment 36,252 0.86 -0.77 0.39 3.60 1.01 0.91 0.63 311 0.85 -2.61
Instruments and
related products 4,591 -2.29 -1.99 -2.33 -2.02 -2.16 -1.66 -1.60 -81 -1.81 -3.12
Miscellaneous
manufacturing 4,860 -0.83 1.59 -4.92 -10.18 -3.69 -0.87 2.41 -36 -0.72 0.52
Nongoods-producing 1,334,690 2.56% 2.46% 1.40% 3.71% 2.53% 2.05% 1.76% 28,795 2.11% 1.73%
TCPU 102,263 1.89 1.55 1.28 1.85 1.64 1.16 0.92 1,284 1.24 0.94
Trade 422,869 2.76 2.38 2.54 2.44 2.53 1.54 1.74 8,344 1.94 1.73
Wholesale trade 86,359 0.92 1.20 1.44 1.18 1.19 -0.45 1.98 785 0.91 1.44
Retail trade 336,510 3.24 2.68 2.82 2.77 2.88 2.04 1.68 7,559 2.20 1.82
FIRE 70,957 0.40 0.82 0.80 0.97 0.75 1.13 1.15 724 1.01 1.67
Services 443,139 3.14 3.36 0.23 6.87 3.37 2.98 2.70 13,788 3.02 3.05
Business services 92,534 6.09 6.35 -1.58 14.14 6.10 4.89 3.91 4,824 4.97        NA
Health services 153,623 2.27 2.48 2.74 2.83 2.58 2.92 3.05 4,503 2.85 2.73
Government 295,461 2.16 1.93 1.71 2.14 1.98 1.89 0.78 4,655 1.55 1.58
Federal 38,053 1.71 0.97 0.39 -0.41 0.66 0.56 -1.46 -31 -0.08 -1.00
State and local 257,408 2.23 2.07 1.90 2.51 2.18 2.09 1.10 4,687 1.79 1.96
State 88,722 0.76 0.19 0.33 0.28 0.39 0.41 0.53 397 0.45        NA
Local 168,686 3.00 3.06 2.72 3.68 3.12 2.95 1.39 4,290 2.48        NA
TCPU = Transportation, Communications, and Public Utilities FIRE = Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
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is not expected to add employment in the next few
years but is forecast to continue to do much better
than the nation as a whole.
As is seen in Table 2, about one-half of the state’s
manufacturing industries are forecast to add jobs in
the next three years.  Specifically, just nine of the 20
manufacturing industries are forecast to grow.  Still,
this compares favorably with the national forecast,
where only one manufacturing industry is forecast
to grow.  The fastest rates of growth for Kentucky
manufacturing industries are forecast for plastic
products, wood products, and transportation
equipment.  The fastest rates of job loss are forecast
for tobacco products, leather products, instruments,
and electric machinery.
The construction industry in Kentucky is
forecast to grow by 1.4 percent per year over the
next three years.  Growth is forecast to be fastest in
1999.  Coal mining employment is forecast to decline
during each of the next three years.  It should be
noted, however, that the rate of decline in the coal
mining industry is expected to be small relative to
the substantial declines in the 1980s and early 1990s.
After declining by 1,400 jobs per year in the early
1990s, coal mining employment is forecast to decline
by only 400 jobs per year in 1999 through 2001.
As with manufacturing, non-goods producing
industries in Kentucky such as retail trade and
services are expected to outperform their national
counterparts in terms of jobs.  This result is not
surprising given the faster rate of income growth
expected for Kentucky.  As was seen in Figure 4,
income is forecast on average to grow 0.1 percent
faster in Kentucky than nationally.  Since demand
for industries like retail and services is largely driven
by local demand and incomes, faster-growing
incomes in Kentucky should lead all services and
trade industries to grow as fast or faster in Kentucky
than nationally.
A faster rate of growth is clearly seen in retail
employment.  Retail trade employment is forecast
to grow by 2.2 percent in Kentucky compared to 1.8
percent nationally over the next three years.
Meanwhile, government employment in Kentucky
is forecast to average 1.6 percent growth over the
next three years, the same rate as nationally.
Despite the much more rapid growth in retail
trade, some non-goods producing industries are
forecast to grow somewhat slower in Kentucky than
nationally.  Services employment is forecast to grow
by 3.0 percent per year in Kentucky compared to
Occupations
3.1 percent nationally.  The finance, insurance, and
real estate industry is forecast to grow by 1.0 percent
per year in Kentucky compared to 1.6 percent
nationally.
The forecast rate of employment growth of
services, however, still exceeds the rate of growth
forecast for retail trade employment.  The service
industry contains some of the fastest-growing
portions of the economy such as business services
and professional services.  A trend in business
towards outsourcing services rather than keeping
in-house staff continues to fuel rapid growth in
business and professional services.  Table 2 indicates
that business services are forecast to grow by 5.0
percent per year on average in 1999 through 2001.
It is also worth noting that the rate of health care
employment growth has moderated both in
Kentucky and nationally.  With efforts to reduce the
rate of growth in health care costs, health care
employment in Kentucky is forecast to grow at a 2.8
percent annual rate, still a strong rate of growth, but
below the average growth rate for services.
In summary, most trade and service industries
are forecast to grow about as fast or faster in
Kentucky than nationally.  This is consistent with
the slightly faster rate of income growth in the state.
The state also is forecast to benefit from a better
performing manufacturing sector than in the nation
as a whole .
These patterns in industry growth also are
evident in the pattern of occupational growth.  As
Table 3 indicates, two of the three fastest-growing
occupations are services occupations, and to a lesser
extent, marketing and sales occupations.  Workers
in services occupations include health care
assistants, food preparers, cleaners, and household
workers, among others.  Marketing and sales
occupations are composed primarily of cashiers and
other retail sales workers.  Roughly 6,600 service jobs
are forecast to be added over each of the next three
years, while 4,200 marketing and sales jobs are
forecast to be gained.
This growth translates into a 2.3 percent annual
growth rate for services occupation jobs, and a 2.2
percent rate of growth for marketing and sales jobs.
Both growth rates are well above the forecast overall
growth rate of 1.6 percent for all occupations.  Slower
Quarterly Forecasts for the Kentucky Economy, 1999 - 2001
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Growth and Growth Rates for Employment in Kentucky by
Occupation, 1999 - 2001 (Seasonally Adjusted)
TABLE 3
Employment Employment Annual Annual
4th Q 1998 4th Q 2001 Growth Growth Rate
Total 1,767,143 1,854,568 29,142 1.62%
Executives, administrators, and managers 175,578 184,899 3,107 1.74
Professional specialty 217,336 235,649 6,104 2.73
Technicians and related support 62,621 66,380 1,253 1.96
Marketing and sales 185,175 197,628 4,151 2.19
Administrative support, including clerical 335,045 345,200 3,385 1.00
Service 280,865 300,783 6,639 2.31
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and related 18,520 19,233 235 1.25
Precision production, craft, and repair 212,606 218,061 1,818 0.85
Operators, fabricators, and laborers 279,328 286,699 2,457 0.87
growth was forecast for those occupations that
account for a substantial share of manufacturing
employment, such as precision, production, craft,
and repair workers, and operators, fabricators, and
laborers.  The annual growth rate forecast for
precision, production, craft and repair workers is
forecast at 0.8 percent per year, while the growth
forecast is 0.9 percent per year for operators,
fabricators, and laborers.  A substantial share of the
job growth in these occupations is forecast to occur
for workers performing these tasks in non-
manufacturing industries such as construction and
transportation, communications, and public utilities.
Another pattern evident in occupational growth
forecasts is the growth among occupations requiring
a high level of education.  Among all occupational
groups, workers in professional specialty
occupations have the highest level of education.  This
occupational group also has the highest growth rate
and is forecast to experience the second largest job
increase in the next three years.
The number of workers in professional specialty
occupations is forecast to grow by 2.7 percent
annually, resulting in a net increase of 6,100 workers
each year.  The professional specialty occupational
group includes teachers, scientists, engineers,
doctors, and artists, among others.  Executives,
administrators, managers, and technicians are other
groups of workers that, on average, have a high level
of education.  The annual rate of job growth in these
two occupational groups is forecast to be 2.0 percent
for technicians and 1.7 percent for executives,
administrators, and managers.  Both of these growth
rates are above the average of 1.6 percent for all
occupations.  The rapid growth rate for these
education-oriented occupations is forecast to occur
throughout the economy rather than being tied to a
particular industry.
Despite these differences among particular
occupations, it is worth noting that the outlook for
job growth is at least fair for all of the nine aggregate
occupation groups.  The growth rate is forecast to
exceed at least 0.8 percent per year in all major
occupation groups.  While the number of jobs may
be declining in some more specific occupations,
these aggregate numbers indicate that there at least
should be jobs available for workers in related
occupations.  Overall, this implies that there are
expanding opportunities for most Kentucky
workers.
Real total personal income is forecast to grow
somewhat more rapidly in Kentucky than nationally.
Income growth is forecast to average 1.44 percent
per year in Kentucky from 1999 through 2001
compared to 1.35 percent nationally.  An
examination in Table 4 of the sources of income
Income
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per year in Kentucky from 1999 to 2001, adding $48
million per year to state income, while it is forecast
to grow by 1.4 percent per year nationally.
Together, these three sources of working income
are forecast to account for $660 million of $764
million of income growth per year in Kentucky.
Earnings from work will be the key source for
income growth in Kentucky.  After subtracting out
payments on wages for social insurance, earnings
from work will account for 75.8 percent of income
growth in the state.
Transfer income in Kentucky is forecast to grow
at an average rate of 2.4 percent over the next three
years.  This is similar to the 2.5 percent growth rate
forecast for the nation.  Another interesting pattern
is the continued decline forecast for Kentucky’s
residential adjustment over the next few years.
Residential adjustment is the difference between
what Kentuckians earn working in other states
minus what residents of other states earn working
in Kentucky.  The decline in residential adjustment
indicates that one result of Kentucky’s forecast
employment growth is expected to be an increase
in workers from nearby states finding work in
Kentucky, a decrease in the number of Kentuckians
working in nearby states, or both.
growth indicates that this slightly faster overall
growth results from very similar growth rates for
Kentucky and the U.S. in wage and salary income
and transfer income, but better performance for
Kentucky in dividend, interest and rent income.
This 1.44 percent rate of growth also reflects a
slowdown relative to recent growth rate forecasts.
The slowdown results from two sources.  First, there
is a forecast slowdown in employment growth in
both Kentucky and the nation in the next few years
due to slower growth in the labor supply, which is
the result of an aging population.  Second,
expectations for much lower interest rates and
modest growth in the stock markets in the next few
years has also led to a forecast for a decline rather
than increase in dividends, interest, and rent income
in Kentucky and the nation.  However, the rate of
decline in Kentucky, averaging 0.8 percent per year,
is expected to be roughly one-half the national rate
of decline, at 1.7 percent per year.
Real wage and salary earnings are forecast to
grow by 1.8 percent per year in Kentucky, the same
as forecast nationally.  This 1.8 percent rate of growth
translates into nearly $541 million of real income
growth per year from 1999 to 2001.  Benefits income
(other labor income) is forecast to grow by 2.2
percent per year in Kentucky, again the same growth
forecast nationally.  This 2.2 percent increase is
forecast to yield $71 million in new income each year.
Proprietor’s income is forecast to grow by 1.3 percent
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Growth Rates for Real Personal Income and its Components
in Kentucky, 1999 - 2001 (Seasonally Adjusted)
TABLE 4
Income 1999 Quarterly Growth Annual Annual Averages
4th Q 1998 at an Annual Rate Growth Rate Growth Growth Rate
Income Source ($mil) 1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 1999 2000 2001 ($mil) Ky. U.S.
Total personal income $52,214.15 1.45% 1.67% 1.44% 1.58% 1.54% 1.23% 1.56% 764.50 1.44 1.35
Wage and salary income 29,483.57 1.24 2.55 2.22 2.22 2.06 1.50 1.85 541.42 1.80 1.83
Other labor
 income (benefits) 3,103.27 0.20 1.81 1.87 2.50 1.59 2.67 2.48 71.32 2.25 2.22
Proprietor’s income 3,688.31 2.83 2.69 0.72 4.36 2.64 1.28 -0.04 48.11 1.29 1.43
Residential adjustment -293.52 5.00 6.63 6.08 6.53 6.06 4.93 4.47 -15.91 5.15      NA
Contributions to
social insurance 2,707.50 4.55 3.93 3.75 3.54 3.94 2.92 1.88 81.12 2.91 1.92
Transfer income 10,594.24 5.03 2.06 2.54 1.41 2.75 1.96 2.57 263.32 2.43 2.47
Dividends, interest, rent 7,529.78 -1.39 -1.62 -1.77 -1.27 -1.51 -0.61 -0.24 -58.86 -0.79 -1.68
Per capita income $13,247 0.73% 1.03% 0.66% 0.83% 0.81% 0.49% 0.81% $94 0.71% 0.51%
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The forecast presented for the Kentucky
economy is based in part on the baseline October
1998 forecast for the United States economy
produced by DRI/McGraw Hill.  This baseline
national forecast represents a moderate, most likely
scenario for the economy over the next three years.
Use of this moderate national forecast implies that
the Kentucky forecast is also a moderate forecast,
one scenario among a group of possible scenarios
for the state’s economy.  The national economy has
other potential outcomes, which in turn could be
played out in the Kentucky economy.  The two
alternative national scenarios are examined below.
In the first alternative scenario, there may be a
recession on the horizon for 1999.  Recession in the
United States may be brought on by further
deterioration in economic conditions in Asia and
recession in Latin America.  This not only hurts
export-oriented sectors of the United States, but also
causes a fall in U.S. stock markets and consumer
confidence.  The recession lasts for just three quarters
in 1999 and is mild, with the economy contracting
by only a few percentage points.  Deep interest rate
cuts by the Federal Reserve help the economy out
of recession by the year 2000.  DRI has assigned a
probability of 30 percent to this scenario.
In the second alternative scenario, the economy
continues to grow through 1999, but falls into
recession in 2000.  In this scenario, inflation begins
to rise in 1999.  Rising inflation causes the Federal
Reserve to increase interest rates in late 1999 and
early 2000, which hurts consumer confidence and
the stock market.  This causes the economy to fall
into a mild, three-quarter recession in the year 2000.
Year 2000 computer problems exacerbate these
problems.  Interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve
help the economy out of recession by the year 2001.
DRI has assigned a probability of 15 percent to this
scenario.
The Kentucky economy is forecast to experience
moderate to slow growth during 1999, 2000, and
2001.  Growth is expected to decelerate throughout
the period, with the most rapid growth occurring
in 1999.  Growth is also forecast to be broad-based.
Conclusion
Quarterly Forecasts for the Kentucky Economy, 1999 - 2001
Most industries are forecast to add employment,
with the exception of coal mining and selected
manufacturing industries.  All major occupational
groups are forecast to add employment.  Real income
and population are each forecast to grow at a slow
to moderate rate.  Moderate growth is forecast to
help Kentucky maintain moderate statewide
unemployment rates.
The services and retail trade industries are
forecast to add the most new jobs during the next
three years.  Together, these two industries are
forecast to add 21,300 of the 29,100 net new jobs
expected in the Kentucky economy each year.  The
manufacturing industry as a whole is forecast to lose
500 net jobs per year from 1999 to 2001.  But, despite
this slight decline in employment, manufacturing
remains a key to growth in the state economy.  The
manufacturing sector is forecast to account for 34.5
percent of growth in real gross state product in
Kentucky.  It is also worth noting that, despite the
growing importance of transfer payments to the
Kentucky economy, the wage, salary, and benefits
returns from working are forecast to be the primary
source of income growth in Kentucky during the
next three years.
Growth in the Kentucky economy is forecast to
match or slightly exceed growth in the national
economy for most employment and income
measures.  Manufacturing employment is forecast
to decline at a slight 0.2 percent annual rate in
Kentucky from 1999 to 2001, while nationally it is
expected to decline 1.0 percent each year.  Growth
rates in Kentucky for retail trade are forecast to
exceed growth rates for the United States, while
growth rates for services and government are
expected to be roughly the same in Kentucky and
the United States.  Similarly, growth rates for wages
and salaries and transfer payments are forecast to
be similar in Kentucky and the United States.
Population growth in Kentucky, however, is forecast
to be lower than growth nationally, while per capita
income is forecast to grow slightly faster in
Kentucky.
Risks to the Forecast
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1. Population data for Kentucky are not yet available for
the first two quarters of 1998.  Thus, population values
need to be forecast for the first two quarters of 1998
based on the available Kentucky employment data.
In particular, Kentucky employment growth and
unemployment data are key inputs into forecasts of
the migration component of population.  Population
growth for the last two quarters of 1998 are forecast
along with other Kentucky variables such as
employment and income.
2. Moderate series birth and survival rates were taken
from Michael Price, Thomas Sawyer, and Martye
Scobee, How Many Kentuckians: Population Forecast
1995-2020, Population Research, Kentucky State Data
Center, University of Louisville, 1993.
3. National industrial production and productivity by
industry are variables in manufacturing and mining,
gross state product, and employment equations.
National consumer spending and industry
employment variables are important inputs for retail
and service equations.  National data on income
growth by source is a key variable in income growth
equations.
Endnotes
The forecast for Kentucky is based on the
baseline forecast for the national economy in the
DRI/McGraw-Hill publication Review of the U.S.
Economy for October 1998.  National variables
forecast by DRI/McGraw-Hill are key variables in
nearly every part of the University of Kentucky State
Econometric Model.3
The baseline national forecast from DRI/
McGraw-Hill depicts an economy in 1999, 2000, and
2001 that slows relative to the rapid growth of 1998
but which experiences moderate to slow growth.
Real gross state product is forecast to grow by 1.9
percent in 1998, 2.4 percent in 2000, and 1.8 percent
in 2001.  A similar pattern is evident for employment
and unemployment.  Employment is forecast to
grow by 2.0 percent nationally in 1999, 1.5 percent
in 2000, and 0.9 percent in 2001.  This slowdown in
employment growth is partly attributed to a
downturn in the rate of growth in the labor force,
due to the aging of the population.  The
unemployment rate is forecast to average 4.6 percent
in 1999, 4.7 percent in 2000, and 5.1 percent in 2001.
The moderation in the U.S. economy in 1999
through 2001 is expected to result in part from the
effects of the economic and financial crises in Asia.
Economic slowdown in Asia and other developing
countries is expected to continue to hurt exports,
which is expected to slow the U.S. economy.  A
continued federal government surplus also is
expected to remain a fiscal drain on economic
growth.  At the same time, these two factors should
both help to keep interest rates lower, which will
aid economic growth.  Lower rates also will be aided
by the Federal Reserve, which is expected to
maintain low rates after recent cuts.  Consumer
confidence is also expected to hold up with low
interest rates and low unemployment rates.  This
also should help keep the housing market strong in
the next few years.  Each of these factors should aid
economic growth.  The Consumer Price Index, which
measures inflation, rose 1.6 percent in 1998 and is
forecast to rise by 2.3 percent in 1999, 2.9 percent in
2000, and 3.1 percent in 2001.
Quarterly Forecasts for the Kentucky Economy, 1999 - 2001
Appendix:  National Forecast
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The U.S. Economy in 1998:
Uncharted Waters
Christopher J. Waller
The year 1998 saw many macroeconomic events not seen in more than two decades and in
some cases not since the Great Depression.  While most of these events were ‘good,’ such as
federal government surpluses, low unemployment, near zero inflation, and solid growth of
national income, 1998 also produced a tremendous burst of volatility in asset markets, record
trade deficits, and perverse interest rate relationships.  This has made the Federal Reserve’s
job of navigating the U.S. economy much more complicated and uncertain.  While the outlook
for next year is murky, the economy should be able to avoid a recession and continue to grow
at a respectable rate, although probably at a lower rate than we have observed in the last
couple of years.
Introduction
In 1998, the U.S. economy experienced some of
the best macroeconomic outcomes that policymakers
could imagine.  Yet by the end of the year, there was
considerable uncertainty and fear about the direction
of the economy.  In this article, I document the
economy’s recent exceptional performance and
contrast it with U.S. macroeconomic history.  Given
that we are doing so well, I then discuss events that
generated the uncertainty and fear that manifested
itself in the form of severe financial market volatility.
I then address the issue of why our current status is
not always a good indicator of the future and why
policymakers do not make policy on the basis of the
current state of the economy.  Finally, I discuss why
the current macroeconomic situation has created
problems for the Federal Reserve in navigating the
U.S. economy.
The year 1998 saw many macroeconomic events
not seen in more than two decades and in some cases
not since the Great Depression of the 1930’s.  In
assessing the performance of the economy,
macroeconomists tend to focus on the following
variables:
It Was the Best of Times . . .
• Growth rate of the economy (national income)
• Unemployment rate
• Inflation rate
• Growth in real wages
• Federal budget deficit/surplus
• Behavior of asset prices and interest rates
• Trade deficit
• Dollar’s exchange rate
Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth,
which measures the value of all domestic goods and
services, for 1998 has been in the range of 3.0 - 3.5
percent, which is above the long-run average of 2.5
- 3.0 percent that we have observed since the early
1970’s.  Figure 1 shows the percentage change in
growth domestic product for 1990 through the third
quarter of 1998.  Although above average, GDP
growth began to slow in 1998, and this has led many
to question whether or not the U.S. was heading into
a recession in 1999, particularly given the worldwide
slowdown due to the Asian economic crisis.  Some
estimates put the effect of the Asian crisis on the
U.S. economy as a one percentage point reduction
in the growth rate for 1999.
In May 1998, the national unemployment rate,
as shown in Figure 2, reached 4.3 percent, its lowest
level since the late 1960s.  A low unemployment rate
signals a tight labor market, and consequently, real
wages will tend to be pushed up.  Real wages and
productivity have increased recently and there is
evidence that wage inequality is moderating after
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considerably widening over the last 25 years.
Upward pressure on real wages has always been a
key market signal that the Federal Reserve watches
since it may indicate a surge in nominal wages which
gets passed along as higher
output prices for consumers.
As a result, the Fed is worried
that the current tight labor
market may be a harbinger of
inflation.  If labor productivity
rises due to technological
advances, however, workers
can produce more output per
unit of labor time and, as a
consequence, higher wages are
justified.  Wage increases of this
form can be paid without
raising the price of final goods.
Therefore, tight labor markets
may provide a false signal of
future inflation.
One may ask, “Why is 4.3
percent unemployment
viewed as being an indicator of
a tight labor market?”
Economists believe that a zero
unemployment rate is unlikely
due to the fact that in a
dynamic economy,
people change jobs in
an effort to find a more
productive match
between employee and
employer.  As a result,
some amount of
unemployment is the
“natural” outcome of a
dynamic economy.
The question is,
what is the “natural”
rate of unemploy-
ment?  In the 1960’s it
was believed to be
around 4 percent.  In
the 1970’s and 1980’s
it was estimated to be
around 5.5 percent.  So
when the unemploy-
ment rate falls below
this natural rate, there
is more employment in the economy than normal and
firms are hiring more than usual, which means there
is less slack in the labor market.
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Since the unemployment rate in 1998 was below
the long-held estimate of 5.5 percent for the natural
rate of unemployment, some economists believe that
this will cause the economy to overheat, thereby
causing higher inflation.  Furthermore, at some point
unemployment will start to increase back to its
natural level.  Other economists, however, have
argued that the natural rate of unemployment has
actually fallen back to its 1960’s level of around 4
percent.  Hence, the current rate of unemployment
is in the neighborhood of the natural rate.
Consequently, the current low unemployment rate
should not be viewed as a signal that the economy
is overheating.
The U.S. inflation rate continues to fall and,
upon correcting for measurement bias, is between
zero and one percent, something that again has not
been seen since the early 1960s.  In fact, a common
belief is that we may be in or headed for a
deflationary state (negative inflation), something
that has not occurred since the Great Depression of
the 1930’s.
In recent years, the Fed has increasingly shifted
its attention towards generating a slow and steady
disinflation with the goal of driving the inflation rate
to zero or nearly so.  The recent data suggests that the
Fed has been very successful at doing this without
generating a recession, as is commonly feared will
result from a disinflationary monetary policy.  But
some economists now fear that the Fed has been too
successful in its drive towards zero inflation and that
we are about to enter a period of deflation.
Deflation is just as damaging to the economy as
inflation.  One need only look at the last major
episode of deflation in the U.S, the Great Depression,
to find evidence.  The Producer Price Index (PPI),
for example, has displayed a steady downward
trend over the last year or so.  Since the PPI is often
viewed as an early warning for what will happen to
the Consumer Price Index (CPI), then the recent
evidence suggests the potential for deflation in the
CPI in the coming year.  Figure 3 shows the annual
percentage changes in the Consumer Price Index
and the Producer Price Index.
A major macroeconomic development over the
last year or two has been the surprising decline in
the size of the federal government budget deficit.
The U.S. began generating large deficits in the early
1980’s and those deficits increased in size until the
early 1990’s, reaching a peak of nearly $300 billion.
Annual CPI (solid)
U.S. Annual Inflation Rates (Consumer Price Index and
Producer Price Index), 1990 - 1998
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Since then, due to a robust economy and a
combination of fiscal restraint and tax increases, the
deficit began to fall dramatically until it was
eliminated at the beginning of 1998.
At present, the federal government is running a
surplus of nearly $70 billion, as shown in Figure 4.
The last annual budget surplus in the U.S. was in
1969.  Many economists believe that this has had a
reinforcing effect on the economy because as the
government’s demand for debt financing falls, more
funds are available to finance private investment in
capital goods, which in turn spurs economic growth.
On the other hand, this means that there has been a
significant decrease in the ratio of “risk-free” debt
(issued by the U.S. government) and “risky” debt
(issued by private firms).  This dramatic change in
the relative supplies of risk-free and risky debt
comes back into play when we discuss the behavior
of financial markets in 1998.
Financial markets were roiled during the fall of
1998 with large ups and downs being observed on a
weekly basis.  The market continued the spectacular
pace observed in the prior two years with the Dow
Jones Industrial Index starting the year around 7,800
then climbing to a high of over 9,300 in July 1998, an
annualized rate of change of nearly 40 percent.  Then
came an extraordinary sequence of price drops and
price rises, and the Dow fell all the way to 7,500 at
the end of August, a staggering 24 percent loss in
value in little more than a month.  By November
1998 the market had regained a large portion of its
value with the Dow reaching 8,900 (at the time this
article was written).  Figure 5 shows the weekly Dow
Jones Industrial Average from 1994 to 1998.
This volatility in world international markets
reflected the continued effects of the Asian crisis and
the anemic performance of the Japanese economy.
Investors in emerging markets worried that the
Asian “flu” would spread to other countries, leading
to speculative attacks on those currencies.  Then
came the collapse of the Russian ruble, which
startled international markets and led to a
tremendous portfolio reallocation between equities
in emerging markets and equities in developed
economies.  As with all contagion-type panics, the
loss of confidence in equities of emerging markets
spilled over to create doubts about the stability of
equity markets in developed markets.
It Was the Worst of Times . . .
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This led to a further portfolio reallocation and a
classic flight to safety as investors began to seek
shelter in the safety of U.S. government Treasury bills.
The increased demand for bonds forced bond prices
higher and drove down bond yields.  On top of this
increasing demand for risk-free debt, we observed
the U.S. government dramatically decrease the
supply of risk-free debt because of the elimination of
the budget deficit.  This combination of increasing
demand and decreasing supply led to a dramatic
increase in bond prices and plunging bond yields.
The most noticeable aspect of this was that mortgage
rates fell to 30-year lows in the U.S. since mortgage
rates are tightly tied to interest rates on long-term
U.S. government debt.  Figure 6 shows weekly 30-
year fixed rate mortgages from 1972 to 1998.
While such a shift into safe assets could reflect a
permanent shift in investor attitudes, the evidence
suggests otherwise.  The evidence that this was a
temporary flight to safety rather than a shift in long-
term risk preferences appeared in a dramatic one-
day  ½ percentage point rise in mortgage rates driven
by an announcement by the Japanese government
that it would initiate policies to revive the Japanese
economy.  This announcement caused investors to
sell off U.S. government debt and shift into yen-
denominated assets.  Bond prices in the U.S. fell, yields
rose, and mortgage rates increased as a result of this
one-day portfolio reallocation.  Such lightning quick
portfolio reallocations on such whimsical news
hardly reflect a permanent shift in risk attitudes.
The U.S. trade deficit exploded as a result of the
Asian crisis, which has created great concern about
the movement of the dollar exchange rate over the
coming year.  The rise of the dollar relative to the
value of Asian currencies increased the relative price
of U.S. goods to foreign goods.  This caused a
significant decline in U.S. exports and a large increase
of imports into the U.S..  As a result, the U.S. trade
deficit with its trading partners doubled.  The drop
in demand for U.S. exports has led some to fear that
the economy will slow down in the coming year as
exporters reduce output and employment to deal
with the loss of orders from abroad.  Estimates
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suggest the U.S. could lose up to 1.0 - 1.5 percentage
points off its growth rate in the coming year as a
result of the continuing Asian crisis.  Figure 7 shows
the monthly U.S. trade
deficit from 1992 to 1998.
The uniqueness of
the current U.S. macro-
economic situation
relative to the world
m a c r o e c o n o m i c
condition has created a
fair amount of concern
and uncertainty for the
Federal Reserve.  The
superb performance of
the U.S. economy has led
many to believe that we
have just been “lucky”
and that there is no place
to go but down from
here.  In short, the
current U.S.
performance is an
outlier and not the
norm. Thus, there is a
fear that we are
heading for a
recession with rising
unemployment and
rising inflation.  On
the other hand, it can
be argued that the
exemplary perform-
ance of the U.S.
economy is the result
of 1) stable Federal
Reserve policy, 2) the
investment in high-
tech capital over the
last decade, and 3) tax
and regulatory re-
forms over the last
decade that have
promoted free market
capitalism.  From this point of view, the recent
performance of the economy is normal and not an
outlier.
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The recent success of the U.S. economy presents a
puzzle for the Federal Reserve in terms of how to
implement monetary policy.  The Fed has
traditionally viewed a booming economy and a tight
labor market as the result of a high demand
economy.  When rising aggregate demand for goods
and services is the source of economic expansion,
higher prices and inflation are not far behind.
Consequently, a forward-looking policymaker
would want to push up interest rates to stem
demand and relieve some of the pressure on future
prices.  The point to remember is that the Fed is
trying to stop inflation before it occurs.  Thus, even
though there is relatively little inflation at the current
moment, the Fed is trying to anticipate the onset of
inflation and head it off before it starts.
The problem is that if the economy is being
driven instead by a boom in the supply of goods
(arising from increases in productivity of labor and
capital), then the high supply of goods will put
downward, not upward, pressure on prices.  In this
situation, if the Fed increases interest rates, it lowers
demand for goods and services, which puts even
further downward pressure on prices.
As a result, rather than heading off future
inflation, the Fed may actually be contributing to a
deflationary environment.  Consequently, the Fed
faces the difficult task of trying to determine whether
the booming U.S. economy is occurring because of
booming demand for goods or a booming supply
of goods.  Since the economy has been booming for
the last couple of years without any appearance of
inflation, the Fed’s traditional method for
forecasting inflation appears to have lost its
predictive power.  It is in this sense that the Fed is
sailing in uncharted waters.
Through the first half of 1998, there was growing
evidence that the economy was booming as the
result of a surge in demand.  Growth rates of the
money supply were too high relative to the growth
rate of the economy to sustain low inflation, which
led some inside the Fed to believe that inflation was
just around the corner.  Hence, the view from this
camp was that the Fed needed to raise interest rates
to head off inflation.  The problem facing the Fed
was that, due to the inflow of capital into the U.S. as
investors sought safety, any further increase in U.S.
interest rates would simply lead to a greater inflow
Weekly Federal Funds Rate and 1-Year Adjustable Rate Mortgage, 1998
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Where Are We Headed?of capital as investors sought the higher return on
U.S. assets.  This would exacerbate the rise in the
dollar exchange rate and the fall in the value of Asian
currencies, and also undermine efforts by the
International Monetary Fund to stabilize the Asian
economies.  Furthermore, it would worsen the U.S.
trade deficit.
Given the flight to safety into U.S. Treasury bills
and the Fed’s steadfastness in keeping the federal
funds rate constant, the term structure of interest
rates flattened out dramatically and, in some cases,
turned negative.  By late summer, the federal funds
rate, which is the interest rate banks charge each
other for overnight loans, was very close to the rate
charged on long-term debt.  For example, one-year
adjustable mortgage rates were very close to the
federal funds rate at one point, as shown in Figure
8.  This means that households buying relatively
illiquid assets (houses) for a year could borrow at
about the same rate that banks could borrow from
each other for a 24-hour loan of a highly liquid asset
(cash reserves).
Such a distortion in the term structure could not
last.  A flat or negatively sloped yield curve will not
persist unless markets believe that there will be
significant deflation over the coming year(s).
Although the specter of deflation was significant,
we had not seen such an event in over 60 years.  So
it was unlikely that the term structure would remain
flat or negatively sloped.  In short, something had
to give:  either the federal funds rate had to fall or
long-term interest rates had to rise.
Confronted with weak international economies
and an inverted yield curve, the Fed reluctantly cut
the federal funds rate by ¼ percentage point in
September 1998.  The financial markets felt much
more was needed and lost confidence in the Fed’s
willingness to stabilize not only the U.S. economy
but the world economy.  The market dove
dramatically, creating even more uncertainty about
the world economy.  The Fed, realizing it had made
a mistake, cut the federal funds rate another ¼
percentage point and lowered the discount rate to
try to signal its seriousness about stabilizing the
economy.  This boosted the market’s confidence that
the Fed was an effective steward of the economy.
Since then, markets have rebounded, long-term
interest rates have stabilized, and the U.S. economy
seems to be weathering the storm.
The important question now is, where are we
heading?  Consumer spending data in late 1998
showed that U.S. consumers did not appear to be
deterred by the volatility of world financial markets
or weakness in international countries.  This
suggests that the U.S. economy should continue
growing at a steady pace in 1999.  If the Fed
continues down the path of cutting the federal funds
rate, then we should see demand strengthening,
which helps maintain a robust economy.  The flow
of cheap imports into the U.S. will help keep inflation
down even if the Fed cuts interest rates.  U.S.
unemployment rates may rise some as a result of
the drop in demand for U.S. exports but further
interest rate cuts may offset that.  As Asian
economies begin to stabilize and if Japan undertakes
policies to pull itself out of its six-year recession, then
we will see an outflow of capital from the U.S. to
these economies.  This will show up as falling long-
term bond prices, rising long-term interest rates, and
a fall in the dollar exchange rate.  Consequently, by
mid- to late-1999, we may see mortgage rates rise
even though the Fed is pushing short-term interest
rates down.
In summary, the forecast for the U.S. economy
in 1999 is stable economic growth, a slight rise in
U.S. unemployment rates, a slight rise in inflation,
and a rise in long-term interest rates.  Although this
is worse than observed in 1998, given the uncertainty
and instability that permeated the U.S. economy in
the fall of 1998, the outlook could have been much
worse.
The U.S. Economy in 1998: Uncharted Waters
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An Evaluation of the Kentucky
Education Reform Act
William H. Hoyt
The Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA) caused drastic changes in the way education
is provided in Kentucky.  Because KERA attempted to equalize funding and dramatically
alter the curriculum and governance of schools, it is appropriate to see how effective the
reforms have been in affecting spending and educational outcomes.  Comparisons of measures
before and after KERA show that it has equalized funding among school districts, with some
districts gaining substantially in their funding of students.  Teacher salaries and student/
teacher ratios have also improved relative to national averages since the introduction of
KERA.  Educational outcomes have not improved, however.  There has been no appreciable
gain in test scores or graduation rates in Kentucky relative to other states, and there is no
evidence that KERA has increased college attendance rates of Kentucky high school graduates.
Introduction
Among the many states that had their public
school financing systems invalidated by court
rulings, the changes required of the Kentucky
system by the courts as a result of Rose v. Council
(1989) were among the most radical.  Not only did
the Kentucky Supreme Court find the financing of
schools in the state to be unconstitutional, but it also
ruled that the “entire system of common schools is
unconstitutional” and required the legislature to
“recreate, re-establish” the entire system of public
education.  In a remarkably brief interlude, the
Kentucky General Assembly, in response to the court
decision, passed the Kentucky Education Reform
Act (KERA) of 1990.
KERA has attracted a great deal of attention in
the popular press and public discussions in both
Kentucky and throughout the United States.  It has
been criticized and praised and played a major role
in numerous state elections, including the most
recent gubernatorial election.  The vast attention
focused on KERA, in contrast to finance reform acts
in other states, must in part be attributable to the
broad scope of the legislation.  It was not simply
striking down a finance system that was not
providing enough resources for poorer districts —
the court ruling emphasized equality in funding, not
simply additional funding.  Nor was the court ruling
solely a statement about the funding.  It was also
about the outcomes of education.  Again, the court
emphasized the need for education to be reformed
to equalize not only spending but also performance.
Our objective is to provide an evaluation of
KERA by comparing educational funding and, when
possible, performance before and after KERA.  We
evaluate it in light of the emphasis of the original
court case on equity in both financing and
performance.  In addition, to give more perspective
on the impact of KERA, we contrast the changes in
primary and secondary education in Kentucky to
changes throughout the nation.  In the next section,
we begin by providing a brief discussion of the
legislation that created KERA and some of the
institutional features of KERA.  In Section 3 we
examine the impacts of KERA on funding of
education emphasizing both changes in the
distribution of funding within Kentucky and how
the level of spending and equality in spending in
Kentucky compares to the U.S. average and some
of our neighboring states.  In Section 4 we focus on
measures of educational performance and outcomes
and as with funding, our emphasis is both on the
changes in the equality and level of performance in
Kentucky schools.  Again, to give perspective for at
least some measures, such as dropout rates, we
compare Kentucky to the rest of the nation.
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KERA and Education in
Kentucky
The Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990
(KERA, House Bill 940) was not simply a change in
the financing of primary and secondary education,
though it radically altered the financing of education
in Kentucky.  KERA is unique in its attempts to
integrate school finance reform with reforms in the
curriculum and school governance.  Instead of
simply providing additional funds to local school
districts, KERA provided a dramatically expanded
role for the Commonwealth in mandating curricula,
evaluating school performance, and placing
restrictions on district employment and
compensation.  Broadly, then, we might classify
reforms in three categories: curriculum, governance,
and finance.
Curriculum
The major innovations related to curriculum are
the restructuring of primary schools (particularly
kindergarten to third grade); the implementation of
standardized student assessment throughout the
Commonwealth; the encouragement of increased
use of technology; and the introduction of school-
based decision making, which provides a formal
structure for involving parent representatives in
decisions regarding curriculum, personnel, and
instruction.
The General Assembly in 1992 and again in 1994
expanded on KERA’s requirement of replacing
grades kindergarten to third with a “primary school
program.”  The 1992 General Assembly listed
“critical attributes” of primary schools that include
“multi-age and multi-ability classrooms,”
“professional teamwork,” and “qualitative reporting
methods.”  Essentially, in the General Assembly’s
interpretation of KERA, the traditional separation
of students by grade (age) is eliminated (or at least
reduced) with students of both different ages and
abilities found in the same classroom.  The
traditional classroom with a single teacher is to be
replaced (at times) by team teaching.  Finally, and
perhaps most controversially, qualitative assessment
(written reports assessing a student’s performance)
replaces the traditional letter grade system.
KERA created a new system of assessing
students and schools: the Kentucky Instructional
Results Information System (KIRIS).  Based on KIRIS,
a “performance-based” approach, the progress of
schools is monitored.  Schools that are succeeding,
that is, schools that have had increases in average
KIRIS scores, are financially rewarded, along with
their teachers.  KIRIS is not a test in the tradition of
multiple choice objective tests.  Instead, students
create a “portfolio” of writing and mathematics work
in the 4th (writing only), 8th, and 12th grades.  Thus,
students may include lengthy essays in their
portfolios, although the content of these essays is
based on a list of topics emphasized by the Kentucky
Department of Education.
School councils were created by KERA as an
attempt to decentralize policies and plans for
schools.  These councils consist of six people: the
school’s principal, three teachers, and two parents
with teachers and parents being elected
representatives.  These councils are to make
decisions on curriculum, instruction and
instructional materials, discipline, extracurricular
programs, and the school budget.  In addition, the
council is charged with hiring principals if that
position vacant and consult with the principal on
the hiring of teachers.
Increased use of technology, including
computers, was provided special funds in KERA,
and acceptable use of these funds is outlined in the
Kentucky Education Technology System (KETS).  To
obtain matching funds from KETS, districts must
have prepared and submitted a plan for use of
technology in their district.
Governance
In addition to the school councils discussed
earlier, KERA restructured the organization of
primary and secondary education at the state level,
creating a Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education and a Commissioner of Education.  At
the district level, the legislation was designed to
reduce employment based on nepotism or political
involvement.  In addition, the local superintendent’s
power vis-à-vis the local school board was increased
with the Commissioner of Education having veto
power over any dismissal of the superintendent by
the local board.
Finance
Kentucky, through foundation grants and
power equalization programs, had extensive state
An Evaluation of the Kentucky Education Reform Act
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funding assistance of local education prior to KERA.
Under the previous funding system, however, local
support varied dramatically.  For example, the
Kentucky Office of Education Accountability
reported that in 1989-90, property wealth per pupil
varied from $39,138 to $341,707; local equivalent mill
rates varied from $0.229 to $1.119; and local revenue
per student varied from $80 to $3,716.  While state
aid also varied from $1,750 to $2,753 per student,
average per pupil spending for instruction still
varied from $1,499 to $3,709.1
The focus of KERA was to reduce these
disparities in educational funding.  To do so, a new
funding program called Support Educational
Excellence in Kentucky (SEEK) was established.
Under this program, districts are to receive a
guaranteed level of revenue per student.  In 1990-91
this base was $2,305 per pupil and gradually
increased to $2,570 per pupil in 1995-96.  This base
is adjusted (increased) for at-risk children (measured
by participation in federal school lunch programs),
transportation, and exceptional students.  While the
state guarantees this amount of revenue, the district
must share in the financing by providing a minimum
level of effort equivalent to $0.30 per $100 of property
value.  This funding, however, need not be obtained
through the property tax.  Then the state funding,
the adjusted base guarantee equals the base plus
additional funding for at-risk children,
transportation, and exceptional student, minus the
local effort.
In addition to this uniform funding base, each
district can increase its funding by up to 15 percent
of the base while receiving state funding if its
property value per student is less than 150 percent
of the state average.  If its property tax base is below
this amount, the state provides state funding to
guarantee revenue equal to the amount collected on
this property value.  This is referred to as Tier I
funding.  Through Tier II funding, the district can
collect up to an additional 30 percent beyond the
base and Tier I funding, but it will receive no
matching state funds.  This funding must also be
approved by a vote of the electorate in the district.
Finally, the state also provided a guaranteed annual
minimum increase in state funds (8 percent in 1991-
92 and 5 percent in 1991-92) and an annual
maximum increase (25 percent).
How Kentucky Compares
Before and After KERA
While KERA has led to many changes in both
the financing and the actual delivery of educational
services, the major increases in educational spending
were not new for Kentucky.  The increase in real
spending per student from 1989-90 to 1995-96 in
Kentucky, 30 percent, was the highest among the 50
states, which had an average increase in real
spending per student of 3.8 percent.  As Table 1
indicates, Kentucky moved from ranking 45th in
spending per student to 31st during this period.
While this was a major increase in spending, it is
not unprecedented for Kentucky.  During the five-
year period from 1984-85 to 1989-90, real spending
per student also increased by 22 percent, well above
the national average of 16.8 percent.  In fact, from
1969-70 to 1995-96, the 148.7 percent increase in real
spending per student in Kentucky was the highest
among all 50 states and significantly above the
national average increase of 84.2 percent.  Thus,
while KERA was a major increase in spending and
an increase that came very quickly (10 percent in
one year), even prior to KERA, Kentucky had seen
major increases in educational spending.
As we emphasized earlier, KERA was the
legislative response to a court order about the
equality of educational spending and performance,
not the level of spending.  While educational
spending had been increasing in Kentucky prior to
the legislation, KERA changed the distribution of
these increases and dramatically changed the
relationship between educational spending and
revenues and district property wealth and income.
We can see how KERA changed the distribution
of educational funds in several ways.  We first
compare the distribution of funding among districts
in Kentucky to some neighboring states.  To do this
we use a measure of inequality, the Gini coefficient.
The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality
(generally income) that ranges between 0 and 1.  If
the Gini coefficient equals 0 there is no difference in
distribution across groups — everyone receives the
same funding.  On the other hand, a coefficient of 1
means one group (individual) has all the resources.
In our case, we examine the distribution of
educational spending per student among school
districts in the state and compare that to four states
bordering Kentucky.  As Table 2 shows, the Gini
An Evaluation of the Kentucky Education Reform Act
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coefficient in 1989-90 ranks Kentucky third among
the five states but by 1994-95,  Kentucky is second
only to West Virginia in indicating equality of
funding and decreased significantly between the two
periods.
In Table 3, expenditures per
student are given for the academic
years 1994-95, 1989-90, and  1985-
1986.  Inspection of Table 3
suggests that while generally the
largest (percentage) increases in
funding went to the districts
spending less both between 1985
and 1989 and between 1989 and
1994, the variation in increases was
much more pronounced between
1989 and 1994.  For example, from
1985-86 to 1989-90 real spending
per student in Kentucky increased
by 18.7 percent while it increased
by only 13.2 percent between 1989-
90 and 1994-95, despite the fact that
real increases in educational
spending across the state were
much greater during the later
period.  One notable exception
appears to be the Jefferson County
school district, which saw only a
6.7 percent increase in real
spending in both periods.  At the
other end, while those districts that
had large increases in spending
after KERA tended to have larger
than average increases prior to
KERA, these increases were not
nearly as large.  For example,
Somerset Independent school
district had the greatest increase in
spending from 1989-90 to 1994-95
at 71.6 percent but only had a
modest 15.9 percent increase in
spending between 1985-86 and
1989-90.
KERA has continued and
expanded on a trend in
redistribution of resources among
the school districts and, in a very
real sense, eliminated an inequity
in educational spending, if not
educational outcomes.  We can see
the impact of KERA by examining both the
relationship between revenues per student and
property value per student.  In Figure 1a we depict
the relationship between total revenue per student
and assessed property value per student (in $1,000)
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Real Expenditures per Student in the
United States, 1988-89 and 1995-96
TABLE 1
Expenditures Expenditures Percentage
per Student per Student Change
1988-89 Rank 1995-96 Rank 1988-95 Rank
United States $5,921 $6,146 3.8%
Alabama 4,075 48 4,716 45 15.7 7
Alaska 9,837 2 9,012 4 -8.4 50
Arizona 4,975 34 4,860 43 -2.3 44
Arkansas 4,173 47 4,710 46 12.9 10
California 5,271 31 5,108 37 -3.1 46
Colorado 5,763 23 5,521 32 -4.2 47
Connecticut 8,742 5 8,817 5 0.9 36
Delaware 6,913 11 7,267 10 5.1 24
District of Columbia 10,008 1 9,565 2 -4.4 48
Florida 5,817 21 5,894 27 1.3 35
Georgia 4,911 39 5,377 35 9.5 13
Hawaii 5,253 32 6,051 22 15.2 8
Idaho 3,611 50 4,465 49 23.6 3
Illinois 6,254 16 6,128 20 -2.0 41
Indiana 5,462 28 6,040 24 10.6 12
Iowa 5,462 29 5,772 29 5.7 21
Kansas 5,664 24 5,971 25 5.4 23
Kentucky 4,267 45 5,545 31 30.0 1
Louisiana 4,229 46 4,988 40 17.9 4
Maine 6,047 19 6,546 15 8.3 17
Maryland 7,341 8 7,382 9 0.6 37
Massachusetts 7,613 7 7,613 7 0.0 39
Michigan 6,565 15 7,166 11 9.2 15
Minnesota 6,062 18 6,162 19 1.6 34
Mississippi 3,647 49 4,250 50 16.5 6
Missouri 5,434 30 5,626 30 3.5 29
Montana 5,472 27 5,847 28 6.9 20
Nebraska 5,559 25 6,083 21 9.4 14
Nevada 4,934 38 5,320 36 7.8 18
New Hampshire 6,128 17 5,958 26 -2.8 45
New Jersey 9,624 4 9,955 1 3.4 30
New Mexico 4,427 43 4,587 47 3.6 28
New York 9,770 3 9,549 3 -2.3 43
North Carolina 4,939 37 5,090 39 3.1 31
North Dakota 5,038 33 4,979 41 -1.2 40
Ohio 5,974 20 6,266 17 4.9 26
Oklahoma 4,308 44 4,881 42 13.3 9
Oregon 6,606 14 6,615 14 0.1 38
Pennsylvania 7,136 9 7,492 8 5.0 25
Rhode Island 7,731 6 7,936 6 2.7 33
South Carolina 4,763 40 5,096 38 7.0 19
South Dakota 4,570 41 4,780 44 4.6 27
Tennessee 4,450 42 4,548 48 2.2 33
Texas 4,942 36 5,473 33 10.7 11
Utah 3,299 51 3,867 51 17.2 5
Vermont 6,987 10 6,837 13 -2.1 42
Virginia 5,787 22 5,433 34 -6.1 49
Washington 5,557 26 6,044 23 8.8 16
West Virginia 4,950 35 6,325 16 27.8 2
Wisconsin 6,713 13 7,094 12 5.7 22
Wyoming 6,853 12 6,243 18 -8.9 51
Source:  National Center of Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education
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(text continued on page 28)
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for the 1988-89 academic
year.  As the line in the
figure shows, we find a
strong positive relationship
between revenue per
student and property value
per student in a district.
Based on the relationship
we estimate, we would
predict a difference in
spending of $1,336 (in 1994
dollars) per student based
on differences in property
value per student between
the district with the highest
property value per student
(Harlan County) and the
lowest (Elliot County).
Figure 1b shows the
same relationship between
revenues per student and
property value per student
for the 1994-95 academic
year.  As the figure shows,
during this year there is no
apparent relationship
between revenue per
student and property value
per student.  While the
slope of the line in Figure
1b is slightly positive, it is
not statistically different
from zero, and, if we use it
to predict the difference in
spending between the
districts with the highest
(Frankfort Independent)
and lowest property values
(Franklin County), this
difference is only $20.
Figure 2 (page 29)
presents the same type of
comparison between
revenue per student and
per capita income in the
school district.  Again, as
shown in Figure 2a, in the
1988-89 school year there
was a strong relationship
Gini Coefficients for Kentucky and Selected Adjacent
States, 1989 - 1990 and 1994 - 1995
TABLE 2
Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient
1989 - 1990 Rank 1994 - 1995 Rank
Kentucky 0.1001 3 0.0700 2
Indiana 0.0908 2 0.0944 4
Ohio 0.1642 5 0.1262 5
Tennessee 0.1012 4 0.0922 3
West Virginia 0.0343 1 0.0290 1
FIGURE 1
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Exp/Stud Exp/Stud Exp/Stud % Change % Change
1994-95 Rank 1989-90 Rank 1985-86 Rank 1985-89 Rank 1989-1994 Rank
Expenditures per Student in Kentucky Public School Districts, 1985 - 1995
TABLE 3
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Kentucky $5,010 $4,425 $3,728 18.7% 13.2%
Adair Co $5,336 50 $4,398 100 $3,381 109 30.1% 70 21.3% 39
Allen Co 4,255 156 4,192 126 3,444 91 21.7 128 1.5 130
Anchorage Ind 6,468 5 7,105 2 7,524 1 -5.6 174 -9.0 163
Anderson Co 3,640 172 4,088 146 2,979 174 37.2 24 -10.9 167
Ashland Ind 4,091 163 4,652 52 4,120 20 12.9 160 -12.1 170
Augusta Ind 5,255 56 5,269 15 4,360 14 20.9 131 -0.3 144
Ballard Co 5,060 81 4,957 27 3,653 53 35.7 31 2.1 128
Barbourville Ind 4,827 102 4,491 79 2,965 175 51.5 3 7.5 101
Bardstown Ind 5,168 72 4,765 43 4,196 17 13.6 157 8.5 100
Barren Co 4,786 104 4,073 150 3,110 160 31.0 63 17.5 58
Bath Co 5,607 32 4,635 54 3,659 49 26.7 85 21.0 43
Beechwood Ind 3,765 171 5,060 21 4,016 26 26.0 100 -25.6 172
Bell Co 5,881 17 4,423 96 3,502 83 26.3 90 33.0 8
Bellevue Ind 4,559 130 4,542 69 3,385 106 34.2 38 0.4 136
Berea Ind 5,034 83 5,415 11 3,885 35 39.4 17 -7.0 158
Boone Co 4,107 162 4,423 95 3,578 63 23.6 118 -7.1 159
Bourbon Co 5,755 23 4,504 76 4,088 24 10.2 166 27.8 21
Bowling Green Ind 5,193 66 5,471 10 4,175 18 31.0 61 -5.1 156
Boyd Co 4,255 155 4,244 122 3,726 47 13.9 156 0.3 137
Boyle Co 4,778 106 4,179 129 3,213 146 30.1 71 14.3 76
Bracken Co 4,386 144 4,662 50 3,892 34 19.8 139 -5.9 157
Breathitt Co 5,820 20 4,875 34 3,627 57 34.4 37 19.4 46
Breckinridge Co 5,678 25 4,447 90 3,576 64 24.4 114 27.7 22
Bullitt Co 4,288 151 3,934 162 3,273 134 20.2 135 9.0 96
Burgin Ind 4,715 113 4,661 51 3,561 68 30.9 64 1.2 133
Butler Co 4,498 136 4,229 124 3,232 141 30.8 65 6.4 108
Caldwell Co 4,575 128 4,269 118 3,300 131 29.4 72 7.2 102
Calloway Co 5,029 84 4,432 93 3,630 55 22.1 127 13.5 79
Campbell Co 4,110 161 4,451 89 3,629 56 22.6 124 -7.7 161
Campbellsville Ind 4,662 119 4,262 120 3,310 124 28.7 74 9.4 93
Carlisle Co 4,598 124 4,389 101 3,654 51 20.1 136 4.8 116
Carroll Co 5,848 18 4,819 40 4,809 7 0.2 173 21.4 38
Carter Co 4,457 141 4,951 28 3,341 119 48.2 6 -10.0 165
Casey Co 5,392 47 4,171 131 3,481 85 19.8 138 29.3 15
Caverna Ind 5,410 45 5,164 18 3,250 138 58.9 2 4.8 115
Christian Co 5,096 78 4,278 113 3,224 145 32.7 47 19.1 49
Clark Co 4,513 131 4,134 139 3,305 127 25.1 107 9.2 95
Clay Co 5,638 29 5,142 19 3,558 70 44.5 11 9.7 91
Clinton Co 6,465 6 4,846 37 3,601 61 34.6 36 33.4 7
Cloverport Ind 6,012 14 5,327 14 4,692 9 13.5 158 12.9 82
Corbin Ind 4,770 109 3,826 170 3,175 151 20.5 133 24.7 27
Covington Ind 6,145 10 5,079 20 4,004 28 26.9 84 21.0 42
Crittenden Co 4,760 111 4,120 142 3,230 143 27.5 81 15.5 70
Cumberland Co 5,061 80 4,560 67 3,748 44 21.7 129 11.0 87
Danville Ind 5,652 27 4,884 33 3,653 52 33.7 40 15.7 69
Daviess Co 5,228 59 4,432 92 3,366 114 31.7 54 18.0 56
Dawson Springs Ind 4,656 120 4,679 49 3,737 45 25.2 105 -0.5 146
Dayton Ind 5,245 58 4,468 84 3,427 96 30.4 68 17.4 61
East Bernstadt Ind NA 173 3,701 173 2,996 171 23.5 120 NA 175
Edmonson Co 5,278 54 4,024 156 3,069 166 31.1 59 31.2 11
Elizabethown Ind 4,651 121 4,512 73 3,941 31 14.5 155 3.1 125
Elliott Co 6,077 11 4,891 32 3,874 37 26.3 92 24.2 29
Eminence Ind 5,170 71 4,583 64 3,824 40 19.8 137 12.8 83
Erlanger-Elsmere 4,508 134 4,722 46 3,688 48 28.1 76 -4.5 153
Estill Co 5,294 53 4,478 82 3,469 86 29.1 73 18.2 54
Fairview Ind 4,141 160 4,587 62 3,269 135 40.3 15 -9.7 164
Fayette Co 5,374 48 6,023 6 4,427 12 36.0 29 -10.8 166
Fleming Co 4,968 89 4,567 66 3,906 33 16.9 150 8.8 98
Floyd Co 5,594 35 3,921 165 3,164 152 23.9 116 42.7 3
Frankfort Ind 6,030 13 6,034 5 4,820 6 25.2 106 -0.1 142
Franklin Co 4,069 165 4,468 83 3,603 59 24.0 115 -8.9 162
Ft. Thomas Ind 4,408 143 4,615 57 3,878 36 19.0 140 -4.5 152
Fulton Co 5,681 24 4,856 35 3,562 67 36.3 28 17.0 65
Fulton Ind 5,974 15 5,027 22 3,579 62 40.5 14 18.8 50
Gallatin Co 4,959 91 4,188 127 3,301 130 26.9 83 18.4 52
Garrard Co 4,600 123 4,370 105 3,417 98 27.9 77 5.3 112
Glasgow Ind 4,668 118 4,610 58 3,086 164 49.4 4 1.3 132
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Exp/Stud Exp/Stud Exp/Stud % Change % Change
1994-95 Rank 1989-90 Rank 1985-86 Rank 1985-89 Rank 1989-1994 Rank
Grant Co $4,588 126 $4,411 97 $3,535 78 24.8% 113 4.0% 120
Graves Co 3,977 167 3,792 172 3,355 117 13.0 159 4.9 114
Grayson Co 4,491 137 4,102 143 3,570 65 14.9 154 9.5 92
Green Co 4,462 140 4,603 60 3,407 100 35.1 34 -3.1 149
Greenup Co 4,949 92 4,149 135 3,289 132 26.2 96 19.3 48
Hancock Co 4,206 157 4,909 30 4,009 27 22.4 126 -14.3 171
Hardin Co 4,676 117 4,059 152 3,091 163 31.3 57 15.2 71
Harlan Co 5,670 26 5,189 16 3,490 84 48.7 5 9.3 94
Harlan Ind 5,174 69 4,453 88 3,304 128 34.8 35 16.2 67
Harrison Co 4,591 125 3,911 167 3,383 107 15.6 153 17.4 60
Harrodsburg Ind 5,134 74 5,025 23 3,769 42 33.3 41 2.2 127
Hart Co 4,512 132 4,341 107 3,542 75 22.6 125 3.9 121
Hazard Ind 4,784 105 4,081 149 3,255 136 25.4 103 17.2 62
Henderson Co 4,687 116 4,623 56 3,515 80 31.5 55 1.4 131
Henry Co 4,887 96 4,583 63 3,386 105 35.3 33 6.6 104
Hickman Co 4,979 87 4,505 75 3,558 71 26.6 86 10.5 88
Hopkins Co 4,942 93 4,443 91 3,390 103 31.0 62 11.2 86
Jackson Co 5,621 31 4,545 68 3,442 93 32.1 53 23.7 31
Jackson Ind 4,696 114 4,427 94 3,543 74 24.9 109 6.1 109
Jefferson Co 5,474 42 6,201 4 5,813 2 6.7 170 -11.7 169
Jenkins Co 6,179 8 4,402 99 3,560 69 23.7 117 40.4 4
Jessamine Co 3,960 169 4,088 145 3,466 87 18.0 146 -3.1 150
Johnson Co 5,196 64 4,096 144 3,247 139 26.2 97 26.9 24
Kenton Co 4,308 149 4,485 81 3,553 72 26.2 93 -3.9 151
Knott Co 5,556 38 4,307 112 3,139 154 37.2 25 29.0 17
Knox Co 5,804 21 4,467 85 3,428 95 30.3 69 29.9 14
Larue Co 4,309 148 4,051 154 3,365 115 20.4 134 6.4 107
Laurel Co 4,716 112 4,172 130 3,000 170 39.0 19 13.0 80
Lawrence Co 4,862 98 4,464 87 3,412 99 30.8 66 8.9 97
Lee Co 5,181 68 4,165 132 3,326 122 25.2 104 24.4 28
Leslie Co 5,511 40 4,325 110 3,103 162 39.4 16 27.4 23
Letcher Co 5,485 41 4,163 133 3,111 159 33.8 39 31.8 10
Lewis Co 5,027 86 4,273 116 3,422 97 24.9 112 17.7 57
Lincoln Co 5,592 36 4,053 153 3,177 150 27.6 80 38.0 5
Livingston Co 4,507 135 4,503 77 3,568 66 26.2 94 0.1 141
Logan Co 5,221 60 4,315 111 3,442 92 25.4 102 21.0 41
Ludlow Ind 4,266 154 4,001 158 3,303 129 21.1 130 6.6 105
Lyon Co 7,740 3 4,980 25 3,362 116 48.1 7 55.4 2
Madison Co 4,584 127 3,905 168 3,333 120 17.1 148 17.4 59
Magoffin Co 5,132 75 4,540 70 3,327 121 36.5 27 13.0 81
Marion Co 5,324 51 4,350 106 3,452 89 26.0 99 22.4 35
Marshall Co 3,946 170 4,270 117 3,212 147 33.0 43 -7.6 160
Martin Co 5,034 82 3,981 159 3,231 142 23.2 121 26.5 25
Mason Co 4,354 147 3,340 176 3,625 58 -7.9 175 30.4 13
Mayfield Ind 5,535 39 4,832 39 3,633 54 33.0 42 14.6 75
McCracken Co 4,305 150 4,044 155 2,982 173 35.6 32 6.5 106
McCreary Co 5,834 19 4,524 72 3,405 101 32.9 44 29.0 18
McLean Co 4,761 110 4,330 108 3,144 153 37.7 23 10.0 90
Meade Co 3,967 168 3,930 163 3,180 149 23.6 119 0.9 135
Menifee Co 5,187 67 3,961 160 3,111 158 27.3 82 31.0 12
Mercer Co 4,360 146 3,690 174 3,057 167 20.7 132 18.1 55
Metcalfe Co 5,606 33 4,698 47 3,538 76 32.8 46 19.3 47
Middlesboro Ind 5,423 44 4,465 86 3,368 113 32.6 48 21.5 37
Monroe Co 5,626 30 4,931 29 3,733 46 32.1 52 14.1 77
Montgomery Co 5,173 70 4,539 71 3,830 39 18.5 144 14.0 78
Monticello Ind 4,854 99 3,948 161 3,371 112 17.1 149 22.9 33
Morgan Co 5,644 28 4,750 45 3,254 137 46.0 9 18.8 51
Muhlenberg Co 4,468 139 4,489 80 3,553 73 26.4 89 -0.5 145
Murray Ind 7,062 4 5,965 7 4,729 8 26.1 98 18.4 53
Nelson Co 4,373 145 4,130 140 3,306 125 24.9 110 5.9 110
Newport Ind 5,558 37 5,552 9 4,401 13 26.2 95 0.1 140
Nicholas Co 4,828 100 4,124 141 3,504 82 17.7 147 17.1 63
Ohio Co 4,509 133 4,006 157 3,126 156 28.1 75 12.5 84
Oldham Co 4,077 164 4,276 114 3,805 41 12.4 161 -4.7 154
Owen Co 4,968 90 4,243 123 3,846 38 10.3 165 17.1 64
Owensboro Ind 6,212 7 6,202 3 5,603 4 10.7 162 0.2 138
Owsley Co 8,366 1 8,492 1 4,323 15 96.4 1 -1.5 147
Paducah Ind 5,762 22 5,756 8 4,167 19 38.1 22 0.1 139
Paintsville Ind 4,563 129 4,511 74 4,089 23 10.3 164 1.2 134
Paris Ind 5,116 77 4,904 31 3,376 111 45.2 10 4.3 118
Pendleton Co 4,802 103 3,896 169 3,282 133 18.7 143 23.3 32
Perry Co 5,270 55 3,926 164 3,106 161 26.4 88 34.2 6
Pike Co 5,198 63 4,062 151 3,210 148 26.5 87 28.0 20
Pikeville Ind 5,342 49 5,354 13 4,099 21 30.6 67 -0.2 143
Pineville Ind 5,196 65 4,328 109 5,690 3 -23.9 176 20.0 44
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Exp/Stud Exp/Stud Exp/Stud % Change % Change
1994-95 Rank 1989-90 Rank 1985-86 Rank 1985-89 Rank 1989-1994 Rank
Powell Co $4,886 97 $4,088 147 $3,112 157 31.4% 56 19.5% 45
Providence Ind 4,973 88 4,086 148 3,457 88 18.2 145 21.7 36
Pulaski Co 4,014 166 3,807 171 3,450 90 10.3 163 5.5 111
Raceland Ind 4,171 159 4,377 104 3,429 94 27.7 78 -4.7 155
Robertson Co 5,071 79 5,169 17 5,086 5 1.6 172 -1.9 148
Rockcastle Co 5,207 61 4,151 134 3,032 168 36.9 26 25.4 26
Rowan Co 5,120 76 4,407 98 3,528 79 24.9 111 16.2 68
Russell Co 5,134 73 4,651 53 3,226 144 44.2 12 10.4 89
Russell Ind 4,693 115 4,503 78 3,389 104 32.9 45 4.2 119
Russellville Ind 5,452 43 5,014 24 3,602 60 39.2 18 8.7 99
Science Hill Ind NA 175 3,498 175 3,013 169 16.1 151                NA 176
Scott Co 4,894 95 4,267 119 3,380 110 26.3 91 14.7 74
Shelby Co 4,477 138 4,276 115 3,401 102 25.7 101 4.7 117
Silver Grove Ind 5,403 46 4,853 36 3,954 30 22.7 123 11.3 85
Simpson Co 6,062 12 4,590 61 3,381 108 35.7 30 32.1 9
Somerset Ind 8,150 2 4,750 44 4,097 22 15.9 152 71.6 1
Southgate Ind NA 176 4,692 48 4,469 10 5.0 171                NA 174
Spencer Co 5,202 62 4,201 125 3,537 77 18.8 142 23.8 30
Taylor Co 4,420 142 4,253 121 3,075 165 38.3 21 3.9 122
Todd Co 4,827 101 4,143 136 3,136 155 32.1 51 16.5 66
Trigg Co 4,773 107 5,401 12 3,659 50 47.6 8 -11.6 168
Trimble Co 5,028 85 4,380 103 4,001 29 9.5 168 14.8 72
Union Co 5,247 57 4,574 65 3,305 126 38.4 20 14.7 73
Walton Verona Ind 4,932 94 4,842 38 3,937 32 23.0 122 1.9 129
Warren Co 4,194 158 3,920 166 2,990 172 31.1 60 7.0 103
Washington Co 4,772 108 4,608 59 3,514 81 31.1 58 3.6 123
Wayne Co 5,599 34 4,628 55 4,208 16 10.0 167 21.0 40
Webster Co 4,602 122 4,388 102 3,321 123 32.1 50 4.9 113
West Point Ind NA 177 4,968 26 3,749 43 32.5 49                NA 173
Whitley Co 5,321 52 4,138 137 3,242 140 27.6 79 28.6 19
Willamsburg Ind 4,279 152 4,137 138 2,910 176 42.2 13 3.4 124
Williamstown Ind 6,175 9 4,786 42 4,024 25 18.9 141 29.0 16
Wolfe Co 5,884 16 4,806 41 4,454 11 7.9 169 22.4 34
Woodford Co 4,276 153 4,185 128 3,345 118 25.1 108 2.2 126
Note: All dollar values are expressed in constant 1994 dollars.
Source:  National Center of Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education.
between per capita income and revenue per student,
with an additional $1,000 in per capita income
increasing revenue per student by approximately $61.
The predicted difference between the district with
the highest income per capita (Oldham County) and
the lowest per capita income (Owsley County) is $852.
From Figure 2b it is apparent that there is not a strong
relationship between district per capita income and
revenue per student in 1994-95.  In fact, there is a
weak (statistically insignificant) negative
relationship between per capita income and revenue
per student.
While KERA has led to significant increases in
educational spending, what is most significant about
its impact is not the magnitude of these increases
but which districts received them.  KERA, in a very
real sense, has eliminated the inequity in educational
spending in the state.  While there are still differences
in spending throughout the state, these differences
are of a smaller magnitude than they were prior to
KERA.  Further, these differences are unrelated to
either income or property wealth — poor districts,
in either income or property wealth, can be expected
to receive as much funding as wealthy districts.
How Has the Money Been
Spent?
While much of the media attention and
discussion that preceded KERA was focused on the
unequal funding of schools and corrupt assessment
practices, attention was also paid to how districts
used their resources.  Concerns about the appropriate
use of educational monies are also apparent in the
KERA legislation itself.  In particular, KERA has
increased standardization of curricula, attempted to
increase parent and teacher input in governance, and
placed restrictions on employment practices in
attempts to eliminate nepotism and politically
motivated appointments.
While it is beyond the scope of this report to
provide a thorough examination of how successful
KERA has been in ensuring that funds are used
productively, we can offer some general information
on how the additional funds KERA has provided
have been spent.
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FIGURE 2
Table 4 provides information regarding
personnel and employment in primary and
secondary education aggregated to the state level.
Again, we make comparisons among the states both
before and after the implementation of KERA.  The
legislation did reduce class sizes in Kentucky, from
17.7 students per teacher in 1988-89 to 16.9 students
per teacher in 1994-95.  However, during a period
when per pupil spending increased by
30 percent, the highest among all the
states, this was only a 4.5 percent
reduction in the student-teacher ratio,
ranking 13th among the states.
At the same time, teacher salaries
in Kentucky did increase from an
average of $32,688 (in 1996 dollars) in
1988-89 to $33,950 in 1996-97.  This
3.86% increase in salaries was the 11th
highest among the states and increased
Kentucky’s rank from 38th to 30th in the
ranking of average teacher salaries.
Again, while this was a significant
increase in teacher salaries relative to
other states, only a small share of the
increase in educational spending from
KERA can be attributed to increased
teacher salaries.
Prior to KERA in the 1988-89
academic year, 46 percent of current
expenditures by school districts were
teacher salaries, while by the 1995-96
academic year only 41 percent of
current expenditures were teacher
salaries.  The decrease in the share of
expenditures going to teacher salaries
is related to the fact that only 32
percent of the increase in current
expenditures from 1988-89 to 1995-96
was for increases in salaries and
increased numbers of teachers in
Kentucky.
While Kentucky has increased its
number of teachers relative to students
during a time when the majority of
states have seen fewer teachers per
student, teachers as a percentage of total public
school staff have decreased significantly, as Table 4
illustrates.  Kentucky has traditionally been a state
with a low percentage of its staff employed as
teachers, ranking 45th in 1988-89 with about 50
percent of its staff employed as teachers.  By 1995-96,
however, the state ranked last among the states with
only about 46 percent of its staff being teachers.
Perhaps the one feature of KERA that
distinguishes it more from earlier educational
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Student/Teacher Ratio, Teacher Earnings, and Teachers
as a Percentage of Total Staff, 1988 - 1995
TABLE 4
finance reform acts in other states is the emphasis on
equality in student performance and achievement,
and not simply equality in funding.
Attempts to achieve equality in performance
required a means of monitoring and measuring the
performance of students.  This led to the development
of the Kentucky Instructional Results Information
System (KIRIS).  KIRIS is an ambitious testing system,
relying not simply on objective questions but also
requiring extensive writing and even group projects.
The results of KIRIS have been criticized for a
number of reasons, however.  Evidence of fraud has
surfaced in some districts2 , possibly as a result of the
bonuses provided to schools and teachers based on
performance on the KIRIS.  A recent study by the Rand
Corporation argues that the increase in KIRIS scores
is an overestimate of the increase in performance by
Kentucky students.  The study supports this
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Student/ Student/ 1989- Teacher Teacher 1989- Teachers/ Teachers/
Teacher Teacher 1995 Earnings Earnings 1994 Total Staff Total Staff
1989 Rank 1995 Rank Change Rank 1988-89 Rank 1994-95 Rank Change Rank 1988 Rank 1994 Rank
United States 17.2 17.3 0.1 $38,765 $38,509 -0.7 53.8% 52.0%
Alabama 18.1 38 16.9 29 -1.2 7 32,538 39 32,549 38 0.0 22 53.2 32 52.9 27
Alaska 16.8 25 17.3 37 0.5 38 54,748 1 50,647 1 -7.5 47 46.5 49 49.1 41
Arizona 18.9 43 19.6 46 0.7 42 37,368 24 33,350 33 -10.8 49 52.7 34 50.1 40
Arkansas 17.0 28 17.1 34 0.1 31 28,053 50 29,975 44 6.9 4 54.7 27 53.8 19
California 22.4 50 24.0 51 1.6 50 45,478 5 43,474 9 -4.4 36 50.2 44 52.0 33
Colorado 17.6 35 18.5 42 0.9 45 38,757 18 36,175 23 -6.7 43 52.5 35 52.5 29
Connecticut 13.3 1 14.4 5 1.1 46 48,964 2 50,426 2 3.0 15 86.9 1 54.5 10
Delaware 16.4 23 16.8 27 0.4 37 41,415 11 41,436 12 0.1 21 54.8 26 54.5 12
District of Columbia 13.4 2 15.0 11 1.6 49 48,818 3 45,012 6 -7.8 48 58.4 9 56.4 7
Florida 17.2 31 18.9 43 1.7 51 35,369 28 33,881 30 -4.2 35 50.8 41 48.3 43
Georgia 18.3 40 16.5 25 -1.8 2 35,298 29 36,042 24 2.1 16 49.7 46 48.2 45
Hawaii 19.1 44 17.8 40 -1.3 5 40,356 15 35,842 25 -11.2 50 42.1 50 62.3 3
Idaho 20.1 47 19.0 44 -1.1 9 29,809 44 31,818 39 6.7 5 63.0 5 58.6 4
Illinois 16.9 27 17.1 35 0.2 33 40,838 13 42,679 11 4.5 10 56.4 15 54.3 16
Indiana 17.5 34 17.5 37 0.0 29 38,236 21 38,575 17 0.9 18 51.2 40 48.0 47
Iowa 15.7 15 15.5 15 -0.2 25 33,800 33 33,275 34 -1.6 29 53.9 31 52.1 32
Kansas 15.0 11 15.1 13 0.1 31 35,875 26 35,837 26 -0.1 23 57.6 11 53.7 20
Kentucky 17.7 37 16.9 30 -0.8 13 32,688 38 33,950 29 3.9 11 49.9 45 46.3 51
Louisiana 17.6 36 17.0 31 -0.6 15 29,463 46 28,347 48 -3.8 33 48.9 47 50.5 39
Maine 14.1 6 13.9 3 -0.2 22 32,699 37 33,800 31 3.4 13 57.3 12 52.3 30
Maryland 16.8 26 16.8 28 0.0 28 44,443 8 41,148 13 -7.4 45 54.4 29 54.4 13
Massachusetts 14.0 5 14.6 8 0.6 39 42,248 10 43,806 8 3.7 12 56.5 15 55.4 8
Michigan 19.7 46 19.7 46 0.0 30 45,460 6 44,251 7 -2.7 30 47.1 48 46.9 50
Minnesota 17.2 32 17.8 41 0.6 40 40,202 16 37,975 18 -5.5 38 56.3 17 62.7 2
Mississippi 18.2 39 17.5 39 -0.7 14 29,604 45 27,720 49 -6.4 41 63.1 4 47.6 48
Missouri 15.7 16 15.4 14 -0.3 20 34,099 32 34,342 28 0.7 19 51.8 39 48.0 46
Montana 15.7 17 16.4 24 0.7 41 32,021 40 29,950 45 -6.5 42 77.5 3 54.2 17
Nebraska 14.7 9 14.5 7 -0.2 24 31,266 42 31,768 40 1.6 17 55.8 19 52.9 28
Nevada 20.4 49 19.1 45 -1.3 6 37,815 23 37,340 20 -1.3 28 85.8 2 58.5 5
New Hampshire 16.2 21 15.7 18 -0.5 18 35,012 30 36,867 22 5.3 8 54.4 28 53.3 22
New Jersey 13.5 3 13.8 1 0.3 35 43,318 9 49,349 4 13.9 3 55.3 22 53.2 25
New Mexico 18.3 41 17.0 32 -1.3 4 31,858 41 29,715 46 -6.7 44 52.3 36 48.3 44
New York 14.7 10 15.5 16 0.8 43 48,061 4 49,560 3 3.1 14 55.3 23 51.0 38
North Carolina 17.1 30 16.2 22 -0.9 11 33,748 34 31,225 43 -7.5 46 52.0 37 52.2 31
North Dakota 15.1 12 15.9 21 0.8 44 29,173 48 27,711 50 -5.0 37 56.1 18 54.3 14
Ohio 17.4 33 17.1 36 -0.3 21 38,905 17 38,831 15 -0.2 24 54.1 30 55.2 9
Oklahoma 16.2 22 15.7 19 -0.5 19 29,332 47 29,270 47 -0.2 25 54.8 25 47.0 49
Oregon 18.4 42 19.8 48 1.4 48 38,536 19 40,900 14 6.1 6 53.1 33 51.8 35
Pennsylvania 15.7 18 17.0 33 1.3 47 40,973 12 47,429 5 15.8 1 55.4 21 53.0 26
Rhode Island 14.5 7 14.3 4 -0.2 23 44,887 7 43,019 10 -4.2 34 62.3 6 63.5 1
South Carolina 17.0 29 16.2 23 -0.8 12 33,597 35 32,659 36 -2.8 31 58.0 10 53.3 23
South Dakota 15.5 14 15.0 12 -0.5 17 26,919 51 26,764 51 -0.6 26 59.4 7 53.2 24
Tennessee 19.1 45 16.7 26 -2.4 1 33,592 36 33,789 32 0.6 20 50.5 42 54.0 18
Texas 16.7 24 15.6 17 -1.1 8 34,782 31 32,644 37 -6.1 40 29.5 51 52.0 34
Utah 24.9 51 23.8 50 -1.1 10 29,964 43 31,750 41 6.0 7 57.2 14 53.6 21
Vermont 13.8 4 13.8 2 0.0 27 35,542 27 37,200 21 4.7 9 57.3 13 49.1 42
Virginia 15.9 19 14.4 6 -1.5 3 37,982 22 35,837 27 -5.6 39 51.9 38 54.3 15
Washington 20.1 48 20.4 49 0.3 34 38,286 20 37,860 19 -1.1 27 55.7 20 51.4 36
West Virginia 15.1 13 14.6 9 -0.5 16 28,721 49 33,159 35 15.5 2 54.8 24 54.5 11
Wisconsin 15.9 20 15.8 20 -0.1 26 40,358 14 38,950 15 -3.5 32 59.0 8 57.9 6
Wyoming 14.5 8 14.8 10 0.3 36 36,234 25 31,721 42 -12.5 51 50.4 43 51.2 37
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Comparisons Among Districts
conclusion by noting that the increases in KIRIS
scores are much higher than the increase in scores
for Kentucky students on the National Assessment
in Educational Progress (NAEP) during the same
period, as well as the gains in scores received by
Kentucky students taking the American College Test
(ACT), a standard test required for college entry.  The
study suggests that much of the gain might be related
to teaching directed at questions that are reused over
time.
We provide a few different measures of
performance to compare Kentucky to other states,
including the scores from the Math NAEP,
graduation rates, and ACT scores.  Table 5 provides
NAEP math scores for both 4th and 8th grades for
1990 and 1996 as well as measures of the changes in
these scores.  Kentucky’s score on the 8th grade Math
NAEP has risen relative to the national average,
ranking 5th in percentage increase among the 28
states in which the test was administered during
both years.  In 1996, Kentucky ranked 28th in scores
of the 43 states administering the exam.  The 4th
grade test began in 1992, and scores in Kentucky
increased by 2.8 percent from 1992 to 1996, compared
with an average U.S. increase of 3.2 percent.  Again,
Kentucky ranked 28th among the states
administering the exam.
The ACT scores in 1995 and 1998 give a similar
story, with Kentucky having a slight increase in
scores from 20.1 to 20.2, while the national average
increased from 20.8 to 21.0.  While Kentucky’s scores
are lower than the national average, some caution
in interpreting these results is warranted since a
much higher percentage of Kentucky students (67
percent in 1998) take the exam than the national
average (37 percent).  The higher the percentage of
students taking the exam, the lower the scores we
should expect.
Also in Table 5 are figures on the percentage of
18- to 24-year-olds who have completed high school
for the 1989-91 period.  We see that during this
period, and in the 1994-96 and 1996-98 periods, the
figure for Kentucky is below the national average for
three three-year periods: 1989-1991, 1994-96, and
1996-98.3  Kentucky’s high school completion rate is
below the national average during all three periods,
and there have only been modest gains in Kentucky
since KERA.  Of course, when considering these
figures, it is important to remember that some of the
individuals represented by these graduation rates
may not have been in school under KERA for more
than a few years or even at all.
Overall, and not too surprisingly, these measures
suggest that at least thus far, KERA has had little
impact on the performance of Kentucky students and
schools compared to the rest of the United States.
Given the criticisms of KIRIS and limited
information at the district level on test scores, we
focus on two other important measures of school
performance:  the dropout rate and the percentage of
graduates planning to attend college.  Given the
strong evidence of the impact of high school
completion on earnings and the substantial
difference in earnings between high school
graduates and college graduates, decreases in
dropout rates and increases in college attendance
should signal increases in future earnings.
Table 6 gives the percentage of 12th graders
planning to attend college for 1993 and 1997 as well
as the change in the percentage between the two
years.4   As the table shows, there has been only a
slight increase in planned college attendance for the
state between 1993 and 1997.  Some districts,
however, have had significant increases in planned
college attendance.  Seven of the ten districts with
the greatest increases in the percentage planning to
attend college were districts who ranked 155 or
below (out of 173 districts in the state) in terms of
the percentage of students planning to attend college
in 1993.
The dropout rate for 1991 and 1995 for the 7th
through 12th grade is also included in Table 6.  The
overall dropout rate for Kentucky has actually
increased for this period by almost one percent.  Of
course, educational quality is not the only reason
that dropout rates may change.  For example,
changes in economic conditions and alternatives to
schooling will also have a significant impact on the
dropout rate.  Again, while the dropout rate has
increased overall, a number of districts have seen
significant decreases.  In fact, eight of the ten districts
with the greatest reduction in dropout rates were
districts that were in the top ten in terms of highest
dropout rates in 1991-92.  While it is more likely that
those districts that have the greatest dropout rates
(text continued on page 35)
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National Assessment in Education Progress (NAEP) Scores and
High School Completion Rate, 1990 - 1996
TABLE 5
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8th Grade Math NAEP 4th Grade Math NAEP Completion Rate
1990-96 1992-96 1989 1992 1994
1990 Rank 1996 Rank Change Rank 1992 Rank 1996 Rank Change Rank -91 -94 -96
United States 262 271 3.4% 217 224 3.2% 85.0% 86.1% 85.8%
Alabama 253 31 257 38 1.6 25 207 38 212 40 2.4 15 82.2 83.3 86.8
Alaska 278 10 224 21 88.7 89.8 87.8
Arizona 260 21 268 25 3.1 16 214 26 218 31 1.9 19 83.2 83.7 85.8
Arkansas 256 26 262 34 2.3 20 209 36 216 34 3.3 7 87.1 87.5 86.7
California 256 27 263 31 2.7 17 207 39 209 41 1.0 28 76.7 78.9 78.6
Colorado 267 11 276 14 3.4 12 220 15 226 15 2.7 13 87.8 87.6 87.9
Connecticut 270 9 280 8 3.7 6 226 7 232 3 2.7 14 89.7 92.6 96.1
Delaware 261 18 267 27 2.3 22 217 21 215 35 -0.9 37 85.9 93.7 88.8
District of Columbia 231 35 233 41 0.9 29 191 42 187 44 -2.1 38 82.0 86.4 87.8
Florida 255 30 264 30 3.5 7 212 32 216 33 1.9 18 83.2 83.2 80.1
Georgia 259 23 262 33 1.2 26 214 27 215 36 0.5 32 85.5 79.4 81.3
Hawaii 251 32 262 36 4.4 4 213 31 215 37 0.9 31 92.9 90.7 92.6
Idaho 271 8 220 16 83.1 86.7 85.2
Illinois 85.4 86.7 89.3
Indiana 267 12 276 15 3.4 13 220 17 229 8 4.1 5 88.9 88.4 88.3
Iowa 278 2 284 2 2.2 24 229 18 229 6 0.0 35 94.5 94.2 91.6
Kansas 92.5 92.2 91.6
Kentucky 257 25 267 28 3.9 5 214 28 220 28 2.8 10 81.6 83.3 82.2
Louisiana 246 34 252 39 2.4 19 203 40 209 42 3.0 9 80.6 83.9 82.2
Maine 284 4 231 1 232 1 0.4 34 90.5 94.0 91.8
Maryland 261 19 270 21 3.4 10 216 25 221 27 2.3 16 87.3 92.9 93.4
Massachusetts 278 11 226 8 229 7 1.3 25 89.6 91.2 92.0
Michigan 264 14 277 12 4.9 2 219 19 226 16 3.2 8 86.3 89.2 89.1
Minnesota 275 4 284 3 3.3 15 227 6 232 17 2.2 17 92.0 93.2 95.3
Mississippi 250 40 200 41 208 43 4.0 6 84.0 88.8 83.9
Missouri 273 19 221 14 225 17 1.8 20 88.0 90.0 88.0
Montana 283 7 228 11 92.7 91.6 89.8
Nebraska 276 3 283 5 2.5 18 224 10 228 10 1.8 22 90.8 95.9 93.3
Nevada 218 32 82.6 83.4 81.4
New Hampshire 273 6 229 3 87.3 86.6 87.7
New Jersey 270 10 226 9 227 12 0.4 33 90.0 91.0 87.0
New Mexico 256 28 262 35 2.3 21 212 33 214 38 0.9 30 84.7 83.7 82.7
New York 261 20 270 22 3.4 11 217 22 223 24 2.8 12 87.7 87.5 90.9
North Carolina 250 33 268 26 7.2 1 211 34 224 20 6.2 1 82.8 85.3 87.2
North Dakota 281 1 284 1 1.1 28 228 4 231 4 1.3 26 95.6 96.6 93.0
Ohio 264 15 217 23 89.3 89.6 87.7
Oklahoma 263 17 223 26 87.1 83.1 87.0
Oregon 276 16 219 20 89.2 82.9 81.1
Pennsylvania 266 13 223 12 226 14 1.3 24 90.2 89.7 89.6
Rhode Island 260 22 269 24 3.5 9 214 29 220 29 2.8 11 87.4 90.7 87.5
South Carolina 261 37 211 35 213 39 0.9 29 82.6 87.0 88.4
South Dakota 87.6 93.2 89.6
Tennessee 263 32 209 37 219 30 4.8 3 87.7 76.5 83.3
Texas 258 24 270 23 4.7 3 217 24 229 9 5.5 4 78.4 80.5 79.3
Utah 277 13 223 13 227 13 1.8 21 93.9 93.9 91.3
Vermont 279 9 225 18 85.9 89.8 87.0
Virginia 264 16 270 20 2.3 23 220 18 223 23 1.4 23 87.0 88.6 86.6
Washington 276 17 225 19 87.4 87.3 86.8
West Virginia 256 29 265 29 3.5 8 214 30 223 25 4.2 4 82.7 85.6 89.3
Wisconsin 274 5 283 6 3.3 14 228 5 231 5 1.3 27 93.4 93.4 92.5
Wyoming 272 7 275 18 1.1 27 224 11 223 22 -0.4 36 91.4 91.6 89.4
Source:  National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education.
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1993-97 1991- 1995- 1991-95
1993 Rank 1997 Rank Change Rank 92 Rank 96 Rank Change Rank
College Attendance and Dropout Rate in
Kentucky Public School Districts, 1991 - 1997
TABLE 6
Kentucky 49.8% 51.0% 1.2% 2.96% 3.85% 0.89%
Adair Co 52.0% 68 53.5% 60 1.5% 77 3.05% 95 3.11% 84 0.06% 82
Allen Co 38.6 135 49.7 81 11.1 18 3.64 121 2.86 76 -0.78 36
Anderson Co 47.5 88 54.9 55 7.4 30 1.86 34 5.14 156 3.28 171
Ashland Ind 63.7 24 71.1 12 7.4 29 1.45 18 1.90 33 0.45 103
Augusta Ind 37.5 139 43.5 113 6.0 41 2.78 77 0.74 11 -2.04 15
Ballard Co 41.5 120 32.1 155 -9.4 145 1.13 12 2.41 57 1.28 133
Barbourville Ind 72.4 11 57.9 42 -14.5 162 2.91 87 1.57 22 -1.34 27
Bardstown Ind 66.2 19 55.7 51 -10.5 151 2.35 50 2.73 68 0.38 100
Barren Co 35.3 145 35.7 141 0.4 83 3.13 99 0.31 5 -2.82 8
Bath Co 35.3 146 44.7 105 9.4 22 5.23 156 3.82 116 -1.41 24
Beechwood Ind 89.8 2 89.2 1 -0.6 95 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 78
Bell Co 41.6 119 38.8 128 -2.8 109 4.34 142 4.10 125 -0.24 62
Bellevue Ind 40.9 125 34.0 145 -6.9 135 4.00 134 3.67 110 -0.33 57
Berea Ind 67.3 18 70.4 13 3.1 62 2.92 90 2.33 52 -0.59 45
Boone Co 45.3 98 63.3 24 18.0 5 2.11 40 2.30 50 0.19 88
Bourbon Co 47.7 87 44.0 110 -3.7 113 2.95 91 4.53 134 1.58 147
Bowling Green Ind 70.8 14 73.4 7 2.6 66 2.12 41 2.32 51 0.20 89
Boyd Co 57.9 36 47.6 92 -10.3 149 1.18 14 2.60 65 1.42 143
Boyle Co 47.2 90 62.2 28 15.0 13 1.65 25 4.01 121 2.36 162
Bracken Co 55.9 43 43.4 114 -12.5 160 2.71 75 3.09 82 0.38 101
Breathitt Co 64.5 21 54.6 56 -9.9 147 2.41 56 3.90 117 1.49 146
Breckinridge Co 28.3 164 52.6 65 24.3 4 1.74 29 2.77 73 1.03 118
Bullitt Co 37.1 142 33.0 150 -4.1 116 4.28 141 3.97 120 -0.31 58
Burgin Ind 30.0 162 54.5 57 24.5 3 1.69 26 1.73 25 0.04 81
Butler Co 37.4 141 31.1 158 -6.3 130 3.97 133 3.72 112 -0.25 61
Caldwell Co 43.2 113 32.5 154 -10.7 153 2.22 44 3.12 85 0.90 116
Calloway Co 52.2 63 49.6 82 -2.6 107 2.31 48 0.68 8 -1.63 23
Campbell Co 18.1 170 56.1 48 38.0 1 1.64 24 2.75 70 1.11 123
Campbellsville Ind 57.8 37 58.1 39 0.3 84 2.67 70 3.28 93 0.61 106
Carlisle Co 43.8 108 52.5 66 8.7 25 1.05 11 4.19 128 3.14 169
Carroll Co 36.3 143 34.4 143 -1.9 104 3.32 110 3.25 91 -0.07 74
Carter Co 47.1 92 49.0 86 1.9 72 3.93 131 5.02 149 1.09 119
Casey Co 43.6 109 41.4 118 -2.2 106 4.51 149 3.54 105 -0.97 33
Caverna Ind 52.5 61 46.9 97 -5.6 125 2.37 52 1.85 32 -0.52 48
Christian Co 52.1 65 55.6 53 3.5 59 4.67 151 5.35 159 0.68 107
Clark Co 51.6 71 51.6 71 0.0 86 3.44 116 4.77 142 1.33 138
Clay Co 27.7 165 34.9 142 7.2 33 4.91 152 9.91 172 5.00 174
Clinton Co 50.6 73 44.3 107 -6.3 129 5.63 163 2.73 69 -2.90 7
Cloverport Ind 33.3 156 50.0 79 16.7 10 3.11 98 2.27 48 -0.84 35
Corbin Ind 72.0 13 60.5 29 -11.5 156 2.78 78 4.44 133 1.66 149
Covington Ind 33.5 155 25.5 169 -8.0 142 5.46 158 5.93 165 0.47 104
Crittenden Co 51.7 70 50.5 76 -1.2 98 1.23 16 2.41 58 1.18 127
Cumberland Co 41.4 122 44.8 104 3.4 61 2.84 81 4.23 130 1.39 142
Danville Ind 77.4 9 78.5 5 1.1 79 1.90 37 2.13 46 0.23 94
Daviess Co 52.0 67 56.0 50 4.0 55 1.86 33 2.56 63 0.70 108
Dawson Springs Ind 61.5 28 37.5 132 -24.0 170 3.75 126 6.19 166 2.44 164
Dayton Ind 34.6 149 52.1 67 17.5 6 4.08 136 5.38 160 1.30 134
Edmonson Co 33.8 152 27.5 164 -6.3 131 3.65 122 1.74 26 -1.91 19
Elizabethown Ind 72.1 12 67.4 17 -4.7 119 1.57 21 3.37 97 1.80 154
Elliott Co 45.8 96 45.3 101 -0.5 93 3.10 97 4.19 129 1.09 120
Eminence Ind 56.6 41 57.7 43 1.1 80 2.24 46 2.62 67 0.38 99
Erlanger-Elsmere 44.1 106 48.7 88 4.6 50 2.35 49 1.69 23 -0.66 38
Estill Co 37.7 138 33.8 147 -3.9 115 4.23 139 5.02 150 0.79 111
Fairview Ind 58.6 33 48.1 90 -10.5 152 0.80 6 1.93 35 1.13 125
Fayette Co 67.7 17 72.0 10 4.3 51 1.89 36 4.95 147 3.06 168
Fleming Co 38.7 134 44.0 111 5.3 47 2.80 79 2.37 56 -0.43 54
Floyd Co 55.3 48 62.4 27 7.1 34 3.56 119 2.43 59 -1.13 29
Frankfort Ind 52.6 59 69.7 14 17.1 9 5.60 162 3.29 95 -2.31 12
Franklin Co 56.0 42 57.0 44 1.0 81 3.22 103 2.75 71 -0.47 51
Ft. Thomas Ind 81.3 5 87.0 2 5.7 44 0.41 2 0.53 6 0.12 87
Fulton Co 50.0 77 49.1 85 -0.9 97 4.48 148 2.27 49 -2.21 13
Fulton Ind 41.1 124 46.5 98 5.4 46 4.41 144 1.81 30 -2.60 11
Gallatin Co 37.8 136 28.6 162 -9.2 144 5.64 164 3.73 114 -1.91 20
Garrard Co 41.4 121 51.5 72 10.1 20 3.94 132 4.01 122 0.07 83
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Glasgow Ind 62.4% 26 65.9% 20 3.5% 58 3.31% 108 3.13% 86 -0.18% 65
Grant Co 26.9 167 33.4 148 6.5 37 3.22 104 4.07 123 0.85 114
Graves Co 45.3 99 53.9 59 8.6 26 2.66 68 3.47 103 0.81 112
Grayson Co 39.4 131 32.6 152 -6.8 133 3.66 124 3.17 88 -0.49 50
Green Co 43.3 112 41.7 117 -1.6 101 2.75 76 2.37 55 -0.38 56
Greenup Co 47.2 91 37.2 134 -10.0 148 2.64 66 3.06 81 0.42 102
Hancock Co 52.0 66 59.6 34 7.6 28 1.79 31 1.34 17 -0.45 53
Hardin Co 43.2 114 49.2 84 6.0 39 2.26 47 3.61 107 1.35 140
Harlan Co 48.5 81 43.5 112 -5.0 120 4.09 137 2.35 53 -1.74 22
Harlan Ind 64.0 22 74.2 6 10.2 19 1.59 22 1.81 29 0.22 93
Harrison Co 54.3 51 56.1 49 1.8 73 2.42 58 5.09 154 2.67 165
Harrodsburg Ind 52.7 58 60.0 31 7.3 32 2.54 63 4.74 141 2.20 161
Hart Co 34.4 151 47.6 93 13.2 16 5.59 161 1.76 28 -3.83 3
Hazard Ind 82.4 4 72.5 9 -9.9 146 2.92 89 0.72 10 -2.20 14
Henderson Co 53.5 55 59.2 35 5.7 45 2.36 51 2.37 54 0.01 80
Henry Co 41.1 123 39.2 125 -1.9 105 4.43 147 5.14 157 0.71 109
Hickman Co 48.4 82 33.3 149 -15.1 163 3.16 102 2.05 42 -1.11 30
Hopkins Co 54.6 50 52.8 62 -1.8 103 2.83 80 4.09 124 1.26 129
Jackson Co 33.6 154 26.5 167 -7.1 137 3.43 114 2.08 43 -1.35 26
Jackson Ind 52.4 62 67.9 16 15.5 12 3.27 106 0.59 7 -2.68 10
Jefferson Co 52.6 60 54.2 58 1.6 75 2.21 43 5.72 163 3.51 172
Jenkins Co 63.9 23 37.8 130 -26.1 171 2.69 71 2.60 66 -0.09 73
Jessamine Co 50.0 76 49.8 80 -0.2 87 3.77 127 6.44 168 2.67 166
Johnson Co 43.4 111 39.7 122 -3.7 112 4.04 135 3.41 99 -0.63 42
Kenton Co 50.5 74 59.9 32 9.4 23 2.23 45 2.00 38 -0.23 64
Knott Co 55.3 47 62.7 26 7.4 31 3.49 117 2.90 78 -0.59 44
Knox Co 32.8 157 26.0 168 -6.8 134 3.39 111 4.85 145 1.46 145
Larue Co 44.5 104 47.1 96 2.6 67 2.42 57 3.67 108 1.25 128
Laurel Co 45.2 100 53.0 61 7.8 27 6.21 167 6.32 167 0.11 85
Lawrence Co 45.9 95 49.0 87 3.1 64 4.41 145 3.44 100 -0.97 32
Lee Co 41.9 117 47.9 91 6.0 40 4.34 143 4.54 135 0.20 90
Leslie Co 58.2 34 51.2 74 -7.0 136 5.29 157 2.04 40 -3.25 5
Letcher Co 53.8 53 58.0 40 4.2 54 2.37 53 1.92 34 -0.45 52
Lewis Co 29.9 163 36.6 135 6.7 35 1.73 27 1.50 20 -0.23 63
Lincoln Co 31.8 159 37.8 131 6.0 42 3.75 125 4.85 146 1.10 121
Livingston Co 34.7 148 37.3 133 2.6 68 2.67 69 2.10 45 -0.57 47
Logan Co 31.5 160 33.0 151 1.5 76 1.74 28 2.56 62 0.82 113
Ludlow Ind 48.1 86 50.0 78 1.9 71 1.18 13 0.91 12 -0.27 59
Lyon Co 57.6 39 47.2 95 -10.4 150 2.10 39 0.69 9 -1.41 25
Madison Co 55.6 45 51.8 68 -3.8 114 2.91 88 2.78 74 -0.13 70
Magoffin Co 44.2 105 44.4 106 0.2 85 3.92 129 2.58 64 -1.34 28
Marion Co 42.3 116 36.4 136 -5.9 126 2.45 59 3.44 100 0.99 117
Marshall Co 59.3 32 63.1 25 3.8 55 2.37 54 5.31 158 2.94 167
Martin Co 57.3 40 51.7 69 -5.6 124 4.27 140 5.54 162 1.27 131
Mason Co 55.4 46 44.0 109 -11.4 155 2.65 67 2.02 39 -0.63 41
Mayfield Ind 59.6 31 60.1 30 0.5 82 3.53 118 3.39 98 -0.14 69
McCracken Co 59.9 30 56.8 47 -0.1 88 2.09 38 1.97 36 -0.06 76
McCreary Co 34.6 150 34.0 146 -0.6 94 5.57 160 6.88 170 1.31 136
McLean Co 44.7 102 39.3 124 -5.4 122 1.62 23 2.98 79 1.36 141
Meade Co 39.1 133 31.4 157 -7.7 139 2.85 83 5.00 148 2.15 160
Menifee Co 48.9 80 30.6 160 -18.3 166 6.86 169 4.15 126 -2.71 9
Mercer Co 41.8 118 36.4 137 -5.4 123 3.27 107 1.41 18 -1.86 21
Metcalfe Co 33.7 153 29.2 161 -4.5 118 5.20 154 5.06 151 -0.14 68
Middlesboro Ind 51.7 69 55.3 54 3.6 57 6.73 168 3.20 90 -3.53 4
Model Lab 94.6 1 65.4 21 -29.2 173 0.98 9 2.09 44 1.11 122
Monroe Co 35.7 144 38.6 129 2.9 65 1.19 15 2.89 77 1.70 152
Montgomery Co 51.6 72 51.2 75 -0.4 91 2.86 84 3.59 106 0.73 110
Monticello Ind 43.9 107 58.8 36 14.9 14 3.43 115 3.03 80 -0.40 55
Morgan Co 47.5 89 44.8 103 -2.7 108 3.56 120 4.84 143 1.28 132
Muhlenberg Co 49.5 78 52.6 64 3.1 63 2.52 62 4.38 132 1.86 157
Murray Ind 79.0 6 73.0 8 -6.0 127 0.55 4 1.72 24 1.17 126
Nelson Co 44.7 103 32.5 153 -12.2 158 3.42 113 5.08 153 1.66 148
Newport Ind 32.6 158 20.8 171 -11.8 157 5.20 155 5.07 152 -0.13 71
Nicholas Co 42.9 115 27.1 165 -15.8 164 3.65 123 3.47 104 -0.18 66
Ohio Co 39.8 129 42.1 116 2.3 70 3.16 102 4.85 144 1.69 150
Oldham Co 57.9 35 71.6 11 13.7 15 1.31 17 1.43 19 0.12 86
Owen Co 48.3 84 40.4 121 -7.9 140 4.42 146 3.32 96 -1.10 31
Owensboro Ind 27.1 166 36.2 138 9.1 24 2.70 72 1.75 27 -0.95 34
Owsley Co 40.4 126 56.9 46 16.5 11 6.17 166 5.41 161 -0.76 37
Paducah Ind 61.7 27 63.4 23 1.7 74 2.90 86 3.11 83 0.21 91
Paintsville Ind 78.2 8 81.6 3 3.4 60 0.50 3 0.25 3 -0.25 60
Paris Ind 61.4 29 40.9 120 -20.5 168 1.54 19 1.84 31 0.30 97
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Pendleton Co 50.5% 75 39.5% 123 -11.0% 154 1.84% 32 3.68% 111 1.84% 156
Perry Co 39.3 132 44.1 108 4.8 49 3.31 109 5.12 155 1.81 155
Pike Co 49.4 80 48.2 89 -1.2 99 3.93 130 3.93 119 0.00 79
Pikeville Ind 84.6 3 81.6 4 -3.0 110 2.85 82 3.14 87 0.29 96
Pineville Ind 64.9 20 52.6 63 -12.3 159 3.07 96 3.28 94 0.21 92
Powell Co 37.4 140 35.9 140 -1.5 100 5.14 153 7.04 171 1.90 158
Providence Ind 22.2 170 32.0 156 9.8 21 0.89 8 3.26 92 2.37 163
Pulaski Co 45.1 101 51.7 70 6.6 36 3.14 100 3.73 113 0.59 105
Raceland Ind 78.7 7 50.0 77 -28.7 172 0.82 7 1.05 15 0.23 95
Robertson Co 25.0 169 18.8 172 -6.2 128 5.52 159 6.63 169 1.11 124
Rockcastle Co 40.2 127 51.5 73 11.3 17 2.45 60 3.77 115 1.32 137
Rowan Co 52.1 64 58.3 37 6.2 38 1.77 30 3.20 89 1.43 144
Russell Co 43.5 110 35.9 139 -7.6 138 1.01 10 4.69 138 3.68 173
Russell Ind 74.5 10 66.1 18 -8.4 143 1.56 20 0.96 13 -0.60 43
Russellville Ind 54.0 52 58.3 38 4.3 52 2.62 65 2.45 60 -0.17 67
Scott Co 53.0 57 34.3 144 -18.7 167 3.04 94 4.73 140 1.69 151
Shelby Co 55.9 44 49.4 83 -6.5 132 3.85 128 4.17 127 0.32 98
Silver Grove Ind 10.0 172 38.9 127 28.9 2 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 77
Simpson Co 46.0 94 45.6 99 -0.4 92 2.59 64 3.47 102 0.88 114
Somerset Ind 68.7 16 68.4 15 -0.3 89 6.96 170 3.92 118 -3.04 6
Spencer Co 26.1 168 43.3 115 17.2 8 5.83 165 0.28 4 -5.55 2
Taylor Co 39.7 130 56.9 45 17.2 7 1.87 35 1.98 37 0.11 84
Todd Co 48.4 83 31.0 159 -17.4 165 2.96 92 1.00 14 -1.96 18
Trigg Co 45.7 97 45.4 100 -0.3 90 2.50 61 4.59 137 2.09 159
Trimble Co 37.7 137 38.9 126 1.2 78 3.24 105 4.57 136 1.33 139
Union Co 46.6 93 45.0 102 -1.6 102 2.14 42 1.56 21 -0.58 46
Walton Verona Ind 62.7 25 41.3 119 -21.4 169 0.71 5 0.21 2 -0.50 49
Warren Co 53.7 54 58.0 41 4.3 53 2.40 55 3.67 108 1.27 130
Washington Co 48.2 85 47.4 94 -0.8 96 3.41 112 2.75 72 -0.66 40
Wayne Co 34.8 147 26.8 166 -8.0 141 4.52 150 2.55 61 -1.97 17
Webster Co 40.2 128 27.5 163 -12.7 161 2.70 73 5.90 164 3.20 170
Whitley Co 30.3 161 25.1 170 -5.2 121 10.03 171 4.23 131 -5.80 1
Willamsburg Ind 70.2 15 66.0 19 -4.2 117 2.71 74 2.05 41 -0.66 39
Williamstown Ind 53.1 56 55.6 52 2.5 69 4.20 138 2.19 47 -2.01 16
Wolfe Co 54.8 49 59.7 33 4.9 48 2.87 85 2.81 75 -0.06 75
Woodford Co 57.6 38 63.5 22 5.9 43 2.98 93 4.70 139 1.72 153
Source:  National Center of Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education.
could decrease them the most, this need not happen,
and the fact that it has should be considered
encouraging.
The relationship between spending on
education and educational performance and
outcomes is a tenuous one, with many studies
finding little or no evidence of the link.5   While it is
beyond the scope of this study to rigorously and
formally analyze the impact of KERA funding on
educational performance in Kentucky schools, we
did attempt to determine whether the additional
spending from 1998-89 to 1994-95 had, without
accounting for other factors, any significant impact
on changes in planned college enrollment or dropout
rates.  For college attendance, we found no evidence
of any impact of additional spending per student.
While we did find there was a negative correlation
between the change in dropout rate and change in
spending per student, once we controlled for 1991-
92 dropout rate, this correlation disappeared.  Thus,
for these two measures, at least for this short time
period, we have found little evidence of any
significant impact of the spending on educational
outcomes.
The NAEP results can not be directly used to
compare scores in districts in Kentucky because they
are derived from a relatively small sample of
students who take the test.  But the NAEP does
report results based on type of location for each state
with results given for central cities, urban fringe/
large town, and rural/small town.  For the results
in mathematics, for both the 4th and 8th grades, the
scores in rural/small towns were significantly lower
than in central cities or the urban fringe/large towns
in 1992.  While scores did not significantly change
between 1992 and 1996 for central cities and the
urban fringe/large towns, however, they did change
for the rural/small towns.  By 1996, there was no
significant difference in mathematics scores between
the regions.  For reading scores in both 1992 and
1994, there were no significant differences between
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regions, nor were there any significant differences
between the two years.6
The reforms instituted through KERA have
dramatically changed the financing of education in
Kentucky.  Prior to KERA, Kentucky had seen large
increases in educational spending and significant
state involvement in attempts to equalize spending
with spending increases of the order of those in
KERA.  Perhaps the most dramatic impact of KERA
has been its effect on equalizing spending
throughout the state.  While spending does still vary
among districts, this variation no longer bears any
relationship to the traditional determinants of
educational spending with decentralized
educational financing, local income and property
wealth.   Now districts with low incomes or little
property value per student are just as likely to have
high educational spending as are wealthy districts.
What is less clear has been how the increased
spending from KERA has been spent and how
effective this spending has been thus far.  Clearly,
technology has been a major emphasis on spending.
What has not been emphasized has been spending
on teachers.  Kentucky has increased teacher salaries
in real terms and at a faster rate than the national
average, and the student-teacher ratio also has fallen.
However, the share of current spending allocated
to teacher salaries has fallen significantly since the
advent of KERA, and Kentucky ranks last in the
percentage of its public school staff who are
classroom teachers.  Given evidence suggesting that
teacher quality has significant impacts on student
performance, more attention to and funding for
improvements in teacher quality might be
warranted.
KERA was designed to not only equalize
funding but also to equalize educational outcomes.
On this score, KERA appears less successful.
Kentucky seems to have gained little, if at all, when
compared to other states based on test scores or
graduation rates.  Within Kentucky, while some
districts have had significant increases in college
attendance by graduates and reductions in dropout
rates, there is no evidence suggesting that these gains
are related to KERA, or at least not increased funding
from KERA.
1. This discussion is adapted from Adams (1993), p. 331.
2. Discussion of fraud in KIRIS testing has even made
the front page of the Wall Street Journal (see “Apple
Polishing: Kentucky Teachers Get Bonuses, But Some
Are Caught Cheating,” Wall Street Journal, 9/27/
September 27, 1997, p. 1 “Apple Polishing:  Kentucky
Teachers Get Bonuses, but Some Are Caught
Cheating”).
3. A more standard measure is the dropout rate.
However, only recently have such statistics been
compiled for all the states at the National Center for
Educational Statistics.  For this reason, we use the
customary alternative measure of graduation rates
that can be compiled from surveys of individuals
rather than from information from educational
agencies.
4. From information available at the Kentucky
Department of Education website, http://
www.kde.state.ky.us.
5. See Hanushek (1986), Journal of Economic Literature  24
(September), pp. 1141-77.
6. These results are from The NAEP 1996 State
Assessment in Mathematics:  Kentucky and The NAEP
1994 State Assessment in Reading:  Kentucky, available
at http://nces.ed.gov/naep/index.html.
Endnotes
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While the lack of any measurable increase in
achievement or performance since KERA might
appear discouraging, it should not be surprising.
Even if the reforms and spending from KERA will
lead to better schooling and performance by
students, these changes may take a considerable
amount of time.  Increased salaries will have only
limited impacts on teacher quality if they are
received by teachers employed prior to KERA.  Only
when districts have the opportunity to hire new
teachers can we expect to see any benefits from
increased spending on teachers.  In addition, for
some districts the increase in resources has been
substantial and now these districts must learn to
manage these increased funds.  Given that these
districts have now had eight years since the initial
infusion of KERA funding and the apparent limited
spending on teachers, it might now behoove the state
to evaluate how this money has been spent.
Conclusion
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Why Are More
Kentuckians Working?
Mark C. Berger and Sharon Kane
Introduction
Historically, Kentucky has experienced some of
the lowest employment rates in the United States.
In 1986, Kentucky’s male employment rate ranked
42nd among the 50 states and the District of
Columbia, while Kentucky’s female employment
rate ranked 49th.  Since that time, however,
Kentucky’s female employment rate has
experienced a remarkable resurgence.   As shown
in Figure 1, from 1986 to 1996,
Kentucky’s female employment
rate increased from 44.5 percent
to 52.8 percent.  At the same
time, the average increase in
female employment rates across
all states was only from 52.8
percent to 57.8 percent.
Kentucky’s percentage increase
in the female employment rate
from 1986 to 1996 was the 5th
largest across all the states and
the District of Columbia.1   On
the other hand, male
employment rates in Kentucky
fell from 68.0 percent to 65.8
percent, while the average
change across all states was
nearly zero.  The percentage
decrease in the Kentucky male
employment rate ranked 15th in
the United States.  Overall, Kentucky’s employment
rate increased from 55.6 to 59.0 percent, the 21st
largest percentage change.  Clearly, the increase in
female employment rates has been an important
component of the overall increase in Kentucky
employment rates over the last ten years.
Greater labor force participation plays a
significant role in increasing state per capita income,
which is a general measure of a state’s economic
success.  While per capita income has also been
Kentucky’s female employment increased substantially from 1986 to 1996, from 44.5 percent
in 1986 to 52.8 percent in 1996, a larger increase than seen nationwide.  At the same time,
Kentucky’s male employment rate decreased from 68.0 percent to 65.8 percent during this
period, while the U.S. rate stayed the same.  The most important factor behind the increase
in the female employment rate has been the increase in education among Kentucky females
from 1986 to 1996, as more education tends to lead to higher employment rates.  Also
important was the change in industry structure and, to a lesser extent, growth in gross
state product and a decrease in average household size.  The analysis is less clear for Kentucky
males, but nationwide male employment rates have been falling over time.
Male and Female Employment Rates for Kentucky
and the United States, 1986 and 1996
FIGURE 1
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historically low in Kentucky, it has improved relative
to the national average over the last ten years.
Governor Paul Patton has made one of his central
goals for Kentucky to raise the standard of living of
Kentuckians so that per capita income in Kentucky
reaches the national average.  Berger (1997) finds
that lower employment rates in Kentucky relative
to the national average are one of the main reasons
why Kentucky’s per capita income lags behind the
national average.  Put simply, in states where fewer
people are working and earning wages, per capita
incomes are lower.  Therefore, increasing
employment rates may be one of the keys to meeting
the challenge of reaching the national average in per
capita income.  Understanding the forces behind the
increases in employment rates during the last ten
years will help plan for further increases, which in
turn can help assure greater economic prosperity in
the state.
Ten years ago in the Kentucky Annual Economic
Report, Berger (1989) examined the causes behind
Kentucky’s low employment rates relative to other
states in “Why Aren’t More Kentuckians Working?”
He found that the most important reason why
Kentucky’s employment rates were below the
national average was that Kentuckians had lower
levels of education than the rest of the country.  Also
important, but of smaller magnitude, were
differences in industry structure and the level of
business activity in Kentucky versus the rest of the
country.  A similar analysis was performed by
Dorsey (1991) for neighboring West Virginia, where
employment rates are the lowest in the nation.
Instead of education, Dorsey points to the large
Appalachian population and to the high rate of
federal disability benefits receipt to explain the low
employment rates in West Virginia relative to the
rest of the country.  Examining county-level data in
West Virginia and other states, Isserman and
Rephann (1993) dispute the existence of a specific
“Appalachian effect” on labor force participation.
While these studies are useful in that they
examine the reasons for state-to-state variation in
employment rates at a point in time, they do not
help us to understand the reasons behind changes
in employment rates over time.  In this paper, we
examine changes in male and female employment
rates from 1986 to 1996 in Kentucky and other states.
We first consider the possible forces behind changes
in employment rates over time and then compare
Variables Affecting
Employment Rates
how measures of these forces have changed in
Kentucky relative to elsewhere in the country.  We
then estimate a statistical model explaining changes
in female and male employment rates across states.
Finally, we use the estimates of this model to
determine the quantitative contributions of the
various forces behind the observed changes in the
proportions of males and females that are working
in Kentucky and in the rest of the United States.
Many factors affect the state-to-state variation
in overall employment rates.  Ultimately, the fraction
of individuals working in a particular state depends
on the interaction of the supply and demand for
labor in that state.  Increases in demand or supply
lead to higher employment rates, while decreases
in demand or supply lead to lower employment
rates.  Some variables are associated with changes
in the demand for labor, some are associated with
changes in the supply of labor, and some are
associated with changes in demand and supply.  We
discuss some of the variables that may influence the
demand and supply of labor below:
Variables Affecting the Supply of Labor:
• Non-wage Income: Variation in income from
sources other than employment can have an
impact on employment rates, since a higher level
of non-wage income reduces incentives to work.
Therefore, states with higher average amounts of
non-wage income, other things being equal,
should have lower employment rates.
• Household Size: The supply of workers can also
be affected by a larger household size, typically
meaning more children or greater family
responsibilities and thus a lower probability of
working, particularly in the case of females.  This
factor can also work in the opposite direction, since
a greater household size can result in a greater
need to work.  Thus, changes in household size
across states have an uncertain effect on
employment rates.
Variables Affecting the Demand for Labor:
• Output: The economic success of a state as a whole
can impact the employment rates by affecting
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employers’ demand for workers.  In states where
aggregate output of goods and services is higher,
one would expect a higher demand for labor and,
therefore, higher employment rates.
• Industry Structure: The industrial mix in the state
may also affect employment rates.  Some
industries have more labor-intensive technology
than others, resulting in different demands for
labor.
Supply and Demand Factors:
• Education:  Educational attainment can have an
effect on employment rates since those with more
schooling are not only more likely to participate
in the labor force but also more likely to be in
demand by employers.  Therefore, states with
higher rates of education would have higher rates
of employment.
• Age:  The age distribution of the population can
affect the percentage of workers employed.  A
higher percentage of people over age 65 should
lower employment rates since many of these
people would be retired.  A higher percentage of
people that are younger should increase the
employment rates.  In addition to these labor
supply factors, labor demand may also be
influenced by the age composition of the labor
force.
• Unionism:  Union coverage of the labor force may
affect the demand for workers since firms may
hire less workers at a union-negotiated wage
above the competitive market wage.  On the other
hand, higher union-negotiated wages induce a
greater supply of workers.  At the same time,
unions may restrict the supply of workers in union
jobs but raise the supply of workers in nonunion
jobs.  The net effect of all of these forces on the
overall employment rate is uncertain.
In addition to these factors, wages also affect
the supply and demand for labor.  In a standard
labor demand and supply model, however, wages
and employment are determined simultaneously.
We instead focus on the employment relationship
as a function of the variables that influence the
demand for labor, the supply of labor, or both supply
or demand.2
We collected data from the Statistical Abstract of
the United States, the Regional Economic Information
System, and the U.S. Census of Population and
Housing to measure each of these factors affecting
employment rates.  Employment rates are measured
as the fraction of the civilian non-institutional
population over 16 years of age that is working.
Employment rates are calculated separately for
males and females.  Education is measured using
Census data on educational attainment for the
population ages 25 and over.  Four categories are
used:  those that did not complete high school, or
“dropouts”; high school graduates; those with some
college, which includes associate degree recipients;
and those with a four-year college degree or higher.
Output in the overall economy is measured by
per capita gross state product (GSP), the per person
overall value of goods and services produced in the
state.  Non-wage income is  proxied using average
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments,
which are disability payments from the federal
government.  The impact of age is evaluated by
looking at the fraction of the entire state population
that is between the ages of 18 and 34, and also the
fraction that is over age 65.  The effect of unionism
is measured by the percentage of workers in the state
that are covered by unions.  Industry structure is
captured using the portion of GSP produced by a
particular industry sector.  This allows comparisons
across states of the fraction of the state’s income
produced in a particular industry while at the same
time holding constant the overall level of GSP.
Table 1 shows the variables included in the
model, the average of all the state values, the
Kentucky values, and the rankings of Kentucky
among the 50 states and the District of Columbia in
the 1980s and 1990s.  Looking at the changes in
Kentucky’s state rankings over time may help us to
begin to understand the causes behind the changes
in Kentucky’s female and male employment rates
in the last decade.
Data
Kentucky’s Ranking
Among the States
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Employment Rates, Demographics, Gross State Product (GSP), and Industry
Structure in Kentucky and the United States, 1986 and 1996
TABLE 1
Kentucky Kentucky U.S. U.S. Ky. 1986 Ky. 1996
1986 1996 1986 1996 Rank Rank
Males employed (ages 16+) 68.0% 65.8% 71.4% 71.4% 42 48
Females employed (ages 16+) 44.5 52.8 52.8 57.8 49 44
High school dropout 46.9% 35.7% 32.5% 23.8% 1 2
High school graduate 31.3 31.8 35.1 30.9 43 19
Some college 10.7 19.2 16.1 25.3 49 48
Bachelor’s degree or higher 11.1 13.6 16.3 20.0 49 49
Per capita gross state
product $19,760 $29,670 $24,420 $35,350 45 39
Average Supplemental Security
Income payments $2,001 $3,933 $2,103 $3,954 20 24
Average household size (persons) 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.6 15 31
Ages 18 - 34 29.4% 24.9% 29.5% 24.3% 25 16
Ages 65 and over 12.0 12.6 11.9 12.7 29 27
Covered by a union 18.8% 14.1% 18.9% 15.1% 26 26
Agriculture share of GSP 2.7% 2.2% 2.3% 1.9% 11 12
Mining share of GSP 5.2 3.4 3.2 2.4 10 10
Construction share of GSP 3.9 4.0 4.8 4.1 40 29
Manufacturing share of GSP 27.4 26.9 18.0 17.0 6 7
TCPU share of GSP 8.6 9.6 9.6 9.4 33 20
Wholesale trade share of GSP 5.0 5.5 6.1 6.2 44 40
Retail trade share of GSP 9.3 8.9 9.6 9.1 37 36
FIRE share of GSP 11.8 11.0 16.0 16.9 47 49
Services share of GSP 11.9 14.4 15.5 18.5 45 47
Government share of GSP 13.8 13.7 14.6 14.0 24 21
TCPU = Transportation, Communications, and Public Utilities
FIRE = Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Note:  1986 and 1996 employment and age structure data are from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1987 & 1997.
Education data are from the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census of Population.  Household size data are for 1980 and 1996 and are
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1984 & 1997.   All other data are from the Regional Economic Information
System, 1969-1996, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Industry shares of GSP and per capita gross state product are for 1986 and 1994.
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Kentucky’s educational attainment increased
substantially relative to the rest of the country
between 1980 and 1990.  While Kentucky’s dropout
rate remained very high (ranked 2nd in 1990), and
the proportion of the population with some college
or college graduates remained very low (48th and
49th , respectively, in 1990), the fraction of
Kentuckians with a high school education improved
markedly relative to the rest of the country.  In 1980,
Kentucky  rated 43rd in the fraction of its population
with a high school education, and by 1990
Kentucky’s ranking had increased to 19th.  This
increase in educational attainment may be partly
responsible for the increase in female employment
rates observed in Kentucky.
Output per person rose faster in Kentucky than
in the rest of the country, so that Kentucky’s GSP
per capita ranking improved from 45th to 39th.  This
increase in output per capita is consistent with an
increase in employment rates.  Also consistent with
an increase in employment rates, especially for
females, is the reduction in household size in
Kentucky and the drop in ranking among the states
Statistical Analysis
from 15th to 31st.  In other words, while household
size fell nationally as well, the decrease was larger
in Kentucky.
Looking at Table 1, perhaps the other potential
cause for the observed changes in Kentucky’s
employment rates is a change in industry structure.
The rankings of Kentucky’s share of GSP produced
in construction; transportation, communications,
and public utilities; wholesale trade; and
government increased, while Kentucky’s ranking in
finance, insurance, and real estate and services
decreased.  The ranking of the share produced in
the other sectors remained constant or nearly so.  For
example, the ranking of Kentucky’s manufacturing
sector was high in both the 1980s and the 1990s (6th
and 7th, respectively).  The net effect of these changes
in industry mix on employment rates is not
immediately apparent.
We use a statistical model to provide
quantitative estimates of the contributions of the
Why Are More Kentuckians Working?
Percentage Changes in Variables Determining Employment Rates in Kentucky
versus the United States, 1986 - 1996
FIGURE 2
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various factors to the changes in employment rates
observed over time in Kentucky.  We use a multiple
regression model in which the change in
employment rates in each state between 1986 and
1996 is a function of changes in the variables shown
in Table 1.  Thus, the change in employment rates in
each state depends on factors such as the change in
educational attainment, state GSP, SSI payments,
and industry structure.3   The regression model gives
us estimates of the effects of each of the variables in
the model, holding constant the effects of all of the
other variables.  We use these estimates and the
observed changes in each of the variables in
Kentucky and the rest of the country to calculate
the contributions of each of the variables to the
change in employment rates in Kentucky relative to
the rest of the country.
The first step is to calculate changes in the
variables determining employment rates in both
Kentucky and in the rest of the country.  Figure 2
shows the percentage change in each of the variables
in Kentucky minus the U.S. percentage change, as
measured by the average of the 50 states and the
District of Columbia.
The bars on the right
side of Figure 2
represent variables
that have changed by
a greater amount in
Kentucky than in the
rest of the country
while the bars on the
left side show
variables for which
the change in
Kentucky was less
than in the rest of the
country.  This figure
shows that there
have been relatively
large differences in
the change in
industry structure in
Kentucky versus the
rest of the country.
Figure 2 also clearly
shows the increase in
educational attain-
ment in Kentucky
relative to other
states.  Smaller differences in the observed changes
in Kentucky versus the rest of the country are
observed for age composition, unionization,
household size, SSI payments, and per capita GSP.4
These differences in percentage changes are
multiplied by the estimates of the regression model
to obtain the contribution of each variable to the
difference in the employment rate change in
Kentucky versus the average change in employment
rates across all states.  In the case of females,
employment rates in Kentucky increased faster than
in the rest of the country.  Figure 3 shows the
contributing factors to the faster female employment
growth in Kentucky relative to the rest of the country.
Consistent with the Berger (1989) study, the most
important factor contributing to Kentucky’s faster
female employment growth was the increase in
educational attainment in Kentucky.  In other words,
as Kentucky women have become more educated,
their employment rates have also increased.
Also important has been the change in
Kentucky’s industry structure over time, and, to a
lesser extent, the growth in GSP and the decline in
Why Are More Kentuckians Working?
Explaining the Predicted Gap in Employment Growth
between Kentucky and the United States, 1986 - 1996
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Conclusion
household size.  On the other hand, the relative
increase in average SSI payments in Kentucky pulled
down female employment rates.  The contributions
of age composition and unionization were
negligible.  Overall, the model accounts for
approximately 85 percent of the actual difference in
the female employment growth rates in Kentucky
and the rest of the country.5
The story for males is not as straightforward.
The male employment rate in Kentucky decreased
more than in the rest of the country.  And while the
decrease in the male employment rate in Kentucky
ranked 15th in the nation, the magnitude of the
decrease was small, especially compared to the
increase for women.  It is fairly difficult for a
statistical model to account for such small changes.
This is the case for our male regression model.  Our
model predicts that the male employment rate in
Kentucky should have increased by 2.8 percent more
than the average of the states, when in fact the
Kentucky male employment rate decreased by 3.3
percent more than did the state average rate.  As for
females, changes in education and industry structure
were the major factors pulling up predicted
employment rates for men, while changes in average
SSI payments worked to pull down employment
rates.  Other variables in the model made only minor
contributions to the predicted difference in the
Kentucky and state average male employment rate
changes from 1986 to 1996.
Why are more Kentuckians working now than
were working ten years ago?  The overall
employment rate in Kentucky is higher because of
the rapid increase in the employment rate of women,
which occurred despite a decrease in the
employment rate of men.  Why are a greater fraction
of women working now than ten years ago?  Our
analysis suggests that the main reason is that the
education levels of Kentuckians have increased over
the last ten years faster than in the rest of the country.
Those with more education are likely to find jobs
and thus contribute to overall economic activity.
These higher employment rates have the added
benefit of helping raise per capita income and
narrow the income gap between Kentucky and the
rest of the country.
Why Are More Kentuckians Working?
1. Consistent with this change, Cox (1998) finds that
Kentucky’s increase in female labor force participation
from 1987 to 1995 was larger than in other southern
states such as Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee.
2. Thus, we analyze what is known as a “reduced form”
employment model, in which the determinants of
wages have been substituted for the wage variable.
3. The variables are all expressed in natural logarithmic
form so the models are specified in terms of log
differences.  This has the added convenience of
converting the model to one of percentage changes
over time in each state.
4. Small differences in percentage changes between
Kentucky and the other states can nevertheless lead
to a large change in Kentucky’s ranking among the
Endnotes
The other important factors contributing to the
increasing female employment rate in Kentucky are
overall economic growth and the change in the
structure of jobs over time.  Not only has Kentucky’s
economy grown faster than the economies in other
states, but its structure has changed over time in
ways that have helped foster employment growth.
While both education and economic growth
worked to raise employment rates of men in
Kentucky, the net effect was still a fall in male
employment rates.  It appears that this decline was
due to factors outside our analysis.  The decline in
Kentucky mirrors long-term downward trends in
male employment rates nationwide, especially
among older workers.  Perhaps our analysis has not
adequately captured the forces determining
retirement decisions that have led to early labor force
withdrawal of males.
What does the future hold?  The key to
sustaining the increase in employment rates in
Kentucky would appear to be to continue to raise
education levels of Kentuckians.  Also important is
for economic growth and restructuring to continue
in the state.  However, sustaining economic growth
and restructuring will be made easier with a more
educated population.  In the end, we are faced with
yet another economic outcome in Kentucky that
depends critically on the education levels of the
population.  Raising employment rates is one of the
important ways to continue to close the income gap
between Kentucky and the rest of the country.  And
the most important way to continue raise
employment rates is to increase the education levels
of Kentuckians.
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states, as the case of average household size shows.
5. The model predicts that female employment in
Kentucky grew by 6.80 percent more than the average
of the states, while the actual difference was 8.04
percent.
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Market Responses to Kentucky’s
Health Insurance Reforms
Michael Clark and GinnyWilson
In 1994, the Kentucky General Assembly began
a series of three major revisions to the laws
governing health insurance in the state.  The first
revision was designed to provide relief for
policyholders facing unaffordable premiums
because they were judged by insurance carriers to
pose a greater risk of large claims.  One feature of
the legislation was to limit the ability of insurance
companies to charge different premiums based on
individuals’ characteristics such as age, gender, and
health status.  Supporters of the measure generally
expected that this change would substantially lower
premiums for individuals with a high probability
of filing large and numerous claims, and somewhat
increase the premiums for those with a low
probability of filing large and numerous claims.
However, subsequent legislative and executive
provisions created an opportunity for policyholders
to segment themselves by risk, essentially allowing
low-risk individuals to avoid the higher premiums
which were intended to offset the lower premiums
of high-risk people.  This article discusses how the
health insurance market has reacted to these
changes.
Introduction Legislative History of
Health Insurance
There are two “pure” types of rating structures
that insurance carriers might use to price policies.
These are experience rating and community rating.
With experience rating, insurance carriers price
policies to reflect the expected claims of the
policyholder; those with higher expected claims are
charged more than those with lower expected
claims.  With community rating, the expected claims
of the entire covered group is estimated and
policyholders pay an average premium sufficient to
pay total group claims.
The basic distinction between these two pricing
structures is whether risks are pooled or segmented.
Under an experience-rated pricing system for health
insurance, the health risks associated with particular
policyholders are segmented.  This means that those
with similarly low expected claims are placed in one
category and charged a low price, reflecting their
low level of risk, while those with higher expected
claims are placed in another category and charged
a higher price, reflecting their similar level of risk.
Thus, those with different risks are segmented into
defined categories, with differing prices attached to
each category, according to the level of risk the
category represents.  The risk categorization of any
policyholder is only valid for the time period
covered by a specific contract, usually a contract
The authors would like to thank Greg Freedman and D.J. Wasson for
their help in understanding legislation and Dan Jacovitch for help with
data.
Health insurance reforms in Kentucky in 1994, 1996, and 1998 dramatically changed the
nature of health insurance in the state.  One part of the legislation limited the ability of
insurance companies to charge different premiums based upon individual characteristics
such as age, gender, and health status.  Because all insured persons would then be charged
an average premium based upon the average health status of the entire group, those in better
health may have opted to drop their insurance because they would be paying a higher premium
than otherwise.  Legislation passed by the General Assembly again allowed insurance
companies to segment their customers by health status but does not allow them to deny
coverage to high-risk people.
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year.  At the time the contract is renewed, the risk
expectations for each policyholder are re-evaluated,
and a policyholder may be assigned to a new
category if his or her risk status has changed.
The other pure form of insurance pricing,
community rating, is based on risk pooling.  Under
community rating everyone pays a premium closer
to the average for the whole group and those who
move into a different risk category do not see a
parallel increase in premiums.  In pure community
rating, risks are pooled across all individuals in the
group.  Under this insurance pricing scheme, those
with lower expected claims, who tend to be younger
and male, generally subsidize the premiums of those
with higher expected claims, who tend to be older
or female.  Community rating yields a price that is
more stable across subsequent periods for all
individual policyholders but which is higher for
those who would benefit from risk segmentation.
Modifications to pure community rating, such as
allowing adjustments for age, gender, or other
factors, simply restrict the risk pooling to categories
of individuals who share specified demographic
characteristics.  Even with modifications for some
demographic factors, however, community rating
remains essentially different from experience rating,
in that health status factors are not used to adjust
community rates.
Prior to the initial action by the General
Assembly in 1994, insurance carriers in Kentucky
had no restrictions on their rating structures.
Although rate increases for some carriers were
subject to approval by the Kentucky Department of
Insurance, the criteria used for approval were that
the increases be actuarially justified and that they
preserve the financial health of the carrier.  Insurance
carriers did not have to issue policies to those with
high expected claims, waiting periods and pre-
existing condition exclusions were set as desired,
and most premiums were set through experience
rating.
These conditions led to a situation in which
some policyholders with high expected claims were
being denied coverage or were being priced out of
their policies.  A rate filing from the Department of
Insurance showed that from 1980 to 1993, rates
increased by 1,600 percent for one group of
policyholders.  The increase in the medical care
Consumer Price Index (a medical care inflation rate)
for the same period was 105 percent.  Employers
and individual purchasers of insurance were
complaining about large price increases, and those
with employer-provided policies were afraid to
change jobs for fear that long waiting periods or pre-
existing condition exclusions would leave them
exposed to both financial and medical catastrophe.
In response to these conditions, the 1994
Kentucky General Assembly enacted House Bill 250
(HB 250).  HB 250 made many changes in Kentucky’s
health care market, but the ones pertinent to this
discussion were those relating to insurance carriers’
underwriting rules and rating structures.
Kentuckians who purchased insurance in the small-
group and individual markets were the prime
targets of changes in these rules because they were
believed to be the most negatively affected by
experience rating and denial of coverage.
Individuals purchasing health insurance in large
groups were more insulated from the particular
impact their own claims might have on the average
costs for the whole group.
HB 250 required guaranteed issue and
guaranteed renewal.  Guaranteed issue and
guaranteed renewal mean that carriers must provide
a policy to all applicants willing to pay the premium.
In the absence of these requirements, health
insurance carriers could refuse to issue or renew
policies to those policyholders believed to represent
an unacceptable risk of large claims.  HB 250 also
mandated a modified community rating structure
for policies sold to small groups, individuals, and
participants in the Kentucky Health Purchasing
Alliance.  In setting rates for these policyholders,
carriers could consider age, geography, family
composition (single, couple, parent plus children,
family), richness of benefits, and cost-containment
restrictions on choice.  Age adjustments were
allowed only to the extent that the oldest
policyholder in the group could be charged no more
than three times the amount charged the youngest,
and geographic adjustments were limited to a total
of 15 percent.  Neither gender nor claims experience
could be considered in setting rates.
The provisions of HB 250 became effective in
July 1995.  Around that time, insurance carriers
began to withdraw from the Kentucky market.  Prior
1994 Legislation
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to 1994, only health maintenance organization
(HMO) products and individual indemnity products
had to be reviewed by the Department of Insurance.
Therefore, there is no information on the total
number of carriers operating in the state at that time.
Following the enactment of HB 250, however, 28
carriers notified the Department of their decision to
withdraw from Kentucky.
In the period between the enactment of HB 250
(July 1994) and SB 343 (July 1996), three Executive
Orders were issued extending coverage issued prior
to July 15, 1995, to individuals, small groups, large
groups, and trade associations.  This extension,
which was granted through July 15, 1996, was given,
in part, to allow carriers to maintain existing policies
until legislative changes anticipated in the 1996
Regular Legislative Session could be evaluated.
These extensions were given for individuals, small
groups, and small associations at the option of the
insured and with no ability for carriers to increase
rates.  The Executive Order issued for large groups
and large associations permitted rate increases,
however.  The Executive Orders did not prohibit a
carrier from terminating all business and
withdrawing from the health insurance market.
Rather, carriers wishing to remain in the market were
required to continue renewing the pre-reform
policies.
As the General Assembly convened in Regular
Session in January 1996, withdrawal of insurance
carriers from the Kentucky market was forcing many
policyholders to find new coverage.  Legislative
committees heard evidence that some remaining
carriers were conducting mass mailings to
policyholders warning of restricted choice and
higher premiums.  Policyholders who believed they
had been harmed by the changes were vocal in
expressing their displeasure.  In response, the 1996
General Assembly passed Senate Bill 343 (SB 343),
which allowed gender to be used as an adjustment
factor for community rates.  Consideration of past
or expected future claims experience was still not
allowed.  Another change in the reforms was that
SB 343 exempted certain trade associations from
rating restrictions, allowing the associations to
provide health insurance that varied by customers’
1996 Legislation
characteristics, including health status.
Another Executive Order was issued on June 5,
1997, again permitting coverage under pre-reform
policies to be extended, at the option of the insured.
Carriers were permitted, however, to file rate
increases on that business.  In the interim period
following the enactment of SB 343 and the Special
Legislative Session on Health Insurance in October
1997, an additional 23 carriers withdrew from the
insurance market in Kentucky.
No changes were enacted in the Special
Legislative Session on health care called by Governor
Paul Patton in October 1997.  Although it was
anticipated that amendments to SB 343 would be
made by the 1998 General Assembly, the Patton
administration did not issue an additional Executive
Order to extend coverage under pre-reform health
benefit plans through the end of the Regular Session.
Rather, an Executive Order was issued prohibiting
the renewal of pre-reform health benefit plans after
December 1, 1997.  During the time that the freeze
was in place, premiums for these policies did not
increase.  This extension was made to allow carriers
time to complete any necessary internal
administrative and filing issues with the Department
of Insurance.  Following the end of the Special
Legislative Session, six more carriers notified the
Department of their withdrawal from the state
insurance market.
Thus, between 1994 and the end of 1997, a total
of 57 carriers ceased selling policies in Kentucky.
Many of those that remained reported major losses.
In the individual market, only Anthem and
Kentucky Kare, the plan created to be a self-insured
plan for state government employees, continued to
offer policies.
To address the loss of carriers to the market, the
1998 General Assembly passed HB 315.  This
legislation essentially returned the market to
experience rating, with a few exceptions.  HB 315
stipulated that, for any demographic characteristics
except health status, the highest rate charged can be
no more than five times the lowest rate.  For
individuals with the same demographic
characteristics, those with higher expected claims
because of a health condition can be charged an
1998 Legislation
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additional 135 percent of the index rate (the median
rate for the covered group for that carrier).  HB 315
also designated a list of health conditions, such as
juvenile diabetes and leukemia, as high-cost
conditions.  Because people diagnosed with these
high-cost conditions were likely to have higher
claims, insurance companies were permitted to
charge people with these conditions that did not
have prior coverage up to 150 percent of the index
rate.  For those without one of the high-cost
conditions listed, these rules essentially returned the
market to the rate spread that existed in 1994, where
the highest non-high-risk premium can be 11 times
greater than the lowest premium.  Those who would
have been denied coverage prior to 1994 could
purchase coverage at these rates.  Once issued, all
policies are guaranteed renewable.
In the course of completing the analysis
requested by the Department of Insurance and the
General Assembly, the authors had access to
approximately 1.5 million records covering the
claims incurred by participants in Kentucky Kare
from June 1995 to August 1997.  The data included:
• birthdate and gender of the claimant
• date the claim was
incurred
• amount Kentucky
Kare paid for the
claim
Although the file
included data for
claims processed
from June 1995 to
August 1997, there
was often a lag of
several months
between when a
claim was incurred
and when it was
processed.  Therefore,
the decision was to
analyze primarily
claims incurred in
Premiums Under Risk
Segmenting and Risk Pooling
calendar year 1996.  Kentucky Kare paid
approximately $117 million for 590,000 claims
incurred in 1996.  The average payment per claim
was $199, while the maximum payment was
$190,000.  The median payment per claim was $44.
Although Kentucky Kare is not representative of all
insured people in Kentucky, these data do provide
a useful illustration of the relationship between
gender, age, and claims.1   This relationship provides
the basis for risk segmentation in an experience-
rated market.
Table 1 shows the breakdown of total claims
paid in Kentucky Kare by age and gender.  It is
apparent that women between the ages of 21 and 60
accounted for a much larger share of total payments
than did men of the same ages.  The average cost of
claims was not substantially different between males
and females, except that the average claim for the
oldest males was more than double that for females
of the same age.  The gender difference in total
payments is accounted for by the fact that, for ages
21 to 60, women had twice as many claims as men.
To further investigate these differences, we
made specific comparisons by gender for those ages
21 and 64.  Table 2 shows the covered lives in each
age and gender category, along with the total claims
paid for that category and the claims paid per
covered life.  The data indicate that claims paid per
covered life for young women were 2.3 times those
for young men.  This gender ratio declines as age
Kentucky Kare 1996 Total and Average Annual Claims Paid
By Age and Gender
TABLE 1
Females Males
Number Total Average Number Total Average
Age Paid Claims Claim Paid Claims Claim
0 - 10 2,620 $2,207,556 $843 2,740 $3,132,020 $1,143
11 - 20 3,785 3,251,673 859 3,757 3,317,518 883
21 - 30 3,169 4,924,887 1,554 1,430 1,576,999 1,103
31 - 40  4,777 9,104,510 1,906 1,948 3,362,796 1,726
41 - 50 8,268 19,655,735 2,377 3,947 9,510,861 2,410
51 - 60 6,349 19,428,310 3,060 3,552 13,762,906 3,875
61 - 70 3,013 12,145,785 4,031 1,888 9,380,535 4,969
70 - 97 234 888,573 3,797 170 1,285,904 7,564
Total 32,215 $71,607,029 $2,223 19,432 $45,329,539 $2,333
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increases, until it is nearly equal for those above age
50.
A comparison within genders for the effect of
age shows a large difference as well.  For women,
the claims paid per covered life for those ages 61 –
64 were 2.6 times that of women ages 21 – 30.  For
men, the oldest category had claims per covered life
6.7 times that of the youngest category.
These data show how the differences in average
costs are related to gender and age.  These
relationships generally hold for sufficiently large
numbers of customers, and insurance companies
have been able to use the relationships to vary
premiums by demographic characteristics.  On
average, young males are less expense to cover, so
their premiums are relatively low.  If insurance
companies can also determine the health status of
an individual through medical histories or testing,
they can use that information to alter premiums
further.
Under pure community rating, risk segmenting
is not permitted and all insured persons would pay
the same rate.  For example, Kentucky Kare would
have needed to charge an annual premium of
Effects of Community Rating
on Premiums
approximately $1,600 per covered life to equal their
total claims in 1996.  This would have created a
situation where those with low expected health care
costs would have subsidized those with high
expected health care costs.  Alternatively, under
modified community rating, Kentucky Kare might
have segmented their customers by gender and age.
When doing so, young males would be charged
relatively low premiums while older males would
be charged higher premiums.  The subsidization
under modified community rating is less than with
pure community rating.  Within each risk group,
however, healthier persons would still be
subsidizing less healthy people.  Finally, under
experience rating Kentucky Kare could have further
segmented young males by health status,
eliminating the subsidy across health status.
As discussed, the market for health insurance
was an experience-rated market prior to the reforms
of 1996.  With the passage of HB 250 and SB 343,
however, insurance carriers were restricted in how
they could segment risk, redistributing the cost of
health care across demographic groups in the
individual and small group markets.
Based on rate filings from the period, an actuary
retained by the Department of Insurance estimated
that, in 1994, individual health insurance rates for
young women were 150 percent of those for young
men, rates for older men were 450 percent of those
Kentucky Kare Claims Incurred in 1996, Gender and Age Ratios
Source: Kentucky Legislative Research Commission staff analysis of data supplied by Humana, Inc., the claims administrator
for Kentucky Kare, and by PlanSource, former data administrator for the Kentucky Health Purchasing Alliance.
Females Males Female-to-
Covered Total Claims per Covered Total C laims per Male Gender
Age Lives Claims Covered Life Lives Claims Covered Life Ratio
21 - 30 4,065 $4,924,887 $1,212 3,004 $1,576,999 $525 2.3
31 - 40 6,210 9,104,510 1,466 3,628 3,362,796 927 1.6
41 - 50 10,412 19,655,735 1,888 6,376 9,510,861 1,492 1.3
51 - 60  7,710 19,428,310 2,520 5,094 13,762,906 2,702 0.9
61 - 64 2,497 7,840,572 3,140 1,667 5,863,697 3,518 0.9
Total 30,894 $60,954,014 $1,973 19,769 $34,077,259 $1,724 1.1
Age Ratio  (61-64/21-30) 2.6 6.7
TABLE 2
50 Center for Business and Economic Research50 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Simulated Premiums by Age, Gender, and Health Status
TABLE 3
Section 1: 1994 Rating Structure
Age Spread: 4.5 to 1, Gender Spread: 1.5 to 1, Health Status Spread: 2.5 to 1
Age 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5
(Best) (Worst)
Males
20 - 29 $68 $88 $109 $129 $150 $170
30 - 39 85 111 137 162 188 214
40 - 49 122 159 195 232 269 305
50 - 59 194 252 310 368 426 484
60 - 64 307 399 491 584 676 768
Females
20 - 29 $97 $126 $155 $184 $213 $242
30 - 39 98 127 156 185 215 244
40 - 49 132 171 211 250 290 329
50 - 59 190 247 304 361 418 475
60 - 64 276 359 442 525 608 691
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Section 2: HB 250 Rating Structure
Age Spread: 3 to 1, Gender Spread: 1 to 1, Health Status Spread: 1 to 1
Age 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5
(Best) (Worst)
Males
20 - 29 $122 $122 $122 $122 $122 $122
30 - 39 138 138 138 138 138 138
40 - 49 179 179 179 179 179 179
50 - 59 257 257 256 256 256 256
60 - 64 377 377 377 377 377 377
Females
20 - 29 $122 $122 $122 $122 $122 $122
30 - 39 137 137 137 137 137 137
40 - 49 182 182 182 182 182 182
50 - 59 258 258 258 258 258 258
60 - 64 377 377 377 377 377 377
Section 3: SB 343 Rating Structure on Individual
Age Spread: 4 to 1, Gender Spread: 1.5 to 1, Health Status Spread: 1 to 1
Age 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5
(Best) (Worst)
Males
20 - 29 $101 $101 $101 $101 $101 $101
30 - 39 123 123 123 123 123 123
40 - 49 171 171 171 171 171 171
50 - 59 264 264 264 264 264 264
60 - 64 409 409 409 409 409 409
Females
20 - 29 $144 $144 $144 $144 $144 $144
30 - 39 141 141 141 141 141 141
40 - 49 184 184 184 184 184 184
50 - 59 258 258 258 258 258 258
60 - 64 368 368 368 368 368 368
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for young men, and rates for those with the highest
expected claims (and who were still allowed to
purchase a policy) were 250 percent of those with
the lowest expected claims.  This meant that, for
those allowed to purchase a policy, the highest rates
could be 11 times more than the lowest rates.  Given
a rate of $68 per month for the youngest, healthiest
males and the rating spread above, rates for a
comparable policy for others can be calculated,
holding all other factors constant.  These rates are
shown in Section 1 of Table 3.  These rates did not
reflect coverage for those with very high expected
claims, who were denied coverage.
Starting with the actuarial assumptions, and
using the age, gender, and health status distributions
of those in the Kentucky individual insurance
market, the Legislative Research Commission made
simulations of the effect of changes in pricing rules
on the distribution of rates under HB 250 and SB
343.2   The effect of the demographic factors on the
distribution of rates among policyholders under the
various pricing schemes is quite clear.  Under
experience rating, young, healthy males faced a
relatively lower premium, while those who were
female, older, or had poorer health status faced
higher premiums.  The effect of changes in the rules
of issue and pricing enacted in HB 250 on this
distribution of rates is shown in Section 2 of Table 3.
Compared to experience rating, the new rules would
have required those who were younger and
healthier to subsidize the purchase of insurance by
those who were older and less healthy.  Also, young
men would have subsidized the purchase of
insurance by young women.
One point to be made is that, all else held
constant (a major assumption), the changes
contained in HB 250 only addressed the problems
of those who could not afford health insurance
because of high premiums.  Those unable to
purchase insurance because of low incomes would
not have been helped.  To the extent that the young
are more likely to be healthy but have low incomes,
they would have been less likely to be able to afford
health insurance under these rules.  SB 343
somewhat softened these effects by allowing greater
consideration of age and by allowing gender
differences in pricing (Table 3, Section 3).  Since
health status could not be considered, however,
those with good health continued to subsidize those
with poor health, and those with low incomes might
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still be priced out of the market.
HB 315 largely eliminated the subsidization of
premiums for those with large expected claims costs.
Only to the extent that claims of those with medical
conditions not defined as high-cost exceed 135
percent of the median for those of the same age and
gender, and those with high-cost conditions exceed
150 percent of the median for those of the same age
and gender, will there be cross-subsidization by
those with lower expected claims.  The provisions
established in HB 315 essentially returned the
distribution of rates to that existing in the
unregulated market of 1994, except that those with
high cost conditions now have a price ceiling.
As shown in the previous section, moving from
an experience-rated market to a modified
community-rated market redistributes the cost of
health care by making premiums for all people the
same, regardless of their health risk.  This makes
health insurance more affordable for the high-risk
individuals but also raises the premiums for low-
risk individuals.  Because low-risk individuals are
paying the higher premiums that reflect the risk of
the community, they have an incentive to separate
themselves from the high-risk individuals.  This is
an example of “adverse selection,” which can have
substantial impacts on the market for health
insurance.
The classic prediction of adverse selection is that
the healthiest individuals will separate themselves
from the rest of the market by dropping their health
insurance.  Those remaining in the market will be
generally in poorer health than those who dropped
out.  Therefore, premiums must increase to reflect
that expected average costs per person would be
higher.  This increase would then force more people
out of the market and raise premiums even higher.
Eventually, this cycle of rising premiums would
eliminate the insurance market.
This was not likely to be the result in Kentucky,
however.  The combination of legislative changes
and the executive order freezing pre-reform
insurance policies gave low-risk individuals options
for separating themselves from high-risk individuals
without having to drop coverage.  Although HB 250
Expected Claims and
Adverse Selection
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established modified community rating (MCR), the
executive order freezing policies in effect prior to
the implementation of HB 250 allowed people to
keep policies priced under experience rating.  For
the healthy, the pre-reform policies were likely less
expensive than policies rated under MCR, providing
them with an incentive to keep their old policies.
Unhealthy individuals, however, could potentially
receive lower premiums under MCR.
In addition, SB 343 exempted associations from
the MCR restrictions, allowing them to set premiums
based on health status.  Individuals purchasing
health insurance through an association could be
charged a lower premium if they were healthy, or a
higher premium if they were unhealthy, than they
would pay if they purchased a non-association
policy.  Under this pricing structure, people who are
healthier than average had an incentive to seek out
the lower premiums charged by the associations,
while those who are in poorer health would prefer
to be insured under MCR.  Both the freeze of pre-
reform policies and the exemption of associations
from MCR provided an avenue for the healthiest
individuals to pay lower rates than they would
under MCR.
Theory suggests that those in poorer health,
therefore, would have been more likely to obtain
health insurance under MCR and those in better
health would have been more likely to be covered
under a pre-reform plan or an association plan.  Since
the premium charged under MCR reflects the
average risk of those insured under MCR, the
healthiest individuals would always be able to find
a cheaper premium through an association.
Eventually only those in very poor health would
continue to purchase coverage under MCR.  The
premiums they would be charged would reflect their
high risk.
To determine whether adverse selection did
occur in the individual market, we estimated the
effect that health status had on whether an
individual was covered under a modified
community-rated policy (reform policy) or under
an experienced-rated policy (pre-reform or
association policy) using data from the 1997
Kentucky Health Insurance Survey.  This survey
interviewed Kentucky households about various
aspects of their health insurance.  To simplify the
analysis, only single coverage policies were
considered.  Although those purchasing family plans
face the same situation, it is difficult to analyze
insurance decisions of families because of the
interaction of family members with different
characteristics.  Analysis was also restricted to adults
under age 65, because Medicare should provide
coverage for those 65 and over.  There were 155
individuals under 65 with private single coverage.
Of those, 85 were covered under a pre-reform or
association plan.  That is, they either kept coverage
that was in effect prior to HB 250 or they purchased
coverage through an association.  Table 4
summarizes the data.
Whether an individual purchases an MCR
policy or an experienced-rated policy depends on a
number of factors.  As discussed, the difference in
premium is a key determinant when deciding the
type of policy to purchase.  Under reform policies
in Kentucky, premiums were based on gender, age,
and geographic location.  In addition to these factors,
health status could be considered in the pricing of
pre-reform and association policies.  For the reasons
noted above, poor health status is predicted to
increase the probability that an individual would
Plan Type
Experienced rated (pre-reform) 55%
Modified community rated (reform) 45%
Gender
Male 35%
Female 65%
Health Status
Excellent 36%
Very good 32%
Good 23%
Fair 7%
Poor 3%
Age Mean=46 s.d.=13.8
Sample Size 155
Source: 1997 Kentucky Health Insurance Survey
Characteristics of Respondents
with Single Individually Purchased
Health Insurance
TABLE 4
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have purchased a reform policy.  Respondents were
asked if their health in general was excellent, very
good, good, fair, or poor.  Those with fair or poor
health were defined as being “unhealthy.”  It is
uncertain whether age would have had an effect on
price differences, because under both community
rating and experience rating, age could be used as a
rating factor.  However, MCR restricted carriers’ use
of age so that the premium they charged the oldest
person could only be three times greater than the
premium they charged the youngest person.  If this
restriction was a binding constraint, then younger
individuals might have been able to find lower
premiums through experience-rated policies.  The
effect of gender on premium difference is uncertain.
While HB 250 prevented rating based on gender, SB
343 lifted the restriction.
In addition, because of the complexity of setting
premiums under reforms, some people may not
have accurately understood how the different rating
mechanisms affect them.  Therefore, people who are
better informed are expected to make better
decisions.  Those who are in poor health and better
informed are more likely to purchase coverage under
MCR.  Those who are in good health and better
informed are more likely to be covered under an
experienced-rated policy.  Although it was not
possible to determine each respondent’s level of
understanding of health reforms, their highest level
of education was used as a substitute measure for
this understanding.
Analysis of the data showed that health status
did have a statistically significant effect on the
probability that a person was covered by a reform
policy.  The probability that those with excellent,
very good, or good health status would be covered
through an experience-rated policy was 59 percent.
The probability for those with only fair or poor
health was 26 percent.  This suggests that adverse
selection did exist in the Kentucky market for
individual health insurance.  The large difference
can be partially explained by the fact that people
who were previously priced out of the market
because of health conditions were able to purchase
health insurance at lower prices after reforms.  This
probably resulted in a surge of unhealthy people
purchasing reform plans.  Even without an increase
of unhealthy people entering the market, there was
still evidence of adverse selection.  Analysis of only
those who had coverage prior to reforms yielded
similar results.  Healthy people were more likely to
be covered under pre-reform or association plans.
The results also show that older insured persons
were more likely to purchase experience-rated
coverage.  This finding was somewhat unexpected,
because reforms limited the rating spread on age.
This limit should have increased the subsidy to older
individuals.  It may be that older people were more
likely to have health insurance prior to the reforms
and may have been less willing to change their
coverage.  Even though they might have found
lower premiums by switching plans, they may have
been reluctant to drop the coverage they had for
some time for a new policy.  Males were no more
likely to be covered by an experienced-rated policy
than females.  This result is not surprising because
SB 343 allowed gender rating for all policies, which
should have reduced any cross-gender subsidy that
may have existed under HB 250.  Although it was
expected that education would improve a person’s
choice, it did not have a significant effect.
It should be noted that the estimates above
reflect a point in time when healthy individuals had
two avenues for avoiding MCR policies: pre-reform
plans and association plans.  Eventually, however,
the freeze on pre-reform plans ended.  After
December 1, 1997, all pre-reform plans were
supposed to be converted, upon their renewal, to
comply with current law.  This provision removed
one of the ways healthy people were able to avoid
MCR plans and may have slowed the effects of
adverse selection.
The presence of adverse selection in the
Kentucky market could have had major effects on
the outcome of health insurance reforms.  Adverse
selection provides an incentive for the healthiest
individuals insured under MCR to seek cheaper
coverage through an association, where they are not
subsidizing less healthy people.  As these people
leave the community, those remaining have a higher
expected cost per person, and premiums under MCR
must rise to reflect these higher costs.  As premiums
rise, more people will find it beneficial to obtain
coverage through associations, further reducing the
subsidy to the unhealthy individuals remaining in
the community pool.  The end result of adverse
selection is the Kentucky market’s reverting back to
a pure experience-rated market.  The market was
not allowed to move to this end, however, because
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passage of HB 315 eliminated most of the restrictions
on risk segmenting.
Adverse selection occurred in the Kentucky
insurance market as a market response to price
changes.  As health insurance premiums for low-
risk insured persons increased under modified
community rating, these people looked for
alternatives to paying the higher rates.  One
alternative is for people to drop their coverage and
self-insure.  The exemption of associations from the
restrictions against risk-segmenting and the
executive order permitting pre-reform policies to be
renewed, however, allowed low-risk people to avoid
the higher premiums associated with MCR and still
maintain insurance coverage.  Low-risk people are
therefore always better off with a pre-reform or
association policy.  Eventually this situation would
have returned the market to pure experience rating.
The legislative changes made in HB 315 largely
reduced the potential for adverse selection but did
not completely eliminate it.  Under HB 315 carriers
can once again segment their customers according
to health status.  But carriers cannot deny coverage
to high-risk people, and the premium they charge
them is capped.  Therefore, the subsidy across health
status is reduced but not eliminated.  Even though
there is a subsidy across health status, it is much
more difficult for low-risk people to avoid the
subsidy.  Because pre-reform policies can no longer
be renewed and associations have the same rating
restrictions as the rest of the market, low-risk people
can only avoid the subsidy by dropping coverage,
making it much less likely that adverse selection will
occur.
1. Because Kentucky Kare provides an indemnity policy,
it likely attracts relatively more high-risk people.
2. Age, gender, and health status distributions of those
in the individual market were estimated from the 1997
Health Insurance Survey described below.
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In the 1998 General Assembly, the
Commonwealth of Kentucky moved to establish a
managed care program for its Medicaid recipients.
Earlier, in 1995, the Commonwealth received
approval from the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) to establish eight regional
Health Care Partnerships to provide Kentucky’s
Medicaid recipients with health care.  These changes
will have an effect on the provision of health care in
Kentucky.  To examine what effect these changes
may have, it is instructive to examine the experiences
of the neighboring state of Tennessee, which
introduced a managed care program for Tennessee
Medicaid recipients in 1994 known as TennCare.
This comparison is particularly informative because
Tennessee and Kentucky both have large numbers
of rural Medicaid recipients.
This article examines the impact of the TennCare
reform on the provision of health care services in
Tennessee.  In particular, it addresses the issue of
whether the introduction of the TennCare inflicted
financial harm on some Tennessee health care
providers, and reduced the access of Tennessee
resident’s to health care services in their home
county. This is done by measuring how TennCare
affected the number of establishments providing
health care services in Tennessee Counties, and
whether some counties lost all of their providers of
certain kinds of health care services.
In January 1994, Tennessee began moving almost
900,000 Medicaid patients from a traditional fee-for-
service plan to a managed care plan dubbed
TennCare.  In the process of moving to the new
program, Tennessee moved aggressively to control
costs.  Using 12 separate medical care organizations
(MCO), Tennessee sought to control costs by offering
a fixed payment to a MCO for each Medicaid
recipient enrolled in the MCO’s health plan.  To
achieve the cost savings, the MCOs in return
negotiated discounted prices with hospital, doctors,
and other health care providers.
At the same time, Tennessee expanded their
Medicaid program to cover over 400,000 additional
people.  This prompted the New York Times to report
that “With the possible exception of Hawaii,
Tennessee’s population has the highest rate of
insurance coverage in the country, which has
changed hundreds of thousands of lives for the
better.”  Further, because of its aggressive cost
containment, the New York Times reports, Tennessee
accomplished this increase in coverage “with
roughly the same money as its [previous] Medicaid
program would have cost.”1
Tennessee’s TennCare Program
The 1998 Kentucky General Assembly passed legislation creating a managed care program for
Kentucky Medicaid recipients.  In 1994, Tennessee introduced a managed care program for its
Medicaid recipients called TennCare.  The Tennessee program expanded to cover thousands of
additional patients without a concurrent increase in medical expenditures.  This overall increase
in cost may cause some counties to lose health care providers and facilities.  TennCare appeared to
cause a modest reduction in the number of health care facilities in Tennessee counties located on
the border of the state.  The analysis shows that about 1 in 34 border counties would have one fewer
establishment in each health care industry after TennCare, with losses more likely to occur in
counties with smaller populations.  As Kentucky moves to a similar managed care system, it seems
that the effect of such a program on the number of health care establishments is likely to be small.
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According to the medical community in
Tennessee, the increase in the patient load, combined
with little to no growth in real expenditures, caused
severe strains on the Tennessee medical system.  For
instance, Warren McPherson, Vice President of the
Tennessee Medical Association claimed that
TennCare’s policies were so coercive that the doctors
have become “state employees.”2   Officials at the
Erlanger Medical Center estimated that the hospital
gets 56 cents for each dollar of care it provides to
TennCare patients, with losses of $27 million in 1998
alone.3
The strain is presumably felt throughout the
system.  For instance, in 1993, the final year of
Tennessee’s old system, Medicaid payments for
pharmacy expenditures were approximately
$240,079,482 for 908,943 recipients.  In 1996,
TennCare pharmacy expenditures were
approximately $300,000,000 for an estimated
1,408,918 recipients.4
Movement of a state’s Medicaid program away
from a fee-for-service approach towards managed
care could be expected to have a substantial impact
on the state’s health care industry and on the number
of providers in the industry.  As will be seen,
however, although the change may appear dramatic,
it is by no means clear what it will do to the number
of firms in the health care industry.  What will prove
important is the level of government fee-per-service
payments before the change compared to the
implicit fee-per-service offered by the HMOs after
the change, which (assuming competition among
HMOs) will be determined by the fees paid to them
by the government.
Before the change, the goods and services were
provided at a fixed cost, both set and paid by the
government.  The recipient of the goods and services
only bore one cost: the time cost involved (driving
to the health care provider, waiting in line, etc.).  The
health care providers faced two types of costs:  the
fixed costs involved with setting up their businesses
(i.e., rent), and variable costs associated with the
number of patients that they served (i.e., cost of
medical supplies, employee costs).
It is quite possible that the prices set by the
government were higher than the variable costs faced
Impact on Health Care Providers
by the industry.  For example, the price set by the
government to fill a given prescription could be higher
than the cost of filling it to a pharmacy, regardless of
the number of prescriptions filled.  This does not
imply that the industry will make large profits,
however.  Because other businesses could enter the
health care field relatively easily, any economic
profits made would result in new firms entering the
market.  This competition would continue until all
economic profits have been absorbed by the fixed
costs associated with entering the industry.  In
practice, this will mean that the higher the price
offered by the government for goods and services,
the higher the number of firms in the industry.  These
firms will compete with one another by minimizing
the time costs to the customers.  If the price offered to
fill prescriptions were high, one might anticipate
seeing a large number of pharmacies, each serving
relatively few customers.  Areas with small
populations may well have their own pharmacy.
The change in the regulatory environment would
seem to change the incentives faced by the industry
dramatically.  Now the firms must negotiate prices to
win the customers of the various HMOs.  This gives
the firms a strong incentive to minimize costs ; the
firm with the lowest total cost for a given level of
services will be able to make a lower bid for the
provision of the goods and services to the HMO, and
could be expected to win the business.
Of great importance to the result of this process
is the degree of competition within the insurance
industry.  Consider the case where the customers
have to belong to a given HMO (there is no
competition at all).  The HMO would than have no
incentive to minimize the time costs faced by the
consumers.  The firm that could offer the lowest
combination of fixed and variable costs to provide
the level of service required would win the contract.
This would, most likely, result in very high time costs
to the consumer and very few firms in the industry.
If there is competition among HMOs, however,
the time costs of the consumer must be considered.
The HMO that demanded a recipient go to a
pharmacy with very long lines would ultimately be
driven out of business by the HMO that was more
consumer-friendly and did not make such demands.
If there were free entry in the insurance industry,
the result of this process would be insurance
companies competing for customers on the one
Medicaid Managed Care and the Tennessee Health Care Industry:
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margin on which they can compete: service.  Again,
this will result in the number of firms in the industry
being determined by the amount of money per
customer paid by the government to the HMOs, and,
importantly, the price per service implied by this.  If
the price is high, the insurance companies will
compete away economic profits by providing good
service (presumably resulting in a large number of
firms).  If the number is low, the opposite will take
place.
The end result of this is somewhat surprising.
Whether the government provides fee-for-service
insurance or pays HMOs to provide insurance does
not necessarily influence the number of health care
providers.  What matters is the effective price per
service that the government offers.  For example, in
Tennessee, the change in regulatory environment
saw a significant increase in the number of people
covered but only a small increase in the total
spending on insurance by the government.
Assuming competition among HMOs, there are
two possible explanations for this.  The first is that
the government has effectively cut the amount of
money per service that it is offering.  That is, the
new people covered are getting the same level of
service as the people previously covered, and the
people previously covered are getting the same
amount, but the payment per service has declined.
This would be expected to result in a decline in the
number of health care providers, and a higher time
cost borne by the customer.  A second possibility is
that the price per service has remained the same,
but the HMOs have effectively cut the level of service
that the people covered by the insurance are getting.
In this case, one would expect to see no change in
the number of health care providers.  If there is no
competition among HMOs, the above analysis
would not hold, and one would expect to see
customer service effectively ignored, resulting in a
sharp drop in the number of health care providers.
To see which of the above explanations is true,
ideally we would look at the effective fee per service
before and after the change.  Given the difficulty in
finding such data, we will attempt to measure the
impact the change had on the number of firms in
the health care industry.  A negative impact tells us
one of two things.  Either there is limited competition
in the insurance industry, or the effective fee per
service offered to the health care industry has
declined, and the level of service it offers its customers
has declined in step.
One factor ignored up to now is the composition of
the goods and services provided by the health care
industry.  HMOs will have an incentive to see that a
given level of service or good is provided at the lowest
possible cost (for example, substituting generic
medication for the name-brand equivalent).  It is not
clear that anyone would have this incentive under
the previous regulatory system.  Therefore, it is quite
possible that the composition of firms in the industry
will change under the new system, regardless of the
raw numbers.  One would expect to see more low-
cost providers of given services.
This analysis will focus on the number of
establishments in the pharmacy and health care
industries both in Tennessee counties and in counties
located in other states bordering Tennessee.
Statistical comparisons will be made among counties
that are located on either side of the border between
Tennessee and the bordering states of Kentucky,
Virginia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Arkansas, and Missouri.  Such
comparisons between border counties provide an
excellent environment to test the effect of state
government policies.
The economies of counties on either side of the
border often are very similar in economic structure.
Some pairs of counties are in the same metropolitan
area or rural economic region.  They often have similar
natural resources, topology, and demography, and
they also share the same location advantages or
disadvantages within their region of the United
States.  In fact, one of the primary differences between
border counties is that each is located in a different
state, and thus, subject to different state policies
regarding regulation, taxes, and social insurance.  As
a consequence, border counties can provide an
excellent forum to test the effects of state policies.  The
divergence in economic activity between border
counties after a policy is introduced in a state can be
measured to estimate the economic effect of the policy.
Such a divergence will be measured in the case of
Impact of Managed Care on the
Tennessee Health Care Industry
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Tennessee border counties after the introduction of
TennCare in January 1, 1994.  Border counties in
Tennessee and border counties in adjacent states
were defined to include all counties touching the
border between Tennessee and the other state, and
all counties one county away from that border.
For these border counties, data were gathered
on the number of establishments in each year from
1986 to 1995 for nine industries.  These industries
were pharmacies, physicians’ offices, dentists’
offices, nursing and personal care facilities,
hospitals, medical laboratories, dental laboratories,
home health care services, and health and allied
services.  The source for the establishment data for
these industries was the U.S. Department of
Commerce publication County Business Patterns.5
Data also were gathered on population, per capita
income, and per capita food stamp receipts in each
of the border counties from 1986 to 1995.  These data
were designed to reflect other factors that would
influence the demand for health care services in
border counties besides state policies such as
TennCare.  The source for these data was the U.S.
Department of Commerce publication Regional
Economic Information System 1969-1995.6
Statistical tests were conducted to see if the
introduction of TennCare on January 1, 1994, was
related to a decline in the number of establishments
in the health care industries in Tennessee border
counties in 1994 and 1995.  This test was conducted
for all industries together and for each of the specific
industries separately.  In addition to examining
whether the introduction of TennCare caused
counties to lose any establishments, there was also
a statistical test to examine whether TennCare caused
counties to lose particular types of health care
services entirely.  For example, we examined if
TennCare caused a county to lose all of its doctors’
offices or its only hospital.
Table 1 shows the results of the statistical
analysis.  The first finding was that the introduction
of TennCare was related to a modest reduction in
the number of health care establishments in
Tennessee border counties.  The introduction of
TennCare caused the average border county to have
0.03 fewer establishments in each health care
industry in the following years.  Put another way, 1
out of 34 border counties would have one fewer
establishment in each health care industry due to
TennCare.  Reductions were more likely in counties
with a smaller population.
The impact of TennCare on individual kinds of
establishments was more mixed. The introduction
of TennCare was found to leave 1 of 4 Tennessee
Medicaid Managed Care and the Tennessee Health Care Industry:
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Average Establishment Share of Counties Losing or
Health Care Industry Loss or Gain per County Gaining an Establishment
Average Industry -0.030** 1 of 33 Losing
Pharmacies -0.025 1 of 40 Losing
Doctors Offices -0.022 1 of 45 Losing
Dentists Offices -0.042 1 of 24 Losing
Nursing and Personal Care Facilities -0.126** 1 of 8 Losing
Hospitals -0.025 1 of 40 Losing
Medical Laboratories 0.009 1 of 111 Gaining
Dental Laboratories 0.025 1 of 40 Gaining
Home Health Care Facilities 0.109 1 of 9 Gaining
Miscellaneous Health Care -0.249*** 1 of 4 Losing
* Significant at 15% level.
** Significant at 10% level.
*** Significant at 5% level.
Change in Number of Health Care Establishments in
Counties After the Introduction of TennCare
TABLE 1
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Results overall indicated that the introduction
of TennCare was related to a modest reduction in
the number of health care facilities in Tennessee,
although losses were more likely in counties with a
smaller population.  TennCare also appeared to
favor establishments in the low-cost home health
care industry, while at the same time hurting
specialty facilities such as personal care homes and
drug and alcohol treatment centers. This is all
consistent with the idea that TennCare has tended
to lower the per person costs of health care in
Tennessee by pushing the industry towards lower
cost basic procedures and away from specialized
facilities.
The reforms in Tennessee substantially
increased the number of insured recipients without
significantly increasing the expenditures of the
system.  In response to this increased patient burden,
many health care providers in Tennessee have
complained that the financial pressures from the
reforms have threatened their existence.  In this
paper, we examine how the introduction of the
TennCare affected the health care industry in
Tennessee.  Our findings should be instructive for
demonstrating how a movement towards managed
care of Medicaid patients may affect health care
providers in Kentucky.
counties with one fewer miscellaneous health care
establishment, a category that includes kidney
dialysis centers and drug and alcohol treatment
centers, among others.  We also found that 1 of 8
Tennessee counties had one fewer nursing home or
personal care facility.  These changes most likely
occurred in personal care homes, which primarily
aid individuals recovering from serious illness, since
TennCare did not affect elderly individuals covered
by Medicare.  TennCare had no statistically
significant impact on the number of pharmacies,
doctors’ and dentists’ offices, hospitals, home health
care businesses, or medical or dental laboratories in
Tennessee border counties.
For some counties, TennCare also tended to lead
to the loss of all health care establishments in
particular industries.  As Table 2 indicates, the
introduction of TennCare meant a 15.1 percent
increase in the probability that an individual county
would lose all of its establishments in the
miscellaneous health care industry.  On the other
hand, the introduction of TennCare decreased the
probability that a county would lose all its home
health care establishments by 22.0 percent.  Statistical
tests indicated that TennCare had no statistically
significant impact on the likelihood that a county
could lose all its nursing home and personal care
facilities, hospitals, and medical and dental
laboratories.7
Implications for Kentucky
Change in Probability that a Tennessee County Will Lose
All Heath Care Establishment in an Industry after the
Introduction of TennCare
TABLE 2
Change in Probability
Health Care Industry of County’s Losing
Nursing and Personal Care Facilities 7.1%
Hospitals 14.1
Medical Laboratories -11.9
Dental Laboratories -3.3
Home Health Care Facilities -22.0 **
Miscellaneous Health Care 15.1 ***
* Significant at 15% level.
** Significant at 10% level.
*** Significant at 5% level.
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1. New York Times (145:50,201) Sunday October 1, 1995,
page 1.
2. Stuart Schear, “A Medicaid Miracle?” National Journal,
February 4, 1995, pages 294-98.
3. Chattanooga Times, Saturday, February 28,1998.
4. We thank Billy Moates of TennCare for providing the
expenditure data.
5. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
County Business Patterns 1986-1995.  Available on CD
ROMs released through 1998.
6. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
Regional Economic Information System 1969-1995.
Available on CD ROM, 1997 (June).
7. Nearly all counties had at least one pharmacy, doctor’s
office, or dentist’s office during the 1986 to 1995 period.
With very few counties changing status from having
an establishment to not having an establishment in
these industries, or vice versa, it was not appropriate
to attempt a statistical analysis.
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Contrary to some of the more alarming claims,
we find evidence of only a modest impact of the
TennCare on the health care industry.  Among
hospitals, pharmacies, doctor’s offices and dentist’s
offices, we find only small, statistically insignificant
evidence of reductions in the number of
establishments.  We find larger and statistically
significant reductions in the number of nursing
homes and personal care facilities, but we see a
nearly identical growth in the number of home care
facilities.  In general, impacts were greater in smaller
counties than in larger counties.
In our view, the lesson that Kentucky can draw
from TennCare experience is simple.  Kentucky
reforms are likely to have a negligible impact on the
Kentucky health care industry.  This is particularly
true if Kentucky reforms are less aggressive in cost
cutting than Tennessee reforms, which appears
likely given that the Kentucky reforms will not
significantly expand the number of recipients while
holding expenditures virtually unchanged.
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Computer and Internet Usage at
Businesses in Kentucky
Steven N. Allen
Introduction
Virtually all businesses in Kentucky use computers in some way.  Many businesses are also
beginning to use the Internet as a communications medium and sales and marketing platform
for their goods and services.  Results of a recent survey of large Kentucky businesses show
that almost 70 percent of businesses use the Internet for electronic mail and information
searches while smaller numbers use it for marketing and promotion of products and online
commerce.  Kentucky businesses also indicated that they place a good deal of importance on
the computer skills of prospective employees, even though many firms still provide computer
and Internet training to their employees.  Finally, most businesses using the Internet consider
it a productive tool for their business.
The use of computers in the workplace has been
a common sight for many years.  Businesses have
been using large mainframe computers for decades
and since the personal computer revolution of the
1980s, more and more businesses are putting
computers at the reach of their employees.  In
general, businesses believe that computers will make
their workers more productive – eliminating
repetitive tasks, shortening times to do complex
calculations, and facilitating communication and
collaboration among workers, just to name a few.
With computer technology advancing and prices for
this technology falling, the prevalence of computers
in the workplace will only continue to grow.
In the 1990s, an extension of computers has
again revolutionized the workplace.  The explosive
use of the Internet has opened new avenues for
businesses to communicate and even market and
sell their products.  Now many businesses can reach
millions of potential consumers through the use of
Internet technologies such as electronic mail and
web sites.  As more people in the United States bring
computers into their homes, the potential for
businesses to reach potential customers through the
Internet will only continue to expand.  The rapid
growth and predicted future gains in the use of
commerce conducted over the Internet is an obvious
sign of the significance of this technology to the
entire business community.
This article summarizes results of a survey of
Kentucky businesses on computer and Internet
usage at their businesses.  The first section provides
an overview of computer and Internet usage at
businesses in the United States and briefly describes
results of other studies that have documented the
use of this technology in Kentucky.  The next section
provides an overview of the survey and data used
for this study.  I then present the results of the survey
for all businesses and for selected subsets of our
survey sample.  The final section provides some
concluding remarks.
Since the introduction of the personal computer
in the early 1980s, the number of people using
computers has steadily increased.  Furthermore,
computer use in the workplace has been strong from
the inception of computers.  Businesses could realize
the benefits of computers perhaps more readily than
could home users, and have embraced in greater
numbers.  Few businesses today do not have at least
a simple desktop computer in their workplace, and
new and improved uses for computer technology
are being introduced that promise to bring increased
opportunities to businesses who use them.
Only in the past few years has the use of the
Internet changed the way business is conducted in
Overview for Kentucky
and the United States
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the U.S.  Not only can workers communicate with
other workers and access large amounts of
information on the Internet, but perhaps more
significantly, businesses can use the Internet to reach
millions of potential customers.  Commerce
conducted on the Internet has rapidly expanded in
the latter half of the 1990s and will continue to see
extremely high growth in the next few years.  One
source quotes the value of the online commerce
market in 1997 at $9 billion and estimates it will grow
to $26 billion by 2000, representing a 38 percent
annual rate of growth.
Few solid numbers exist on computer and
Internet usage in Kentucky.  A recent study by the
Kentucky Long-Term Policy Research Center
examined computer and Internet usage in the
Commonwealth as well as asked residents about
what types of technology they would like to see in
the future.  The study found that about 65 percent
of Kentuckians use or have access to a computer at
home, work, or elsewhere, compared to about 50
percent of people nationwide who use a computer.
Furthermore, the survey found that about 20 percent
of Kentuckians had used the Internet within the last
12 months, compared to about 19 percent of
residents nationwide.1
A poll conducted in 1997 also found that a large
number of Kentuckians had experience with
computers.  The 1997 Kentucky Poll, a statewide
survey of Kentucky residents conducted by the
University of Kentucky Survey Research Center,
asked respondents if they used computers and
whether they used them at home, work, or school.
About 44 percent of people participating in the
survey said they used a computer at work while
about 43 percent said they used a computer at work.
Relatively no information exists on the use of
computers at businesses in Kentucky.  The following
discussion shows the results of a survey of Kentucky
businesses in an attempt to understand the
prevalence and use of computers at these businesses.
The data used in this article come from a mail
survey of businesses in Kentucky conducted by the
University of Kentucky Center for Business and
Economic Research in May and June of 1998.  A total
of 1,906 businesses throughout Kentucky were
surveyed, and we received 367 responses.  After
subtracting surveys that were undeliverable, we
achieved a return rate of approximately 20  percent.
We asked these businesses a series of questions on
computer and Internet usage, in addition to asking
them to indicate general business conditions and
expectations for their business.  Their responses to
these questions about business conditions are
reported in a separate Center for Business and
Economic Research publication.2
One important feature of the survey is that it
consists primarily of large businesses with 100
employees or more.  Surveying these types of
businesses will cover a significant share of the total
economy in Kentucky.  About 45 percent of all
employees in Kentucky work in businesses of these
sizes.  Figure 1 shows the distribution of businesses
in the sample listed by number of employees.  As
shown, only about 12 percent of businesses
respondents had fewer than 100 employees.
Because we surveyed primarily large
businesses, some industries will be represented more
than others.  Larger businesses tend to be
concentrated in industries such as manufacturing
and services, and Table 1 shows that the respondents
in this survey come mainly from those two
industries.  About 36 percent of the businesses are
in the manufacturing industry while about 35
percent of businesses are in the service industry.
Description of Survey Data
Computer and Internet Usage at Businesses in Kentucky
Size of Businesses in Survey by
Number of Employees
FIGURE 1
4.7%
7.1%
58.9%
17.5%
11.8%
or fewer 50 - 99 100 - 249 250 - 499 500 or more
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We first asked businesses in the survey simply
to respond if their business used computers at all.
Perhaps a little surprisingly, 364 businesses said that
they used computers while three businesses did not
respond to the question.  This means that 100 percent
of responding businesses use computers.  Clearly,
uses for computer technology, combined with the
gradual decrease in the real price of computers, has
made computers both useful and affordable to
virtually all types of businesses.
That most businesses use computers should not
be surprising.  But the growing importance of the
Internet in recent years provides a different way in
which to gauge how businesses are using computers.
About 80 percent of responding businesses said they
were connected to the Internet.  We also asked these
businesses how long they had been connected to the
Internet, and their responses are shown in Figure 2.
As depicted, most businesses connected to the
Internet have some experience using it.  Only about
six percent have been connected for less than a year,
while about 32 percent of have been connected to
the Internet for between one and two years and
another 30 percent for between two and three years.
Perhaps much more important than simply being
connected to the Internet is how businesses use the
Internet as a resource.  Maintaining an Internet
connection and upgrading computer hardware and
software can be a costly undertaking if those
resources are not being put to use.  We asked
businesses to indicate what uses they made of the
Internet and/or their business’s Web site on the
Internet.  Table 2 lists their responses for all firms in
the sample, manufacturing firms only, service firms
only, and for businesses who had been connected to
the Internet for a year or less or for over one year.
As we can see from this table, electronic mail
and information/data searches are the two uses
most commonly cited by businesses.  About 70
percent of all businesses said that they used the
Internet for both of these purposes.  A smaller
percentage, about 43 percent, said they used the
Internet or web site for marketing and promotion
of their products and services, while a small number
of businesses, about 12 percent said they conducted
online commerce over the Internet.
These figures change substantially when we
look at differences among the type of business and
by how long they have been connected to the
Internet.  Manufacturing firms appear to use all of
the different applications more than do service firms.
Notably, only about 8 percent of service firms said
that they conduct online commerce or sales through
19.3%
6.3%
32.2%
29.2%
12.3%
1.0%
Not
Connected
Less than 1
Year
Between 1
and 2 Years
Between 2
and 3 Years
Over 3
Years
No
response
Number of Years Business Has Been
Connected to the Internet
FIGURE 2
What are the Uses of the Internet?
Computer and Internet Usage at Businesses in Kentucky
Computer and Internet Usage
at Kentucky Businesses
Percentage of Industries
in Survey Sample
TABLE 1
Agriculture 1.4%
Mining 2.5
Construction 3.0
Manufacturing 36.2
TCPU 5.7
Wholesale trade 1.9
Retail trade 7.6
FIRE 5.5
Services 35.2
No Response 1.1
TCPU = Transportation,
Communications, and Public
Utilities
FIRE = Finance, Insurance, and Real
Estate
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the Internet.  Even more striking is the difference
between firms with a longer history on the Internet.
Those businesses who have been connected to the
Internet for over one year were much more likely to
use all the applications of the Internet listed.  Almost
90 percent of these businesses use e-mail, 85 percent
perform information/data searches, 60 percent
market and promote their products, and 18 percent
conduct online commerce or sales.
In contrast, businesses who have been connected
to the Internet for a year or less were much less likely
to use the applications listed.  Only 53 percent of
these types of businesses use electronic mail, 32
percent market or promote their products on the
Internet, 8 percent conduct online sales or commerce,
and 58 percent use the Internet for information or
data searches.  These figures show that those
businesses who have been connected to the Internet
for a longer period can perhaps realize more benefits
by using the Internet for more applications.
Use of the Internet for online commerce or sales
promises to be one of the most promising areas for
future growth in the use of computer technology at
businesses.  Although it is somewhat difficult to
obtain accurate figures, estimates on the total value
of the U.S. electronic commerce market ranged
anywhere from $5 billion to about $10 billion dollars
in 1997 and 1998.  Projections for the future call for
the electronic commerce to grow exponentially in
size, with an expected value of $26 billion by 2000.3
Moreover, a vast number of retail areas are ideally
suited for commerce on the Internet.  Many types of
consumer goods have already enjoyed substantial
growth in online sales, including clothing,
computers, books, music, and the like.
The above figures show a limited number of
Kentucky businesses who use the Internet for online
sales and commerce, or only about 12 percent of all
businesses in the survey.  Moreover, survey results
also show that of those Kentucky businesses who
do use the Internet for online sales or commerce only
have about 2.5 percent of their total sales from the
Internet.  Businesses with online sales and who have
been connected to the Internet for over a year still
only saw about 2.8 percent of their total sales come
from the Internet.  These figures show that online
commerce is still a small fraction of total sales activity
for Kentucky businesses.  But given the robust
projections for the future, Kentucky businesses may
have substantial room in which to start or expand
their online commerce operations.
In the current tight labor markets, employers are
placing an increasing emphasis on highly skilled
workers.  Workers with advanced technical and
computer skills are finding very attractive job
opportunities as countless companies make the
transition to computer and other technology.  We
Importance of Computer
Skills and Training
Computer and Internet Usage at Businesses in Kentucky
Uses of the Internet and/or Business Web Site
TABLE 2
All Manuf. Service On Internet On Internet
Firms Firms Firms 1 Year or Less Over 1 Year
E-mail 68.4% 78.5% 58.9% 53.2% 89.4%
Marketing/promotion of
products and services 43.1 47.7 32.6 32.0 58.1
Online commerce/sales 12.3 13.1 7.8 8.4 17.5
Information/data searches 69.2 73.1 67.4 58.1 85.0
Advertised business on 10.6 11.3 10.1 9.8 11.7
Internet (besides on
own web site)
Total Firms 367 133 129 133 160
Note: Firms could check more than one response.
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asked Kentucky businesses to indicate how important
computer skills are when they hire new employees.
Table 3 shows the results of this question and
demonstrates that Kentucky businesses indeed place
a good deal of importance in new employees’
computer skills.  About 34 percent of businesses said
that computer skills are “very important” when
hiring new employees while another 31 percent said
they were “somewhat important.”  About 27 percent
said these skills were “good to have, but not
necessary” while only 8 percent of all businesses said
computer skills were “not important at all.”  These
numbers generally hold up for both manufacturing
and service firms, with service firms placing
somewhat of a greater emphasis on computer skills.
Moreover, about 38 percent of Kentucky businesses
who have been using the Internet for over  a year
said computer skills were very important when
hiring, compared to only about 28 percent of
Kentucky businesses on the Internet one year or less.
Further evidence of the importance of computer
skills is evident in the survey.  Even though many
businesses said they want new employees to have
some computer skills when they are hired, about 81
percent of businesses said that they provide
additional training to their employees on computer
skills and Internet use.  Even about 90 percent of
firms who said computer skills were “very
important” when hiring provide additional
computer and Internet training to employees.
Slightly more businesses (84 percent) who have been
using the Internet for over a year provide additional
training compared to businesses on the Internet for
a year or less (78 percent).
Another important issue concerning training of
workers is how that training is provided.  Whereas
a great deal of job training occurs in the workplace,
many firms have begun to use outside training
facilities to provide computer-related training.  In
fact, the number of businesses providing computer-
related training has increased a great deal in the past
few years and is one of the factors behind the rapid
growth in the business services industry sector.
Indeed, when asked how they provide computer
training to their employees, about 57 percent of
Kentucky businesses said they sent their employees
to outside training facilities for computer instruction
while 28 percent said they also use outside computer
training that is conducted on-site.  But about 84
percent of businesses still use in-house personnel to
provide computer, showing the continuing
importance of on-the-job training conducted by
these businesses.  Table 4 shows that these
percentages generally remain the same when we
look at manufacturing and service businesses and
at businesses who have been on the Internet for a
year or less or for over a year.
Obviously, businesses in Kentucky and
elsewhere will only use computers if they make their
business more productive than they had been before
using computers.  Several studies have documented
the increase in the use of computers at businesses
and have also shown that workers that use
computers at work tend to be more highly paid than
workers who do not use computers at work.4   Still,
some businesses may question how much
computers and the Internet actually increase
measures such as sales or productivity given the
Computer and Internet Usage at Businesses in Kentucky
Importance of Computer Skills When Hiring New Employees
TABLE 3
All Manuf. Service On Internet On Internet
Firms Firms Firms 1 Year or Less Over 1 Year
Very important 32.6% 30.2% 32.0% 28.2% 38.0%
Good to have,
but not necessary 27.8 22.2 33.6 32.3 22.1
Somewhat important 31.4 38.1 28.8 28.7 34.8
Not important at all 8.2 9.5 5.6 10.8 5.1
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Is the Internet a Productive Tool for Your Business?
TABLE 5
Training on Computer Skills at Businesses
TABLE 4
additional maintenance and upgrade costs and the
potential for employees to use computers and the
Internet for activities unrelated to work.
To see how businesses viewed the Internet in
regard to performance, we asked them whether they
considered the Internet a productive tool for their
business.  The results are shown in Table 5.
Approximately 70 percent of all businesses in the
survey said that they considered the Internet a
productive tool for their business, compared to about
22 percent who did not consider it a productive tool,
and another 8 percent who did not respond to the
question.  These numbers generally hold up when
we look at different types of businesses, with about
74 percent of manufacturing firms and 67 percent
of service firms calling the Internet productive for
their business.
As with other questions, more noticeable
differences emerge when we break down responses
based upon experience with the Internet.  Table 5
also shows the responses for those businesses who
said they maintain their own Internet web site.
About 85 percent of these businesses said that the
Internet was a productive tool for their business,
with only about 14 percent saying it was not.  When
we look at businesses who also conduct online
commerce or sales, about 93 percent of them find
the Internet a productive tool for their business.
Finally, those businesses who have been using the
Internet for a longer period of time were more likely
to find the it a useful tool for their business.  Only
about 60 percent of businesses who had been using
the Internet for one year or less said it was
productive for their business, compared to about 83
Computer and Internet Usage at Businesses in Kentucky
Conducts Using Using
All Manuf. Service Has Web Online In ternet Internet
Firms Firms Firms Site Commerce 1 Y ear or Less Over 1 Year
Yes 70.3% 73.7% 67.4% 85.0% 93.3% 59.8% 83.4%
No 22.1% 19.6% 25.6% 13.6% 4.4% 28.4 14.1%
No Response 7.6% 6.8% 7.0% 1.5% 2.2% 11.8% 2.5%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Note: Columns may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
All Manuf. Service On Internet On Internet
Firms Firms Firms 1 Year or Less Over 1 Year
Provide training to employees on
computer and Internet use 80.9% 79.0% 82.2% 77.9% 84.7%
How training is provided
Use in-house personnel
for training 84.2% 83.8% 84.9% 83.0% 85.5%
Send employees to outside
training facilities 56.9 59.1 52.8 54.7 59.4
Use outside training that is
done in-house 28.3 25.7 25.4 26.4 30.4
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percent of businesses who had been using the Internet
for over one year.
Clearly, Kentucky businesses who have been
using the Internet for a longer period of time and
who use it for more specialized purposes such as
online commerce find it a more productive tool.
Perhaps businesses with less experience using the
Internet may be less able to reap its full benefits from
the beginning because of the often substantial
startup and training costs required.  But results here
show that businesses in Kentucky who have
maintained their use of the Internet will likely find
it a productive tool for their business.
Most businesses in Kentucky are using
computers and the Internet in the workplace.
Results of a statewide survey show that all
businesses who responded use computers in one
way or another at their workplace.  Furthermore, a
large number of Kentucky businesses have
embraced the Internet and its promise of greater
communication and widespread distribution of
information.
What will the future hold for computers and the
Internet at Kentucky businesses?  Most certainly, the
number of businesses using computer and Internet
technology will continue to increase, and these
businesses will find new and more advanced uses
for this technology.  Survey results show that the
most widespread uses of the Internet now are for
electronic mail and for searches of data and
information, which are those requiring lesser
amounts of training and investment by businesses.
But as computer use expands and the Internet
matures into a crucial resource of the business
community, more and more businesses will begin
to use it for more advanced purposes, such as
electronic commerce and marketing and promotion
of their products.  These avenues of future growth
hold perhaps the most promise for businesses using
computer technology and the Internet.
Of course, implementing and maintaining all of
this high technology will require an ever increasing
supply of skilled workers in virtually all types of
businesses.  Our survey has shown that employers
place a great importance on employees with
computer skills, and as more businesses adopt
Conclusion
Internet technologies and services, these skills will
be of even greater importance.  The importance of a
workforce skilled in these areas cannot be
understated for the future.  And if Kentucky
businesses are to achieve new levels through the use
of computers and Internet technology, then they
must be able to find and employ such highly skilled
workers.
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